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THE
AESTHETIC THEORIES
OF KANT, HEGEL, AND
SCHOPENHAUER

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SCHOPENHAUER

BY
ISRAEL KNOX



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To
THE MEMORY OF
MY MOTHER

PREFACE

THIS essay is concerned with the aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, but approximately half the book is devoted to Kant. The author has long felt that Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and Tolstoy's *What Is Art?* are the most vital works in modern aesthetic. The significance of Kant's treatise lies in the fact that it contains a precise formulation of the metaphysical and dialectical problems involved in the analysis of art, beauty, and the aesthetic experience. The merit of Tolstoy's book dwells in the fact that it contains a lucid definition of the social and moral questions that may be asked regarding art and the effect of art upon man. To assert this does not imply acceptance of either Kant's or Tolstoy's views. It simply indicates the importance and the stimulating character of their contributions to modern aesthetic.

The present essay is concerned with the problems that Kant—and Hegel and Schopenhauer—raised, and with the analysis and criticism of their answers. Hegel and Schopenhauer—like Kant—are primarily preoccupied with the metaphysical aspect of aesthetic. It has, therefore, seemed advisable to consider the theories of the three philosophers, and, for purposes of unity, to exclude from this small book the doctrines of other thinkers.

The writer has attempted to treat his theme in the light of contemporary social and philosophical thought. It is this interest in contemporary cultural issues that has prompted him to extend some of the notes into brief papers. The notes are printed at the end of the book, and the reader is advised to refer to them upon finishing a chapter or upon conclusion of the volume.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

THERE is a manifest and recurrent tendency in the history of culture to convert aesthetic into something other than itself.¹ Indeed, at various times aesthetic has been reduced to sociology or psychology or morals or metaphysics. Now to be sure there are elements in art which may be described as sociological or psychological or moral or metaphysical, precisely as sociology or psychology or morals or metaphysics is concerned with some phase of aesthetic.² The field of the artist's vision is the totality of life, and the function of art is to project, to interpret, and to elucidate human experience. The salient point to note, however, is that experience—social, moral, religious—is merely the material, the stuff, of art, and is transmuted in the *work of art* to issue as an integrated aesthetic structure of autonomous worth and significance. The stuff of art is discoverable in life; it is the entire panorama of human experience. The product and fruition of art is experience heightened, clarified, and coördinated. To trace the origin, to ascertain the character, to define the value of the beautiful in art and nature should constitute the proper purpose of the philosophy and science of aesthetic.

1. GERMAN AESTHETIC TRADITION FROM BAUMGARTEN TO KANT, HEGEL, AND SCHOPENHAUER

Oddly enough, it appears that the greater part of the history of aesthetic possesses a definitely negative trait.³ The motive which animated the writer upon aesthetic has usually been moral or metaphysical or sociological, and the theory produced frequently served as a footnote to a system. In point of fact, the very use of the word

aesthetic as the name of a special science reveals an instructive tale. By a process of semantic transformation the term *aesthetic* has lost its derogatory implications, but it was its literal meaning that Baumgarten had in mind when he defined the science of aesthetic as *scientia cognitionis sensitivae, theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis*.⁴ Although in his doctoral dissertation Baumgarten had already dealt with some problems of aesthetic, he wrote his magnum opus⁵ on the subject in 1750 in order to complete a metaphysical system in which he believed he had already accounted for the True and the Good, and now needed only to explain the Beautiful as the third term in the philosophical trinity and as an indispensable link in the Leibnizian *lex continui in natura*⁶ (which complements the *lex parsimoniae*, since nature chooses the shortest way but *non facit saltum*). Baumgarten, therefore, developed in all its ramifications the hallowed Leibniz-Wolff doctrine of the beautiful as perfection apprehended through the senses, that is, as the perfection of confused cognition as such—⁷ *perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis* (in Leibnizian language as clear but not distinct, in modern terminology as sensuous-imaginative but not intellectual-conceptual cognition),⁸ and of art as beauty superimposed upon an intellectual concept. Baumgarten's notion of aesthetic illustrates very nicely one of the above-mentioned reductions. It substitutes for the *metaphysics of aesthetic*—that is, for the careful analysis of the *ens* and the *essentia* of the fine arts and of the beautiful—a *metaphysical aesthetic*—that is, a theory of the beautiful in art and nature dictated by the exigencies of a cherished philosophical system. The source of the metaphysics of aesthetic—as Aristotle so truly said about metaphysics in general—is a feeling of wonder, and its consummation is an achievement of wisdom. A metaphysical aesthetic, in contradistinction, is often a prop for

frozen, dogmatic certainties and is at once the cause and consequence of spiritual myopia.⁹

It is a far cry from the callow "system" of Baumgarten to the subtle and stirring philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Yet there is a perceptible continuity of tradition from Baumgarten to these titans of German speculative thought in their approach to aesthetic.¹⁰ It is of paramount importance to keep in mind this distinction between a metaphysics of aesthetic and a metaphysical aesthetic in the consideration of the theories of the beautiful in art and nature propounded by Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The pervasive metaphysical character of German aesthetic has long been recognized and has, for one thing, provoked the vehement denunciations of Véron¹¹ and Tolstoy.¹² Lately Professor Martin Schütze¹³ has written an incisive and constructive critique of the dialectical-absolutistic method in German post-Kantian aesthetic.

2. THE OBJECT OF THIS ESSAY

The object of the following essay is not merely to maintain the thesis that the aesthetic of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer was metaphysical, that is to say, was ancillary to the *Grundlagen* of their systems. The purpose of the essay is to substantiate this view by scrutinizing the aesthetic doctrines of these thinkers, by disentangling the metaphysical threads in their doctrines, and by determining to what extent these presuppositions aided or impeded them in the development and formulation of a clear, cogent, and salutary philosophy of art and beauty. Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer were, of course, philosophers of the first order, and, inevitably, there are bound to be nuggets of truth in their theories which must be perceived by all students of aesthetic. It is, hence, essential not only to point out in what sense their aesthetic is colored (and

vitiated) by anterior and extraneous metaphysical interests, but also in what manner it is vitally and profoundly concerned with the *metaphysics* of art and beauty. The unity of the following essay, therefore, is not dependent upon the unity of aesthetic thought in Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The unity of the essay is derived from its aim and methodology.

It seems to the writer that while all these philosophers made some momentous contributions to aesthetic theory, yet their fundamental postulates and their grand final deductions were conditioned by the inexorable logic of their metaphysics and not inspired and elicited by the objective nature of art and beauty as such, as in *rerum natura*. Kant wrote his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* in order to find in the Judgment a mediating link between the Understanding and the Reason; and in the beauty of objects and in the teleology of organisms, a bridge to span the gulf between the realms of nature and freedom, between the spheres of science and metaphysics. Hegel's definition of art as the sensuous presentation of the Idea (sharing its content with religion and philosophy but differing from them in form) was necessitated by his metaphysical Dialectic. According to this metaphysical Dialectic which identifies the *method* of triadic synthesis with the *processes* of reality (that is, equates logic with life), art is a moment in the self-unfolding, in the temporal forward-march of Spirit. Finally, Schopenhauer exalted aesthetic experience as a pure will-less contemplation of the eternal Platonic Ideas because he believed it provided an interlude in the transition from the empire of Maya to the temple of Nirvana.

What were the consequences, in the case of each philosopher, of these antecedently determined *demands* upon aesthetic? ¹⁴ It led Kant to build an aesthetic upon a basis of paradoxes, that is to say, to posit an aesthetic judgment

that is universally valid and yet subjective, that manifests a purposiveness without purpose, that exhibits a necessity which is exemplary but not apodictic. It compelled him to speak of a pleasure which is abstract, of a beauty which is "free" and devoid of content, and of a sublime which is a violation of form in nature. It involved Hegel in a bifurcation between content and form and in the mazes of the stages and types of art. It induced him to delimit art as a historical propaedeutic to philosophy and to announce its imminent death. It constrained Schopenhauer to proclaim art as a flight from life with its coercions to the Lethe-land of asceticism with its negations.

KANT'S AESTHETIC THEORY

I

THE THREE CRITIQUES

(The Critique of Judgment in the Context of Kant's
Philosophy)

IN the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant¹ reveals the motive which actuated him to write the book. It appears that he intended to effect a synthesis between the Understanding and the Reason by means of the Judgment. He had, apparently, long felt the necessity for bridging the "immeasurable gulf . . . between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the super-sensible realm of the concept of freedom" (p. 13).

1. THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant undertook to clarify the conception of a natural order. Hume had derived the categories from experience (or, more accurately, had regarded the categories as synthetic judgments originating in mere habit and custom, and, consequently, devoid of objective metaphysical validity). Kant meant to derive the categories from the Understanding (*Verstand*) in its pristine purity antecedent to experience. In the *Prolegomena* he says: "I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding."² Kant's problem was to show how judgments can be at once synthetic and a priori (Leibniz's assertion that thought alone determines the conditions to which experience must conform was based on the assumption that the fundamental principles of experience are *analytic*). Now, in Kant's view, Theoretic

Reason achieves knowledge in a process that involves three moments: (i) the combination of sensations into perceptual intuitions (*Anschauungen*) by the Imagination under the forms of time and space; (ii) the synthetic unification of intuitions into conceptual judgments of phenomena according to the a priori categories, that is, the logical forms, of the Understanding; and finally, (iii) the arrangement and coördination of the judgments of natural experience into a cosmological system under a series of universal *regulative* Ideas (the function of *Vernunft* in the narrow sense of the term). In the first *Critique* Kant dichotomizes the universe into two distinct and disparate spheres: on the one hand, he gives us a physical, a spatio-temporal, a phenomenal world; on the other hand, he suggests a metaphysical, a supersensible, a noumenal world—the home of the thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*). As with Plato,³ Kant's dualism is both ontological and epistemological, and, in the *Preface* to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says quite explicitly: “. . . though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to *think* them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.”⁴ The phenomenal realm constitutes the province of science and is ruled by the Theoretic Reason grounded in necessity; the noumenal realm is the spacious empyrean of morality and is governed by the Practical Reason (the Will) rooted in freedom.

2. THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant endeavored to substantiate the moral order which he adumbrated in the first *Critique*. In fact, he is now resolutely striving to shed light upon the baffling problems extruded from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and he believes he has succeeded—

in an impartial and disinterested manner—in establishing the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God as inferences from the fundamental principle of morality. The moral law, “Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation,”⁵ is a categorical imperative, an absolute and unconditional command. It must be venerated for its own sake, and, patently, its unqualified fulfillment is contingent upon the freedom of the will “positively considered . . . as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world.”⁶ No theoretical proof for the freedom of the will can be adduced, but it is a postulate of the moral law. Its pragmatic basis is impregnable: *thou canst, for thou oughtest*. Now the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is *holiness*, and is a state no rational being can attain during his existence in the sensible world (“. . . it is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the moral law”).⁷ It is consequently necessary to assume as a second postulate of the moral law, the immortality of the soul and the possibility of its progress *in infinitum*. But the promise and possibility of an infinite moral progress consummating in holiness, elicits and justifies the belief in a happiness proportionate to such progress. The existence of God, the affirmation of a cause adequate to the effect, is therefore the third postulate “as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*”⁸—the state of supreme holiness and commensurate happiness. Kant thought that he had solved the arcana of the first *Critique* by means of the three postulates of the Pure Practical Reason. (Kant defines a postulate as “a theoretical proposition not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law”).⁹ This a priori moral law cannot be dissevered from the moral nature of man. It is the compelling and inalienable object of his will.

3. THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant sought to complete his philosophic structure by establishing the compatibility between the natural and the moral order. The third *Critique* deals with what lies between the true and the good, and, thus, eliminates the anacoluthon evident in the passage from the first to the second *Critique*. It provides a nexus for the spheres of science and metaphysics, necessity and freedom, phenomena and noumena. The Judgment is intermediate between the Understanding and Reason as the feeling of pleasure or pain is intermediate between the faculties of cognition and desire. It is *reflective* and does not subsume particulars under universals. Unlike the Understanding, it does not possess its own a priori categories whereby it *determines* objects. It is concerned with particulars which are given to it and for which it has to discover the proper universal. In order to be able to find the suitable universal, the reflective Judgment is in need of a principle or law of unity as a guide, and *teleology* is the principle which it arrogates to itself. As such the reflective Judgment is *regulative* and has no special realm. It is not constitutive of experience and does not yield any definite knowledge about objects; it suggests the necessary conditions for viewing them. It is concerned with the purposive adaptation of nature to ends—a purposiveness which enables us to regard nature in her discrete multiplicity as an ordered and harmonious whole. But the purposiveness of nature is not inherent. It is a purposiveness which the reflective Judgment ascribes to itself as if nature in all her diversity had had a unity imposed upon her by an Understanding.

The *Critique of Judgment* is divided into a critique of *aesthetical* and a critique of *teleological* Judgment. The pleasure in an aesthetic judgment and the pleasure in a

teleological judgment are different, and yet in both cases the pleasure flows from the perception of purposive connections—a purposiveness which is neither logical nor practical but psychological and affective. In both cases the mind is absorbed in its own processes, enjoys its own subjective harmony, and is not concerned with the definition of the object. The pleasure which the reflective Judgment occasions is derived from the *reflection* upon the processes of the mind (from the play of representations in an aesthetic judgment and from the play of concepts in a teleological judgment).¹⁰ In an aesthetic judgment the feeling of pleasure is the predicate—and it is pleasure produced by the mere reflection upon the form of an object. The form of a thing (the quality conducive to intellectual apprehension as distinct from its matter, which is the object of sensation) is judged to be purposive when it is adapted to the contemplating subject without the intervention of an end or a reflective idea. In the *aesthetic* contemplation of a flower or a sunset, for example, the pleasure is solely derived from the perception of the harmony of the Imagination and the Understanding in the apprehension of the form of an object (its shape, delineation, arrangement or pattern)¹¹ without the mediation of a reflective idea as to its function, utility, or perfection—that is, as to what it *ought* to be. The purposiveness of the aesthetic object lies in its adaptability to the cognitive faculties. In a teleological judgment the predicate is a relation to the concept of an end which precedes and contains the ground of the end, and is therefore productive of interest in the fitness and utility (the external objective purposiveness), or perfection (the internal objective purposiveness) of the object. The form of the object is judged to be purposive when it is adapted to the end immanent in its existence. In the teleological judgment of an organism, for example, there seems to issue, from the miracle of the reciprocal causality be-

tween the parts and the whole, from the wonder of its coördination of functions, the concept of an end, purpose, or plan internally directed and realized. "In such a product of nature"—Kant tells us—"every part not only exists *by means* of the other parts, but is thought as existing *for the sake of* the others and the whole . . ." (p. 277). This is the basis of his distinction between nature's Technic (her purposive operation) and her Mechanism: "No finite Reason . . . can hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes" (p. 326). Teleological interest is concerned with the fulfillment of expectation of purpose in nature, that is, with the eternal recurrent discovery of inherent design in organisms. A teleological judgment, therefore, is conceptual and refers beyond our mental processes to an object which has an independent existence. In the teleological judgment the predicate is at once a subjective feeling of purposiveness and an objective teleological process, that is to say, the teleology is not merely exhausted in our sense of subjective harmony, but is rooted in nature. But, strictly speaking, this teleological aspect of nature is only a mode of human consideration, a way of looking at things; it is an arrogation of the reflective Judgment. Man cannot penetrate to the meaning of things behind the veil, although "by the example that nature gives us in its organic products we are justified, nay, called upon, to expect of it and of its laws nothing that is not purposive on the whole" (p. 284). Teleological judgments are true, but their truth is that of Reason and not of science. A teleological judgment is regulative and is not grounded, like a scientific judgment about an object, in sense-perception. It is a guide in the labyrinth of nature and clarifies our attitude toward those laws and aspects of nature which cannot be mechanically explained and empirically verified. Kuno Fischer sums the matter up by remarking that in our observation of phenomena, "we

judge their *forms* aesthetically and their *life* teleologically." ¹²

It is then in the notion of purposiveness—formal and subjective in an aesthetic judgment, real and objective in a teleological judgment—that Kant felt he had found the “mediating link” between the natural and the moral order. He did not doubt that the reflective Judgment—combining the unity of Reason and the diversity of the Understanding—really effected a synthesis between them. To grasp this fact is, indeed, to be able to find orientation in the paradoxes and complexities of the *Critique of Judgment*. The following passage indicates that this thought was uppermost in Kant’s mind:

Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom; so that no transition is possible from the first to the second (by means of the theoretical use of Reason), just as if they were two different worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the second, yet the second is *meant* to have an influence upon the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity to law of its form, at least harmonises with the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of freedom—there must, therefore, be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other (pp. 13–14).

And again:

The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept (of the purposiveness of nature) fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and

that of the concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling (pp. 41-42).

Like Isaac, who declared in his blindness and perplexity, "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau,"¹³ Kant avers that the objects of nature are phenomenal but that their apparent design, harmony, and purposiveness are noumenal (or, more precisely, quasi-noumenal).¹⁴ It did not occur to Kant that he was perpetuating the lacuna between the natural and the ideal realm. It was not possible for Kant, without invalidating the essential premises of his entire philosophical system, to abolish completely the "immeasurable gulf" and to proclaim the continuity in nature from the physical to the spiritual.

II

THE FOUR DETERMINATIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL

KANT proceeds to develop the theory of the beautiful by imposing four determinations upon the judgment of Taste. He surveys the aesthetic judgment from the viewpoints of quality, quantity, relation, and modality. His dominant motive throughout is to distinguish the beautiful from the scientific as well as from the moral and practical. In the apprehension of the beautiful—Kant repeatedly urges—pleasure is induced without the mediation of a concept and without the incitement of desire.

Kant's four moments merit grave consideration. It is not possible to grasp their significance and to understand their implications without bearing in mind his imperious metaphysical purpose. It is therefore necessary to examine carefully the postulates and deductions of the four moments.

1. THE FIRST MOMENT

According to *quality*, the judgment of Taste (that is, the pleasure which constitutes its predicate) is *disinterested*.

The first moment is apparently directed against the empiricists who emphasized the primacy of sense-qualities in the aesthetic experience. According to the empirical tradition the special faculty that deals with beauty (and, in the case of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, also with morals) is *taste*. It is rooted in pain and pleasure and judges directly by evoking sensuous satisfaction without the intrusion of intellectual analysis and without reference to formal ele-

ments and criteria. Kant was acquainted with Burke's theory of the beautiful and sublime (based on a sensationalistic psychology that identified the sublime with the vast, the terrible, and the obscure which arouse the instinct of self-preservation, and the beautiful with the smooth, the small, and the delicate which evoke a feeling of love and tenderness). He was cognizant of Hume's conception of aesthetic pleasure (as sensuous, subjective, and relative). Burke had written: ". . . sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty should be smooth and polished . . . light and delicate; the great ought to be solid, and even massive."¹⁵ In the *Treatise of Human Nature*¹⁶ Hume said: "... beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as, either by the *primary constitution* of our nature, by *custom*, or by *caprice*, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. . . . Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence." In the essay entitled *The Sceptic*, Hume stated: "... beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in a particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution of that mind." And finally, in a footnote, he added: "Were I not afraid of appearing too philosophical, I should remind my reader of that famous doctrine, supposed to be fully proved in modern times, 'That tastes and colours, and all other sensible qualities, be not in the bodies, but merely in the senses. The case is the same with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice.'"

In opposition to the sensationalists, Kant draws a sharp line of demarcation between *sensation* and *feeling*. He defines sensation as an objective representation of sense, and feeling as that which remains subjective and does not represent an object. He says: "The green colour of the meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, as a perception

of an object of sense; the pleasantness of this belongs to *subjective* sensation by which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling . . ." (p. 49). *Interest* is, accordingly, pleasure obtained from the idea of the existence of an object, and it may be affirmed of the pleasant that it does not merely *please*, but that it *gratifies*.

The beautiful differs also from the good. The good as the object of Will (a faculty of desire determined by Reason) always presupposes a concept of what the thing ought to be. Indeed, to will something and to have an interest in its existence are synonymous. As for the beautiful there is no need to have a concept of it in order to know what sort of thing the object ought to be, for "flowers, free delineations, outlines intertwined with one another without design and called foliage, have no meaning, depend on no definite concept, and yet they please" (p. 50).

In brief, the judgment of Taste is contemplative, is indifferent to the existence of the object, and merely compares the representation of the object with the feeling of pleasure or pain. The contemplation of the judgment of Taste is an apprehension and neither its source nor its end is a reflective idea. It is therefore not a judgment of cognition, that is, it is not logical but aesthetical, "by which we understand that whose determining ground can be *no other than subjective*" (p. 45). Kant sums up the first moment: "*Taste* is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an *entirely disinterested* satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called *beautiful*" (p. 55).

The notion that the disinterestedness characteristic of the apprehension and the appreciation of the beautiful constitutes one of its *fundamenta differentionis* was not wholly novel with Kant, although no one before him treated it with such consistency and with such dialectical skill and precision. Mendelssohn somewhat before Kant

and Schopenhauer after Kant were deeply concerned with the problem. Mendelssohn had already written: "We contemplate the beautiful in nature and in art, without the least motion of desire, with pleasure and satisfaction. It appears the rather to be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our possession, and even though we be never so far removed from desire to put it to our use."¹⁷ Mendelssohn, of course, was formulating an obvious truism. It remained for Kant—in the *Critique of Judgment*—to define the metaphysical nature and to formulate the dialectical implications of the disinterested pleasure felt in the aesthetic experience by discriminating nicely between the pleasure in the beautiful and the pleasure in the *pleasant* and the *good*. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* he deals again with this issue: ". . . the pleasure, which is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the object, and which, therefore, is at bottom not a pleasure in the existence of the object of the representation, but clings to the representation only, may be called mere contemplative pleasure or *passive satisfaction*. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we call *taste*."¹⁸ It is this Kantian doctrine of aesthetic contemplation as wholly emancipated from all interest and desire that became the essence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of art: "If . . . a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things . . . if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the *what* . . . he is *pure*, will-less, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge*."¹⁹ As an instance of its influence on contemporary thought, the following citation from Professor Alexander's recent book, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, may be offered: "The beautiful as that which satisfies an impulse become contemplative is disinterested. . . . In essence the beautiful is shareable, even though it makes no claim to

be such, because it is not personal and practical. This feature has been unquestionable ever since Kant first made it plain." ²⁰ Lipps, too, approaches Kant closely in his sharp and clear distinction between practical and aesthetic empathy. In the *Asthetik* he says: "Empathy is practical when it is concerned with the reality of what is felt; aesthetic empathy, on the contrary, is not so concerned. (Praktisch ist die Einfühlung, die nach der Wirklichkeit des Eingefühlten fragt; ästhetisch dagegen diejenige, die darnach nicht fragt). . . . Aesthetic empathy is empathy under the condition of pure aesthetic contemplation." ²¹

Kant's analysis of the disinterestedness of the judgment of Taste is subtle and ingenious, but there is an elusiveness, an element of unreality about it. He divorces the aesthetic experience from all content and meaning and transforms it into a "no-man's-land" of detached and abstract feeling. His sole concern seems to be to establish the identity of the aesthetic judgment with pure subjective feeling, but feeling—in contrast to the empiricists—dissociated from *sensation*, and also from the socio-ethical problems of life. In a sense Kant builds his entire metaphysical aesthetic upon the basis of the first moment. "In order to decide"—he tells us—"whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation, not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition but, by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the Understanding) to the subject, and its feeling of pleasure or pain" (p. 45). This "no-man's-land" of virginal feeling is endowed (in the remaining moments) with a universality that is subjective, with a purposiveness that is without purpose, with a necessity that is not apodictic. This seems paradoxical but it was precisely in the paradoxical nature of the Judgment of Taste that Kant thought he had discovered its value as a "mediating link" between the phenomenal and the noumenal realm and as sustaining a sort of *lex continui* in his metaphysical system.

It is not strange that Kant should have made *disinterestedness* the *sine qua non* of aesthetic contemplation. *Disinterestedness* is liberation from *interest*, and *interest* is pleasure dependent upon the idea of the phenomenal existence of an object. *Disinterestedness* is freedom from the preoccupation with the phenomenal aspects of objects whose *locus* is nature but whose apparent purposiveness is noumenal and hence "promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling" (p. 42).

The doctrine of disinterestedness cannot be dismissed lightly. It is central and crucial in modern aesthetic and it is not requisite—in repudiation of Kant—to discard it wholly. It is not intrinsic to the concept of disinterestedness that art and beauty be cut off from their roots in reality. It is possible, indeed it is necessary, to discover a deep and substantial relationship between beauty and existence, between art and life—a relationship in which art and beauty are neither subservient to an extraneous concept nor degraded to function as a source of fleeting delight, of sensuous and evanescent pleasure. Thus, Professor Dewey points out what is true in the notion of disinterestedness: "Taken at its best, that is to say, with a liberal interpretation, contemplation designates that aspect of perception in which elements of seeking and of thinking are subordinated (although not absent) to the perfecting of the process of perception itself. To define the emotional element of esthetic perception merely as the pleasure taken in the act of contemplation, independent of what is excited by the matter contemplated, results, however, in a thoroughly anaemic conception of art. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would exclude from esthetic perception most of the subject-matter that is enjoyed in the case of architectural structures, the drama, and the novel, with all their attendant reverberations. Not absence of desire and thought but their thorough incor-

poration into perceptual experience characterizes esthetic experience, in its distinction from experiences that are especially 'intellectual' and 'practical.'" ²²

Contemplative and *disinterested* aesthetic experience entails an intense and compelling interest in the subject matter of art and beauty. It was a gleam of this truth that Shelley caught in these precious and memorable words: "The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively. . . . Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination." ²³ And it was a light that Keats saw as time went on more and more steadily and clearly. He spoke very often of the selflessness of the poet (using the very word *disinterestedness*) in the act of imaginative identification with the object of his lucid contemplation. In a letter he wrote: "A poet is the most unpoetical of anything in existence; because he has no Identity—he is continually in for, and filling, some other Body. The sun, the moon, the sea, and men and women, who are creatures of impulse, are poetical, and have about them an unchangeable attribute; the poet has none, no identity." ²⁴ It lay at the heart of Matthew Arnold's philosophy of art and criticism. It was his belief in the *disinterestedness* of poetic vision that prompted him to proclaim: "In poetry . . . the spirit of our race will find . . . its consolation and stay . . . let our minds rest upon that great and inexhaustible word *life*, until we learn to enter into its meaning." ²⁵ And finally, while Guyau vigorously criticized Kant's depleted notion of *disinterestedness* since he felt that beauty stimulates our vitality in its three phases of sensation, intelligence, and volition, he yet wrote: "But the essence of poetic and artistic genius (*mais le propre du génie poétique et artistique*) consists in being able to divest oneself not only

of the external circumstances which surround it but of the inward conditions of education, the convergence of the facts of birth and of moral situation, even of sex and of good qualities or of faults which have been acquired." ²⁶

Now Kant was thinking of disinterestedness in the apprehension of the beautiful in nature. Shelley, Keats, Arnold, and Guyau are speaking primarily of disinterestedness in the artistic process and in artistic appreciation. But surely there is a common element in the contemplation of the beautiful in art and nature. Aesthetic disinterestedness as conceived by Shelley, Keats, Arnold, and Guyau, is a triumphant apprehension of the inmost qualities of life and nature, of art and beauty. Such aesthetic experience involves, as Kant failed to realize, the totality of personality—sense, emotion, imagination, intellect—and consummates in clarity, comprehension, and imaginative sympathetic vision. To break the continuity in man from the natural to the ideal, and between man and his environment is to shatter the unity of the self with its emotional, cognitive, and volitional phases and to demolish the possibility of interaction between man and his world. If the error of the empiricists lay in their emphasis upon the primacy of sense-qualities in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of formal elements and intellectual criteria, Kant's fallacy consists in his exclusive definition of beauty in terms of an abstract relation—that is, a relation between the cognitive faculties (the Imagination and the Understanding), and the form (the shape, delineation or composition—as distinct from the matter) of an object.

Imaginative experience, however, is real and concrete, and differs from "ordinary" experience in its freedom from incidental and extraneous factors. It is concentrated and complete and is the integration of impulse, emotion, sensation, thought, volition flowing from, and leading to, an unimpeachable comprehension of reality. It is not a

"double life" that man has, and reality cannot be cut asunder into an "actual" and an "imaginative" sphere.²⁷ Aesthetic experience, imaginative experience (creative and appreciative), is the intensification and elucidation of life and is the gratification of a need, the response to a stimulus and an interest, in the fullest sense, and on the highest level of life. The reality of art is enchanted and has almost the glamor of magic about it, but it is reality. What more substantial evidence of this truth can be offered than the testimony of sensitive and profoundly intelligent lovers of art. In one of his letters Keats wrote (he is speaking of a painting): "It is a wonderful picture, when West's age is considered; but there is nothing to be intense upon, no women one feels mad to kiss, no face swelling into reality. The excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship with Truth and Beauty."²⁸ Jane Harrison confesses with an almost religious ecstasy: "There is in the Acropolis Museum at Athens an archaic woman's figure, to look at which is to me all but unbearable. The reality behind her face . . . seems just about to break loose, utter itself and the tension is overmuch."²⁹

This is aesthetic experience—the apprehension and contemplation of the beautiful in art and nature: dawns and sunsets, light and half-light and darkness, flowering fields and snowy peaks, sparkling waters and fluttering leaves; and men and women on their brief day of sunlight loving, laughing, rejoicing, lamenting, suffering, and dreaming. It is impersonal and detached from partial and fragmentary emotion, from beclouded moral certainties. It is born of a poignant, an almost unbearable sensitivity for life and beauty and it leads to the "fellowship with essence,"³⁰ to the redeeming identification with the "giant agony"³¹ of mankind. It is in this sense, and in this sense only, that the aesthetic experience, creative and appreciative, is dis-

interested, that Santayana's assertion that "beauty . . . cancels lust"³² is to be interpreted. In the aesthetic contemplation of art and nature trivial and egoistic interests vanish, the soul is lifted upon the wings of love and comprehension, and the mind attains possession of the truth and beauty of things, of the *signatura rerum*. Inevitably, the consummation of a genuine aesthetic experience is an inner reconciliation, is a healing peace and serenity. But once more it must be asseverated that this peace and serenity are not the symptoms of socio-ethical nonchalance and acquiescence. They are the indicators of a mental state of composure, of an emotional-intellectual-volitional equilibrium with reference to the insistent problems and exigencies of life. It is a call in the dawn to life, clear, confident, melodious, after a night of doubt, hesitancy, longing.

2. THE SECOND MOMENT

According to quantity "*the beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction*" (p. 55).

The second moment seems to be directed against the intellectualists. Kant says that the beautiful affords a universal satisfaction, but he stresses that the beautiful is the object of a universal satisfaction *apart from concepts*. The Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten school regarded the beautiful as a confused perfection, that is, as perfection apprehended through the senses, and art as beauty superimposed upon a concept. It was thus that Baumgarten insisted upon the distinction between an *oratio perfecta sensitiva* (a perfected sensuous utterance) and an *oratio perfecte sensitiva* (an utterance altogether—*omnino*—sensuous). In his doctoral dissertation Baumgarten wrote concerning poetry: "Ideas which can be distinctly conceived, and which are adequate and perfect, are not sensuous and, consequently, not poetical. Since clear or vivid ideas are poetical, but

distinct ideas are not, it is only confused [i.e., sensuous] but vivid ideas which are poetical.”³³ In the *Aesthetics* he stated: “So aesthetic truth, which should rather be called probability, is that grade of truth, which, though not carried to complete certainty, yet contains no obvious falsehood.”³⁴ Kant maintains the universality of the aesthetic judgment; but avers that it is subjective and divested of specific conceptual meaning.³⁵ He derives this from the first moment, which explained the beautiful as an object of disinterested satisfaction. The disinterestedness of the satisfaction indicates that it is not based on any inclination of the subject or on any interest, and consequently, it must be grounded on what may be presupposed in all men. In the first *Critique* Kant conferred fundamental importance upon the synthetic a priori judgments, and in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* an analogous function is fulfilled by the universally valid and communicable satisfaction involved in the reflection upon the form of an object *apart* from scientific or moral concepts. In the judgment of Taste, the a priori universal rule does not consist in the pleasure, but in the subjective universal validity of the pleasure obtained in the perception of the free, spontaneous accordance of the form of an object with our faculties of cognition, that is, in the perception of the purposive adaptation of an object to a contemplating subject.³⁶ Kant writes: “It is an empirical judgment [to say] that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is an a priori judgment [to say] that I find it beautiful, i.e., I attribute this satisfaction necessarily to every one” (p. 165). In the second *Critique* Kant draws a similar distinction between a maxim and a law: “Practical Principles are . . . subjective, or *Maxims*, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical *laws*, when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, as valid for the will of every rational being.”³⁷ And again:

"A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only." ³⁸

The universality of aesthetic satisfaction serves once more to differentiate it from the merely pleasant. The gratification afforded by the pleasant is sensuous, subjective, and hence *individual*. It is futile to deny—Kant believes—that everyone has his own taste (of Sense). In this context it is right to affirm: *de gustibus non disputandum est*.³⁹ Kant says: ". . . to one violet colour is soft and lovely, to another it is faded and dead. One man likes the tone of wind instruments, another that of strings" (p. 57). Kant concedes that there are rules regarding the pleasant but they are empirical and comparative and not a priori and universal. The rules governing a judgment of the taste (of Sense) are rooted in *sociability*, as when we say that a man knows how to entertain his guests in a pleasant manner. The universality of an aesthetic judgment implies that the judging of the object is *anterior* to the pleasure in it. Otherwise, the pleasure in the aesthetic experience would be identical with the pleasantness in sensation and would retain only private efficacy, that is, would be dependent on the representation through which the object is given. Kant thinks that this is the very key to the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. He asserts, therefore, that the judging of the object is the ground of the pleasure which is obtained from the perception of the harmony of the powers of cognition and hence is *posterior* to the act of judgment. The universality of the satisfaction is based on the universality of the subjective conditions for judging of objects.

The beautiful is distinguished from the pleasant and coincides with the good in the universal validity of its satisfaction, yet there is an important difference between

them. The good—Kant reiterates—is always represented as the object of a universal satisfaction by means of a reflective idea to which it must conform, while the judgment of Taste takes place without the intervention of a mandatory moral concept.

Kant sums up the second moment: “The *beautiful* is that which pleases universally without a concept” (p. 67).

Kant’s doctrine of the universality of aesthetic satisfaction is quite as abstract and as purged of valid import as is his doctrine of disinterestedness. The universal satisfaction does not flow from the concrete beautiful object in nature and in art. Kant is constrained to admit the possibility, nay, the necessity, of speaking of beauty as if it were a quality of the thing contemplated, as if it had an *objective* reference, but he circumspectly adds that beauty is really aesthetical, that is, “involves merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject” (p. 56).⁴⁰ In the explanation of beauty he cannot avoid assigning to the aesthetic judgment objective truth, but he hastens to emphasize that the *Beurtheilung* (judgment) in a *Geschmacksurtheil* (judgment of Taste) is emancipated from scientific or moral concepts as to type or end, as to utility or purpose. Kant does not divine—for he himself is guilty of the rationalistic fallacy in his consideration of art and therefore excludes it from the domain of *pure* beauty—that meaning is *implicit* in the beautiful object and *immanent* in the work of art.

Similarly, there is an element of truth in Kant’s insistence that the pleasure in the aesthetic experience is *posterior* to the act of aesthetic judgment. But the pleasure he is speaking of is arid and inane: it is a satisfaction that springs from the perception of the harmony of the cognitive faculties in the aesthetic apprehension of the form of an object. It is formal and hollow, and has no relation to the object, to the actual content of the beautiful in art

and in nature. Kant was unable to discern that the aesthetic experience is an apprehension of the qualitative in art and in nature and is replete with *appropriate* emotion (as Aristotle had already known). This emotion cannot be separated from the quality of the object apprehended. It pervades the entire aesthetic experience: the subject-matter of the beautiful, the beholder, and the process of contemplation.

Kant's doctrine of the universality of the aesthetic judgment is based on the universality of the subjective conditions for judging of objects.⁴¹ It is formal and a priori, and, like the theoretical cognition of objects, is mechanical and automatically completed behind the curtains. It does not take place in the sunlight of thought, of understanding. The universality of an aesthetic judgment is not postulated but merely imputed to everyone. It is not a universality in depth, a universality of value and insight, achieved by spiritual effort. It is not the product of emotional-intellectual growth and enrichment. The categories of Kant are not culture-categories, socio-educational instruments and consummations. Kant rightly affirms that all mankind possesses a capacity for the appreciation of the beautiful, and he defines this capacity in terms of his own metaphysics. But the universality of the aesthetic experience must be construed in terms of the integration of sense, emotion, and thought in the apprehension of the qualitative aspects of nature—in interaction *with* nature. In the *Sense of Beauty* Santayana tells us that "If our appreciation were less general, it might be more real, and if we trained our imagination into exclusiveness, it might attain to character."⁴² Granting the universality of the psychological and moral capacity for aesthetic appreciation, it is yet true that the scope, variety, and intensity of aesthetic appreciation are no easy achievements (as Tolstoy with his insistence upon the *immediate* universal accessibility of art failed to divine).

It is a precious possession. It involves vision and intelligence. Keats wrote to his brother: "Do you not see how necessary a world of pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a Soul?"⁴³ Kant was not concerned with the intensification of aesthetic appreciation, with the socio-empirical implications of art and beauty. His interest lay in a neat metaphysical scheme, in a nicely arranged table of once-for-all completed a priori categories.

3. THE THIRD MOMENT

According to *relation* "*the judgment of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)*" (p. 69).

In a logico-scientific judgment knowledge of an object is gained by means of the a priori categories of the Understanding. In an aesthetic judgment the beautiful object is perceived as exhibiting a purposiveness without purpose, that is to say, a purposiveness without the representation of an end, without a concept of its nature. In the expression *purposiveness without purpose* (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*) Kant wants to say that it is the form of purposiveness of an object which affords the satisfaction that is universally communicable without the aid of a reflective idea, and that, consequently, there can be a union of the Imagination and the Understanding in a judgment of taste that is *not* cognitive. In this judgment a concept is present, but it is the general concept of the agreement of the form of an object with the cognitive faculties—that is to say, a sort of cognition takes place in which the Understanding participates but is not determined by definite concepts. The adaptation of the object to the contemplating subject merely indicates an *inner causality* in the subject as regards *cognition in general* without being confined to any specific condition. Kant says: "This pleasure is in no way practical, neither like that arising from the pathological ground of

pleasantness, nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But yet it involves causality, viz. of *maintaining* the state of the representation itself, and the exercise of the cognitive powers without further design" (p. 71).

Now if the relation between the aesthetic object and the contemplating subject is one of purposiveness without purpose, it follows that aesthetic pleasure is pure, is independent of the charm of sensation or the feeling of emotion. Kant makes his usual distinction between empirical and pure judgments: "Aesthetical judgements can be divided just like theoretical (logical) judgements into empirical and pure. The first assert pleasantness or unpleasantness; the second assert the beauty of an object or of the manner of representing it. The former as judgements of Sense (material aesthetic judgements); the latter [as formal] are alone strictly judgements of Taste" (p. 73). The *green* of grass, the *scent* of a flower, the *melody* of the musical note of a violin are impure (since they are pleasant and provocative of interest) and have at their basis sensations, that is, merely the matter of representations. But the *arrangement* of colors, the *shape* of the flower, the *harmony* of the note, produce pure pleasure.

And once again the pure pleasure in the beautiful is distinguished from the pleasure in the good which "presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e., the reference of the object to a definite purpose" (p. 77).

Kant sums up the third moment: "*Beauty* is the form of the *purposiveness* of an object, so far as this is perceived in it *without any representation of a purpose*" (p. 90).

The emphasis upon the *purity* of the a priori pleasure in the beautiful leads Kant to formulate his famous distinction—which Hutcheson and Lord Kames had already suggested—between *free* and *dependent* beauty. Hutcheson had written:

Beauty is either *original* or *comparative*; or, if any like the terms better, *absolute* or *relative*. . . . We therefore by *absolute* Beauty understand only that Beauty which we perceive in objects without *comparison* to any thing external, of which the object is suppos'd an imitation, or picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the *Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems*. *Comparative* or *relative* Beauty is that which we perceive in objects, commonly considered as *Imitations* or *Resemblances* of something else.⁴⁴

Lord Kames approaches Kant more nearly:

Considering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds. The first may be termed *intrinsic* beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart without relation to any other . . . The other may be termed *relative* beauty, being founded on the relation of objects . . . Intrinsic beauty is an object of sense merely; to perceive the beauty of a spreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but singly an act of vision. The perception of relative beauty is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection; for of a fine instrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its use and destination.⁴⁵

Lord Kames's *Elements of Criticism* was translated into German in 1763, twenty-seven years before the appearance of Kant's third *Critique*, and doubtless exerted some influence upon him. Kant develops this distinction fully, and with all its dialectical corollaries, for "the judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure" (p. 81). This is a cardinal problem in aesthetic, especially in Kant, and it is worthwhile and interesting to quote at length:

There are two kinds of beauty; free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) or merely dependent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance therewith (p. 81) . . . Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly any one but a botanist knows what sort of a thing a flower ought to be; and even

he, though recognising in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no regard to this natural purpose if he is passing judgement on the flower by Taste. There is then at the basis of this judgement no perfection of any kind, no internal purposiveness, to which the collection of the manifold is referred. Many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird, the bird of paradise), and many sea-shells are beauties in themselves, which do not belong to any object determined in respect of its purpose by concepts, but please freely and in themselves. So also delineations *à la grecque*, foliage for borders or wall-papers, mean nothing in themselves; they represent nothing—no Object under a definite concept,—and are free beauties. We can refer to the same class what are called in music phantasies (i.e. pieces without any theme), and all music without words.

In the judging of a free beauty (according to the mere form) the judgement of taste is pure. There is presupposed no concept of any purpose, for which the manifold should serve the given Object, and which therefore is to be represented therein. By such a concept the freedom of the Imagination which disports itself in the contemplation of the figure would be only limited.

But human beauty (i.e. of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, or a building (be it church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse) presupposes a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; it is therefore adherent beauty. Now as the combination of the Pleasant (in sensation) with Beauty, which properly is only concerned with form, is a hindrance to the purity of the judgement of taste; so also is its purity injured by the combination with Beauty of the Good (viz. that manifold which is good for the thing itself in accordance with its purpose). We could add much to a building which would immediately please the eye, if only it were not to be a church. We could adorn a figure with all kinds of spirals and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tatooing, if only it were not the figure of a human being. And again this could have much finer features and a more pleasing and gentle cast of countenance provided it were not intended to represent a man, much less a warrior . . . (pp. 81–82).

In painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts—in architecture, and horticulture, as far as they are beautiful arts—

the *delineation* is the essential thing; and here it is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form that is fundamental for taste. The colours which light up the sketch belong to the charm; they may indeed enliven the object for sensation, but they cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful. In most cases they are rather limited by the requirements of the beautiful form; and even where charm is permissible it is ennobled solely by this (p. 75).

In the first moment Kant amplified the notion that aesthetic contemplation is dissociated from sensation and from the interest in the existence of the object. Kant is now maintaining that aesthetic pleasure accrues from the perception of the harmony of the cognitive faculties in the apprehension of the form of an object as distinct from its matter. He denies the expressiveness of sense-qualities and the role of sense in aesthetic apprehension. But as Saint Thomas had so truly said, "even sense is a sort of reason."⁴⁶ Indeed *sense* is indispensable to the apprehension of beauty. "Even sense is a sort of reason," a sort of measure and proportion, and finds in the beautiful object—in its sense-qualities—a likeness to its own nature. The form, the clarity, the spiritual significance of the beautiful thing are presented to the mind by the sensible object from which they are inseparable and in which they are apprehended. It is thus that the senses of sight and hearing are aesthetic and St. Thomas says "it is of the nature of the Beautiful that the appetite is allayed by the sight and knowledge of it"⁴⁷ (*id quod visum placet* and *id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet*). The beautiful allays and evokes the harmony—not only of the Imagination and the Understanding—but of the senses, the emotions, and the mind. It bestows peace and elicits pleasure and is a pledge of the possibility of consonance between man and nature. But if the senses, the imagination, and the mind participate in aesthetic experience, it is just to conclude that the entire experience—comprising the object, the subject, and the process of perception—is emo-

tionally pervaded. The aesthetic experience is neither a formal abstraction nor is it merely a delicately sensitized awareness.

Kant divorces aesthetic experience from sensation and emotion and goes on to say that free beauty "presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be" (p. 81). There would surely be no cause for dissidence if Kant meant to affirm the autonomy of beauty and especially of art, in respect to an external, anterior concept, that is, against such views of aesthetic as the allegorical-symbolical interpretation of beauty and the didactic-moralistic theories of art. But nothing was further from Kant's mind. By concept he meant any purpose, except the general concept of the purposive adaptation of the form of the object to the subject's faculties of cognition. Kant was led to affirm this in order to sustain the subjectivity of the aesthetic experience. He writes: "The formal [element] in the representation of a thing, i.e., the agreement of the manifold with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought to be), gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For since abstraction is made of this unity as *purpose* (what the thing ought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representation in the mind of the intuiting subject" (p. 78). Aesthetic experience offers no visions, does not reveal reality. It does not even clarify consciousness. It merely indicates the purposive attitude of the cognitive faculties to presentations. Kant believed, or thought he believed, that a building would please the eye more aesthetically, more *purely*, "if only it were not to be a church." He failed to see that a building can only please effectively when its function seems to be the expression of its architectural conception, when there appears to be a purposive adaptation between its use and its beauty. Artistic beauty and truth are achieved when content and form, experience and expression, idea and image, are harmoniously and

indissolubly blended in the total aesthetic structure, in the integrated work of art. Because of the *Grundlagen* of his Judgment of Taste, because of his metaphysics, Kant is compelled to bar the doors of the temple of *free* beauty against the freest, the most serious beauty—the beauty that reveals reality and clarifies experience and is, in the impassioned phrase of Mr. Lewisohn, “a thing of blood and tears.”⁴⁸ Kant excludes from the realm of *pure, free* beauty almost everything that is truly significant, that possesses the least vestige of meaning (human and animal beauty, portraits, sculpture, architecture, the sublime). He includes those objects which do not involve a concept of utility, of type, of a perfection that *ought* to be realized, that is, those objects which he alleges mean nothing in themselves and represent nothing (flowers, some birds, many sea-shells, drawings, free delineations). The aesthetic Judgment, he asserts, is concerned only with form—the objective element conducive to cognitive apprehension without the intervention of a concept. It is the enunciation of the most consistent, the most extreme, and the most dialectically impeccable formalism in the history of aesthetic.⁴⁹

Kant's second moment was directed against the intellectualists and his victory consisted in the establishment of the universality of the aesthetic judgment. But in the third moment it becomes clear that his was a Pyrrhic victory. The intellectualists defined beauty as the realm of confused concepts, and art as the sensuous-imaginative embodiment of a rational idea, and Kant paid an appalling price for the liberation of beauty from its bondage to the concept. He surrendered to them the fertile lands of authentic beauty and preserved for himself some mythical garden of Eden where beauty, like Adam before his “intellectualistic” fall, was supposed to live in the presence of the tree of knowledge and yet refrain from tasting of its fruit. The truth is that Kant's negation or qualification of so much beauty

and art attests that he was in essential agreement with the rationalists regarding the "fertile lands" and that he digressed from the hallowed tradition merely regarding his "garden of Eden." And he had reasons. For the "garden of Eden," as is well known, had something of earth and something of heaven in it. It was a place where Yahveh could walk in the blue and golden hour of sunset. It was, in fine, very much like Kant's aesthetic Judgment.

Kant acquiesces in the consecrated fallacy of rationalism and posits a concept alien and transcendent to art and to much of beauty. He then relegates these to the category of *dependent* beauty. Like the Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten school he cannot conceive of a work of art not being *about*, or a representation *of*, something.⁵⁰ As a lugubrious result he is led to exalt a part of beauty which he divests of meaning, and to deny aesthetic freedom and purity to that larger part which he endows with significance. He did not fathom the truth that beauty and art speak at once to the heart and to the mind, that art contains a meaning, a purpose, *immanently* and *implicitly*—a meaning which it does not illustrate or exemplify but which is its substance, its own intelligibility. As such, art is a concrete projection of experience, an interpretation of reality; as such, it extends and intensifies the field of human consciousness. Art—Professor Edman tells us—is both "an organ of vision and an object of enjoyment."⁵¹ It will commune with no one—Santayana informs us—"who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart."⁵²

4. THE FOURTH MOMENT

According to modality "the *beautiful* is that which without any concept is cognized as the object of a *necessary* satisfaction" (p. 96). The necessity of this satisfaction is not a theoretical objective necessity, for then it would be

cognized a priori that every one will feel the same pleasure in the beautiful object; nor is it a practical necessity, for then the pleasure would be the necessary result of an objective law and would show that we ought to act unconditionally in a certain way. Aesthetic satisfaction is *exemplary*, is "a necessity of the assent of *all* to a judgement which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state" (p. 91).

Kant presupposes, therefore, a *sensus communis* which makes possible the communication of the feeling for beauty. All men share in the *sensus communis* "by which we do not understand an external sense, but the effect resulting from the free play of our cognitive powers" (p. 93). It is essentially different from the Understanding which judges and communicates knowledge by means of concepts and not feeling. It is an ideal norm allowing one to make into a rule for all a judgment that agrees with it, and the satisfaction occasioned by it. Kant writes:

But under the *sensus communis* we must include the Idea of a *communal* sense, i.e., of a faculty of judgement, which in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought; in order *as it were* to compare its judgement with the collective Reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the judgement. This is done by comparing our judgement, with the possible rather than the actual judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to our own judgement. This, again, is brought about by leaving aside as much as possible the matter of our representative state, i.e., sensation, and simply having respect to the formal peculiarities of our representation or representative state . . . (p. 170).

The *sensus communis* communicates an *exemplary* satisfaction, and makes for harmony in the realm of the aesthetic

Judgment. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* the test for the conversion of a maxim into an *apodictic* moral law is its universal applicability.

Kant's *sensus communis* and his affirmation of the necessity of aesthetic pleasure lose their cogency in view of the satisfaction which he assigns to the aesthetic experience. This universally necessary and communicable satisfaction which indicates that a thing is beautiful—precisely as in the *Critique of Practical Reason* the universal applicability of a maxim is at once the sign and the sanction of its moral validity—is no more than the *effect* resulting from the spontaneous play and harmony of the faculties of cognition. It merely indicates that the psychological conditions underlying aesthetic judgments are the same in all men. It is thus, and only thus, that the Judgment of Taste has at once a subjective and yet a universally valid principle, determining what pleases or displeases by abstract feeling. The *sensus communis* does not communicate the meanings and realities of life in their experiential context and with their specific emotions and immanent values.

The doctrine of a *sensus communis*, like the conception of aesthetic disinterestedness, is important, but cannot be accepted in Kant's formulation. The light that irradiates the beautiful in nature and in art is not hidden in the dark recesses of the mind. It is more than the spark—the effect—resulting from the spontaneous accordance of the cognitive powers. Art is a source and a cause of genuine union among men and its true efficacy resides in its transmission of experience, in its widening and deepening of the field of human consciousness.

Beauty is felt and art is shared far more fully and authentically than Kant seems to discern. The flowering of art is social communication: the wafting of a vision, the revelation of an experience to humanity. Kant cannot fully do away with this problem of communication; he forbids it

to enter through the door, but permits it to flutter in through the window. He cannot deny the transmitting phase in art; he therefore attributes it to the gregarious impulse, which he describes as empirical: "That the judgement of taste by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest *as its determining ground* has been sufficiently established above. But it does not follow that after it has been given as a pure aesthetical judgement, no interest can be combined with it. . . . Empirically the Beautiful interests only in *society*. . . . A man abandoned by himself on a desert island would adorn neither his hut nor his person; nor would he seek for flowers, still less would he plant them, in order to adorn himself therewith" (pp. 173-74). Is Kant's dichotomy supportable? Is this mechanism of pure formal judgments and empirical interests justifiable? Is it not the union of the various phases of personality that consummates in that true aesthetic experience which can be enjoyed and shared? In the matrix of social life, art and beauty can have a discoverable value only when they speak the language of the human heart in a way that can be really understood and shared by many. It is in this sense that both Grosse and Hirn emerge from their anthropological studies of the origins and beginnings of art with the verdict that "an individual art . . . is . . . nowhere demonstrable," that "art appears . . . as a social manifestation,"⁵³ that "the artist's presentation needs for its completeness to be complemented by the beholder's conception of it,"⁵⁴ that "without a public—in the largest sense of the word—no art would ever have appeared."⁵⁵ The dearest quality in art to Tolstoy was its power of union—that wonder by dint of which hearts and minds estranged from each other in the artificial market places of the world are reunited in the strong and simple love of their common understanding of their common humanity.⁵⁶ It was perhaps this that Shelley had in mind when he con-

demned egotism as the colossal obstacle to the writing of good poetry and attributed all great poetry to Love.⁵⁷ Art and beauty communicate; they do more: they unite. They are a form of union in which the spirit participates. This conception of art and beauty as concrete and contagious communication solves a problem which baffled Bosanquet. He was displeased by the prevalent impression (and it is the essence of Kant's theory) that the process of contemplation is a recipient one, a passive attitude.⁵⁸ But if real infectiousness is one of the preëminent signs of the beautiful in art and nature, it appears that the contemplative process is not a vague passive effect of the harmony of the cognitive faculties, but is an active surging participation in a shareable human experience that is full of meaning and value. Kant's fourth moment posits the necessity, as his second moment asserts the universality, of the aesthetic judgment, as mechanical, as a priori, as taking place behind the scenes. It is a necessity that is formal and abstract and is not invested with content, with socio-spiritual significance.

5. ART

Kant makes some specific remarks upon the character of the beautiful in art. To begin with, art is the product of genius, and whereas "a natural beauty is a *beautiful thing*," art, or "artificial beauty, is a *beautiful representation* of a thing" (p. 193). The constituent factors of genius⁵⁹ are intellect and imagination, and genius is the capacity for representing aesthetical Ideas. And by an "aesthetical Idea"—Kant says—"I understand that representation of the Imagination which occasions much thought, without, however, any definite thought, i.e., any *concept*, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. We

easily see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of a *rational Idea*, which conversely is a concept to which no *intuition* (or representation of the Imagination) can be adequate" (pp. 197-98). The aesthetical normal Idea is an intuition of the Imagination representing the individual as an example of the entire species. It is a generic image, constructed out of many individuals. It attains its end when it represents the species correctly. The aesthetical Ideal is an intuition of the Imagination representing an individual as the most perfect embodiment of the species. It is the highest type of dependent beauty and is restricted to Man, since Man alone possesses a "supersensible substrate" and can determine his purposes in the light of Reason. The aesthetic Ideal possesses meaning and significance, both moral and intellectual, and is thereby excluded from the sphere of free beauty.

It is as the expression of aesthetic Ideas that art is play and yet directed toward the production of an object. Art is—to use Hermann Cohen's word—*Beschäftigung*; ⁶⁰ it has intention. It is not, however, directed toward the production of a sensation, or toward the definition and explanation of a concept. Art is the expression of aesthetic Ideas which contain a wealth of material for effecting an intention. Fine art is not, like science, the product of the Understanding, but of Genius, and derives its rule from aesthetic Ideas which differ from rational Ideas of determinate ends.

Art is distinguished, therefore, both from science and from handicraft. Art (as skill) differs from science as *can* from *know*, as *Technic* from *Theory* (as mensuration from geometry), as a *practical* from a *cognitive* faculty. The artist does not operate according to concepts and definite purposes. He can neither explain (even to himself) nor impart his method. Indeed, only that which cannot be performed or accomplished by one who knows all about it

conceptually, is the domain of art. And, by the same token, what can be done as soon as one knows what ought to be done and is thus aware of the desired effect, is not art.

Art differs from handicraft as the free, spontaneous purposiveness of play differs from the coercive, utilitarian purposiveness of work. Art is an occupation that is intrinsically pleasant, and work is an occupation unpleasant in itself and attractive only by virtue of an external principle—that is, economic remuneration.

There is a kinship between beautiful nature and beautiful art. Nature is beautiful when it seems to manifest the purposiveness of art. Art is beautiful when it approaches nature in its freedom from binding and definite concepts. Kant says: "Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature. For whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial beauty we can say generally: *That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of judging it* (not in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept)" (p. 187).

In speaking then of the kinship between beautiful nature and beautiful art, Kant simply means that art becomes beautiful as it approximates *eine Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*, as it is more completely enfranchised from reflective ideas, as it is more fully made merely according to rule but not according to concept. Kant is not attempting to abolish the hiatus between *Kunst und Wahrheit*, between art and life; nor is he trying to emphasize the need and significance of a logico-imaginative consistency in art, in a specific work of art. (That is the immensely vital and profound meaning of Aristotle's dictum that a tragedy must have a *beginning*, a *middle* and an *end*, and of St. Thomas's conception of *integrity* in a work of art).⁶¹ He is averse to any philosophy of art which acknowledges it to be an expression of genuine emotion and a communication

of authentic experience. But art—it must be affirmed, in contradistinction to Kant's view—is the communication of unimpeachable experience. The rationality of art is not the logic of an abstract conceptualism, of a detached analysis. It is the logic of a qualitative situation, of an imaginative experience. The integrity of the artistic product consists, so to speak, in its ontological convincingness, in its fullness of being. Absence of integrity and presence of aesthetic falsehood in a work of art indicate alike a certain intrinsic dissonance, the influence of some external consideration, or simply, lack of talent and intuition. Aesthetic integrity is wholeness, is inner fullness and qualitative consistence. It is what Professor Dewey calls in an essay on qualitative thought—"the presence of a dominant quality in a situation as a whole."⁶² In a work of art every detail—line, color, tone, word, rhythm, image, idea, incident, character—must accord with this dominant regulative quality of the whole situation, must become inwoven in the significant total aesthetic texture under the guidance and sovereignty of the imaginative reason.

6. CONCLUSION

Kant's four moments are the essence of his aesthetic theory. What final comments can be made regarding their intrinsic philosophic value and their historico-cultural importance?

a) Kant describes the aesthetic Judgment as being concerned with the formal qualities of objects, that is, with those qualities which can be apprehended in unity by the harmonious accordance of the Understanding and the Imagination without the aid of a scientific concept, without the determination of the Practical Reason, without appeal to the senses or emotions, and consummating in a feeling of pleasure flowing from the perception of this free, spontaneous agreement of the cognitive faculties and

the form of the beautiful object. Kant builds his aesthetic upon a basis of paradoxes. As to quality, the aesthetic judgment is disinterested. As to quantity, it is universally valid though subjective. As to relation, it manifests a purposiveness without purpose and participates in cognition in general without being determined by definite concepts. As to modality, it exhibits a necessity which is not apodictic but only exemplary. In addition, Kant deals with a pleasure which is abstract and with a beauty which is pure. He discovers the sublime in the violation of form in nature.

In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant inveighed against the use of the word *aesthetic* to signify *taste*, and employed it with reference to *perceptual intuition*. In a footnote he wrote: “. . . it is advisable . . . to give up using the name in this sense of critique of taste, and to reserve it for that doctrine of sensibility which is true science—thus approximating to the language and sense of the ancients, in their far-famed division of knowledge into *aistheta kai noeta* . . .”⁶³ In the *Critique of Judgment* he uses it in the forbidden sense, and gives it a subjective determination. It was necessary, as has been seen, for his purpose of effecting a synthesis between the Reason and the Understanding by means of the Judgment, of providing a link in the transition from the phenomenal to the noumenal realm.

b) Kant's theory is consistently and undeviatingly formal. A moral quality, grand and fervent, has been sometimes attributed to it. In order to explain the analogy between beauty and morals, Kant resorts to a doctrine of symbolism. All intuitions are either schemata or symbols. The schemata contain direct, the symbols contain indirect representations of the concept. A symbol is thus opposed to the discursive but not to the intuitive. It is a presentation of a concept neither as a sign nor as abstract schemata, but obliquely through the application of the rules “of the

reflection made upon that intuition to a quite different object of which the first is only the symbol" (p. 249). The analogy is in the rules determining the reflections in both cases, that is, in the thing or intuition or idea and in the symbol. Kant elucidates his point by comparing a monarchical state to a living body if it is rationally (constitutionally) governed, and to a machine (a hand mill) if it is governed by an arbitrary, absolute, individual will, and saying that "between a despotic state and a hand mill there is, to be sure, no similarity; but there is a similarity in the rules according to which we reflect upon these two things and their causality" (p. 249). It is in this sense that beauty is a *symbol* of the good and that the judgment of Taste has a reference to the supersensible.

Kant's master-thought and dominant purpose are omnipresent with him and the moral value of beauty coincides with his metaphysical needs, for "Taste makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charm of Sense to habitual moral interest" (p. 252).

The first moment—the disinterestedness of the judgment of Taste—refers to the Practical Reason in general, just as the third moment—the freedom of the beautiful object from conceptual determination—refers to the Theoretical Reason in general. The first moment manifests the influence of Reason upon the Understanding, of the Practical upon the Theoretical faculty. It reveals the state of mind in aesthetic contemplation. It explains how beauty can become a symbol of the good. The moral symbolism of beauty does not contravene Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the good. It is precisely because the judgment of Taste is free that it attains moral value and discloses the profound import of beauty. It is no light matter for the soul to reach that height from which it can contemplate beauty. Man can love nature freely and can—in the experience of the sublime—esteem something even

in opposition to his own interests. Beauty, therefore, is the transition from the realm of nature to the realm of freedom, and suggests the possibility of a supersensible ground in which the Theoretical and the Practical faculty are bound up into unity. As a symbol of the good, the judgment of the beautiful is universally valid despite the fact that it is not defined by a concept. The judgment of Taste is based on the autonomy of the subject but the disinterestedness of the pleasure in the beautiful is a guarantee that it dwells in what may be presupposed in all.

Kant's "moral" symbolism of beauty is directly connected with the paramount theme of his aesthetic, and casts some light upon the meaning and intent of the four moments.

c) It is not the paradoxes or the analogy between the beautiful and the good which is of enduring worth and of abiding influence in the third *Critique*. Kant's great merit is that he put in the current of modern aesthetic two momentous ideas. He made the principle of harmony the root-thought of his philosophy of art and beauty.⁶⁴ Now, to be sure, the harmony which aesthetic experience engenders is the fine, spiritual flower of vision and comprehension, of the contemplation—not merely of the form of an object—but of the eternal, ever-new, ever-growing qualities and meanings of life. Kant is constantly speaking of the abstract, of the formal accordance of the cognitive faculties, yet there is this graver import latent in his words. Of equal importance is Kant's emphasis upon the *disinterestedness* and *purposiveness without purpose* of the judgment of Taste. And here, too, although Kant liberated the judgment of Taste—not only from subservience to the scientific or moral concept, but really from all content and meaning, and converted it into "a beautiful and *ineffectual* angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain"—⁶⁵ it was, historically viewed, an indispensable task.⁶⁶ For it was the historical tradition to treat art as a moralistic-

pedagogic instrumentality, as an "elementary philosophy," or else as a sensuous amusement, as a delectable pastime, or as a combination of both. In the *De Rerum Natura* Lucretius gave it classic expression when he compared the poets with the physicians, who

. . . when they seek to give
Young boys the nauseous wormwood, first do touch
The brim around the cup with the sweet juice
And yellow of the honey.⁶⁷

And Tasso, in the invocation of his *Jerusalem Delivered*, writes in a similar strain:

. . . And Truth, enriched by flowing song, thou know'st,
Through its disguise the most reluctant gains;
Thus the fond mother o'er the vase's lips .
Spreads the sweet snare, which her sick child she gives.
Deluded, he the bitter potion sips,
And from his own delusion life receives.⁶⁸

Kant's doctrine of disinterestedness and of purposiveness without purpose was—as a revolt against the historical tradition—a salutary concentration upon the more specific, the more autonomous aspects of beauty and of art. But Kant's revolt was only a partial one, as his doctrine of dependent beauty shows. He liberated beauty from its moral and intellectual fetters and endowed the harmony of the cognitive faculties in the aesthetic experience with no content. He consigned *significant* beauty and almost all of art to the category of *dependent* beauty, that is, of beauty that *adheres* to a concept. He failed to see that art may truly manifest a purposiveness without purpose (that is, a purpose, alien and extraneous to itself)—that it may come to us free, bright, and enchanting.

In *The Frogs* Aristophanes puts into the mouth of Aeschylus the following unjust accusation against Euripides (the poet of protest against "the judgments that men make blind," of pity and compassion for the inarticulate, the seeking, the suffering):

Thou picker-up of Cretan monodies,
Foisting thy tales of incest on the stage.⁶⁹

But in the *Apology* which Browning wrote for Aristophanes are these truer and nobler words clothed in warmth and light, and pointing to the deep, harmonious effect of art upon the spirit. In the presence of the tragedies of Euripides:

Small rebuked by large,
We felt our puny hates refine to air,
Our poor prides sink, prevent the humbling hand,
Our petty passions purify their tide.⁷⁰

Great art pierces life to its central streams from which flow the tears of laughter and the tears of sorrow. It breaks the heart at times and yet it allays and assuages.

d) Kant's emancipation of the beautiful object from its servitude to the concept may be compared to the emancipation of the serf from bondage to the feudal lord (which was in full tide in the eighteenth century). The serf was freed in a *double* sense. He was liberated from the lord and the land to which he was bound, and he was liberated from possession of the land which he tilled and the tools and instruments with which he worked. The bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century inscribed upon its banner the flaming myth: liberty, fraternity, equality. It fought for the freedom of the exchange market and for the freedom of the labor market. It denounced feudalism as a violation of the sacred rights of *man* since it was in dire need of *men* for the factories which were beginning to spring into existence. But it wanted "truly" free men: free from serfdom and free from property. Kant's beautiful object was *free*: free from the fetters of the concept and free from the possession of content. The eighteenth century did not interpret freedom to mean—in Nietzsche's pithy and profound aphorism—as being free *to*, and not *from*, things. Freedom is positive and not negative. Aesthetic disinterestedness is

positive and not negative. Was Kant's doctrine of disinterestedness, of *purposiveness without purpose* as his distinction between art (as pleasant play) and handicraft (as unpleasant in itself), at least partly, a reflection of the socio-economic ideology of the time? Did the *Zeitgeist*, in some devious fashion, spread its wings also over Kant's timeless metaphysics with its eternal noumena and its unconditional, absolute categorical imperative?

III

THE SUBLIME

LIKE Burke's *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, is important, not only for its discussion of the beautiful, but also for its treatment of the sublime.

1. THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL AS TWO SPECIES OF THE AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

Kant's theory bears clear traces of the influence of Winckelmann (whose aesthetic was tinged with Platonism) and of Burke (whose aesthetic was sensationalistic), but is doubtless profounder and subtler in its analysis of the concept of the sublime. Like Burke,⁷¹ Kant regards the sublime and the beautiful as two species of the aesthetic Judgment. Burke had written of the sublime and the beautiful: "They are, indeed, ideas of a very different nature, one being founded on pain, the other on pleasure; and, however they may vary afterwards from the direct nature of their causes, yet these causes keep up an eternal distinction between them, a distinction never to be forgotten by any whose business it is to affect the passions." ⁷²

Both Burke and Kant refuse to accept the sublime as one of the forms or manifestations—perhaps the highest—of the beautiful. With Winckelmann, Kant concurs in the belief that the mind is at first baffled and then experiences a feeling of spiritual rehabilitation and even triumph in the perception of the grand in nature.

But why are the beautiful and the sublime two species

of the aesthetic Judgment? Burke based his "eternal distinction" on sensationalistic grounds:

. . . For sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty should be smooth and polished; the great, rugged and negligent: beauty should shun the right line, yet deviate from it insensibly; the great, in many cases, loves the right line; and, when it deviates, it often makes a strong deviation: beauty should not be obscure; the great ought to be dark and gloomy: beauty should be light and delicate; the great ought to be solid, and even massive.⁷³

Kant's distinction is metaphysical:

The *Beautiful* is what pleases in the mere judgement (and therefore not by the medium of sensation in accordance with a concept of the Understanding). It follows at once from this that it must please apart from all interest . . . The *Sublime* is what pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of sense. Both, as explanations of aesthetical universally valid judging, are referred to subjective grounds; in the one case to grounds of sensibility, in favour of the contemplative Understanding; in the other case *in opposition to* sensibility, but on behalf of the purposes of practical Reason. Both, however, united in the same subject, are purposive in reference to the moral feeling. The Beautiful prepares us to love disinterestedly something, even nature itself; the Sublime prepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest (p. 134).

The purposiveness of the beautiful resides in the accordance of the Imagination and the Understanding in the apprehension of the form of an object. The effect of the sublime consists in the abasement of the Imagination—in its discord with Reason—and the evocation of the feeling of the superiority of the noumenal self to the might and magnitude of nature. Beauty generates a feeling of peace and harmony. Beauty dwells in the form of the object, in the purposive adaptation of the object to the subject. The sublime resides in the disparity between the form and the content. And the pleasure of the sublime is a consequence of the purposiveness of the subject in relation to the

object—an object which resists the power of the Judgment, which is, indeed, incongruous with it. The object of sublime feeling is formless and represents boundlessness, “and yet its totality is also present to thought” (p. 102). The beautiful dwells in the form of the object and has boundaries. The purposiveness in the form of the beautiful object preadapted to our Judgment consummates immediately in pleasure, whereas the sublime in its formlessness seems to violate purpose in relation to the powers of cognition, to destroy the harmony between the Understanding and the Imagination.

2. THE PLEASURE OF THE SUBLIME

A baffling question still remains unanswered in Kant's explanation of the sublime—how can the idea of sublimity be evoked by formless objects manifesting a violation of purpose? Kant suggests that the sublime does not really exist in nature, has no objective status, and that its domain is in the mind. The sublime is to Kant—as Bosanquet⁷⁴ points out—one degree more subjective than the beautiful. Kant writes:

Now from this we may see that in general we express ourselves incorrectly if we call any *object of nature* sublime, although we can quite correctly call many objects of nature beautiful. For how can that be marked by an expression of approval, which is apprehended in itself as being a violation of purpose? All that we can say is that the object is fit for the presentation of a sublimity which can be found in the mind; for no sensible form can contain the sublime properly so-called. This concerns only Ideas of the Reason, which, although no adequate presentation is possible for them, by this inadequacy that admits of sensible presentation, are aroused and summoned into the mind. Thus the wide ocean, agitated by the storm cannot be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible. . . . We must seek a ground external to ourselves for the Beautiful of nature; but seek it for the Sublime merely in ourselves and in our attitude of thought which introduces sublimity into the representation of nature (p. 104).

Wherein then resides the pleasure of the sublime? In the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful the mind undulates in a restful apprehension or contemplation, but in the presence of the object evoking the feeling of sublimity the mind is stirred into a certain movement. Now we know that the sublime *does* please us, and consequently there must be some sort of subjective purposiveness in this mental movement. This purposiveness may be referred through the Imagination either to the Theoretic Reason or to the Practical Reason; in the one case we shall have the mathematically sublime (of magnitude) and in the second case we shall have the dynamically sublime (of power). The mathematical sublime is aroused by objects manifesting the discrepancy and disparity between the idea of the absolutely great, of totality, and the impotence of sense to satisfy that idea, by the disagreement or incongruity between the aesthetical judgment of magnitude formed by the Imagination and the judgment of magnitude formed by Reason. The feeling of pain arising from the perception of this want of accordance is mitigated or counter-balanced or overcome by the feeling of pleasure "arising from the correspondence with rational Ideas of this very judgement of the inadequacy of our greatest faculty of Sense; in so far as it is a law for us to strive after these Ideas" (pp. 119-20). Indeed, it is for us a law of Reason to judge as small the objects of nature regarded as great by Sense when compared with Ideas of Reason; and this is so because of our "supersensible destination" (*übersinnliche Bestimmung*). Hence the paradox: "For just as Imagination and *Understanding*, in judging of the Beautiful, generate a subjective purposiveness of the mental powers by means of their harmony, so [here] Imagination and *Reason* do so by means of their conflict" (p. 121). The dynamical sublime is aroused by events or objects revealing our impotence in the presence of the power of Nature, and originates in a

feeling of pain which is transformed into a feeling of joy in the perception of the superiority of our moral freedom to the mute forces of nature. . . .⁷⁵ The beautiful is a property of the aesthetic Judgment; the sublime is rooted in intelligence. Man does not remain passive in the presence of the awe-inspiring objects and spectacles of nature. He transcends the province of the Imagination and appreciates the grandeur of nature which is really a grandeur in his mind—the grandeur born of Reason and the consciousness of moral worth. How insignificant is the boundless greatness and how phantomlike is the appalling might of natural objects and events, how deliquescent is the pain and how transient is the despondency of the soul arising from the impotence of Sense to grasp and master them, in the clear calm cognizance of our “supersensible destination” as the possessors of Reason and the practitioners of the Moral Law, as beings whose spiritual home is the empyrean of Noumena and whose season is eternity. And so in the experience of the sublime the cup of bitterness becomes filled with the honey of joy, and—like Burke—Kant bases the demarcation between the beautiful and the sublime on the difference between the pleasantness of pleasure and the pleasantness of pain. Burke wrote of the pleasure of the sublime: “. . . this delight I have not called pleasure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure.”⁷⁶ And Kant says: “. . . there accompanies the reception of an object as sublime a pleasure, which is only possible through the medium of a pain” (p. 123).

3. THE SUBLIME AND THE “NOUMENAL SELF”

In conjunction with his explanation of the dynamical sublime, Kant diverges from Burke on a central issue. Burke's theory is linked up with the passions and instincts relating to self-preservation and turning mostly on pain or

danger. He says: "The passions which belong to self-preservation turn on pain and danger; they are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circumstances . . . Whatever excites this delight, I call *sublime*. The passions belonging to self-preservation are the strongest of all the passions." ⁷⁷ This is faintly reminiscent of the beautiful introductory lines of the second book of Lucretius's magnificent philosophical poem:

'Tis sweet, when, down the mighty main, the winds
Roll up its waste of waters, from the land
To watch another's labouring anguish far,
Not that we joyously delight that man
Should thus be smitten, but because 'tis sweet
To mark what evils we ourselves be spared;
'Tis sweet, again, to view the mighty strife
Of armies embattled yonder o'er the plains,
Ourselves no sharers in the peril . . . ⁷⁸

Burke goes on to assign to the sublime a quality of astonishment—a dazing, dazzling, overwhelming astonishment: "The passion caused by the great and sublime in *nature*, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment: and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended with some degree of horror. . . . Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect." ⁷⁹ . . . No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear, for fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that resembles actual pain." ⁸⁰ In the brief but pregnant chapter on the sublime, in the first volume of *Modern Painters*, Ruskin (to whom the sublime consisted in the greatness of matter, space, virtue, beauty affecting our feelings) was later to show the fatal error of Burke. He wrote: "But it is not the fear, observe, but the

contemplation of death; not the instinctive shudder and struggle of self-preservation, but the deliberate measurement of the doom, which are really great or sublime in feeling. It is not while we shrink, but while we defy, that we receive or convey the highest conceptions of the fate. There is no sublimity in the agony of terror.”⁸¹ There is a truly sublime passage in the *Iliad* which seems to substantiate and corroborate Ruskin’s view. It impressed also Longinus who quotes it with deep respect. Ajax, helpless in the gloom and darkness that have descended on the battle of the Greeks, implores Zeus for light, even if he destroy him:

Zeus, sire, do thou the veil of darkness rend,
And make clear daylight, that our eyes may see:
Then in the light e’en slay us.⁸²

And thirty centuries later, Tolstoy wrote these sublime, luminous, and yet simple lines (he has just described the death of Andrew and he is now telling of its effect on his sister, Princess Mary, and on his beloved, Natásha): “Natásha and Princess Mary also wept now, but not because of their own personal grief; they wept with a reverent and softening emotion, which had taken possession of their souls at the consciousness of the simple and solemn mystery of death that had been accomplished in their presence.”⁸³ It is a far cry from Burke’s melodramatic notion of the sublime, indeed, even from Lucretius’s finer and Ruskin’s nobler thoughts, to Tolstoy’s lucid vision.

Now Kant’s view differs from Burke’s as well as from Tolstoy’s. To Kant astonishment is only the first stage in the experience of the sublime and it is followed by a sense of intellectual or moral superiority to the fearful object of nature:

. . . Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, rocks; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes in all their violence of destruction;

hurricanes with their track of devastation; the boundless ocean in a state of tumult; the lofty waterfall of a mighty river, and such like; these exhibit our faculty of resistance as insignificantly small in comparison with their might. But the sight of them is the more attractive, the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in security; and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature . . . (p. 125).

Evidently Kant's digression from Burke for whom the sublime was always rooted in fear, is not casual but is grounded in his ascription of the sublime to the awareness in us of our "noumenal self." Burke, on the contrary, ascribed the beautiful and sublime to instinctive sources. He associated the beautiful with the social instincts, especially the sexual (anticipating Darwin's theory of the function of decorative beauty and appendages in animal life), and the sublime with the instinct of self-preservation. The beautiful—whose qualities are smallness, smoothness, and delicacy—arouses in us a feeling of tenderness, and the sublime—whose qualities are vastness, obscurity, awe—stimulates in us a feeling of terror. Kant says that the objects of sublimity must be *fearful* but must not evoke *actual fear*, that there must be no consciousness of imminent personal danger, since the awareness of such danger would incite the instinct of self-preservation and would thwart the feeling of the supersensible. (To Burke there must be *actual fear* but no *actual pain*. To Kant the presence of actual fear would render impossible a pure judgment of the sublime, precisely as subservience to appetite would preclude a pure judgment of the beautiful.) The feeling of the sublime must flow from the perception of our *sensuous* insufficiency in the presence of the magnitude and might of nature. The fearfulness of the objects and events

and the feeling of pain are indispensable only because they augment the energies of the soul and purify the moral Ideas of the mind, and disclose by contrast another kind of self-preservation anchored in the glory of the Reason and the grandeur of the Will. *That* is the sublime and *that* is the source of its pleasantness, and *that* is the ground of the possibility of agreement in the judgments of the sublime. For the sublime too must provide a necessary and a universal satisfaction. And it is the moral feeling in man, the consciousness of his "noumenal self" that sustains the same relation to the sublime as the *sensus communis* does to the beautiful. There is a tie between sublimity, beauty, goodness, and an absorption in nature manifests a moral disposition. Kant writes: "In fact, without development of moral Ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime, presents itself to the uneducated man merely as terrible. In the indications of the dominion of nature in destruction, and in the great scale of its might, in comparison with which his own is a vanishing quantity, he will only see the misery, danger, and distress which surround the man who is exposed to it" (p. 130).

Although Kant uses the words *culture* and *moral*, it is no social conception that he is advancing of the interrelationship subsisting between sublimity, beauty, goodness. On the contrary, he is thinking of a static individual morality—the "supersensible destination" of man, his *holy* accordance with the Moral Law—in *vacuo*, in nonchalant *disinterestedness* to "the misery, danger and distress which surround the man who is exposed to it." It is, therefore, no wonder that Kant imposes upon the sublime and the beautiful (which he wanted to liberate from the Baumgarten bondage to the concept) a devastating thralldom; he fetters them to an empty, barren *liberty*, to the communication of abstract feeling denuded of all content. Kant stresses the point that no conceptions must be involved in

the perception of the sublime, no ideas drawn from culture (using the word in a real and social sense) are to be injected, the feeling of the sublime must flow from the innocence of direct perception. There cannot be, according to Kant, a sublimity of character, of intellect, of art (since in these "human purpose determines the form as well as the size," p. 113), but only of rude nature, of physical might or magnitude (but not of the things of nature, since in these the aesthetical judgment is mingled with a teleological judgment—as in the case of animals with a known natural destination "the concepts of which bring with them a definite purpose," p. 113). Kant writes:

If then we call the sight of the starry heaven *sublime*, we must not place at the basis of our judgements concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, and regard the bright points, with which we see the space above us filled, as their suns moving in circles purposively fixed with reference to them; but we must regard it, just as we see it, as a distant, all-embracing vault. . . . And in the same way, if we are to call the sight of the ocean sublime, we must not *think* of it as we [ordinarily] do, endowed as we are with all kind of knowledge (not contained, however, in the immediate intuition). For example, we sometimes think of the ocean as a vast kingdom of aquatic creatures; or as the great source of those vapours that fill the air with clouds for the benefit of the land; or again as an element which, though dividing continents from each other, yet promotes the greatest communication between them: but these furnish merely teleological judgements. To call the ocean sublime we must regard it as poets do, merely by what strikes the eye; if it is at rest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded by the heaven; if it is restless, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything (pp. 137–38).

Now this is all fanciful. No poet has ever regarded the sublime in this naked and empty formalism. All these concepts and reflective ideas Kant enumerates fuse in the concrete aesthetic intuition of the beautiful and the sublime. They are immanent and inwoven in the aesthetic percep-

tion. They constitute the feeling of the sublime as genuine and full of content, and provide a basis of continuity in nature from the beautiful to the sublime which are not, as Burke and Kant thought, two species of aesthetic Judgment but, as Longinus and Ruskin held, modes and manifestations of the same species. Longinus, for example, speaks at length of a little lyric by Sappho, for there may be that *elevation*, that *ring of greatness*⁸⁴ even in a simple poem. And Ruskin wrote that “. . . the sublime is not distinct from what is beautiful, nor from other sources of pleasure in art.”⁸⁵

4. CONCLUSION

In sum, Kant presents us with the spectacle of a formless and boundless and chaotic nature of might and magnitude, on the one hand, and man with a consciousness of his “supersensible destination,” on the other hand, finding delight in the feeling of the sublime precisely because of the contrast involved. The sublime, therefore, resides solely in the mind, and there is no shadow of a possibility of accordance between the external formless object and the mental *movement* or response. In the experience of the beautiful, Kant was constrained to endow form with a content, with a preëstablished adaptability to the subject, although he stressed the subjectivism of the purposiveness dwelling in the free, harmonious accordance of the faculties of cognition. The consequence is clear, and Bosanquet truly remarks: “The ideas of reason thus negatively evoked can have only a bare moral victory, and are not recognized as prevailing, in an intricate orderliness and significance, throughout all the terror and immensity of the external world.”⁸⁶ Kant demolishes the continuity of the beautiful in nature from the simplest and the loveliest to the most inspiring and the grandest. He was unable to discover the sublime in nature and so he makes of it no more than a

subjective sign and symbol of the triumph of the “supersensible” in man, of an intellectual and moral victory over nature, of the “moral law within” over the “starry heavens above.”⁸⁷ Kant thinks that only so is it possible to transcend an attitude of sheer prostration before nature, before God as manifesting his power in storm, earthquake, tempest. In *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone* he accordingly divides religions into “favor-seeking” and “moral” religion. But is it not possible to steer clear between the Scylla of prostration and the Charybdis of opposition to, and triumph over, nature? When Hamlet says of man, “A creature how infinite in faculties, in comprehension how like a god,” when Markham says of Lincoln

Here was a man to hold against the world,
A man to match the mountains and the sea,

and when he adds

The color of the ground was in him, the red earth;
The smack and tang of elemental things—

are they not thinking of the seamless continuity from the physical to the ideal *in* nature, from the natural to the spiritual *in* man? What “moral victory,” what “moral assertion” of the “supersensible” rings in these truly sublime lines of Shelley:

. . . If even

I were as in my boyhood, and could be
The comrade of thy wanderings over heaven,
As then, when to outstrip thy skiey speed
Scarce seem'd a vision,—I would ne'er have striven
As thus with thee in prayer in my sore need . . .

. . . Be thou, spirit fierce,

My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one!⁸⁸

In this passionate longing for identification with nature, in this intense desire to absorb its strength and sinuosity, the unity of nature, and the roots of man in nature, are magnificently manifest.

5. BRADLEY AND KANT ON THE SUBLIME

In one of his remarkably fine essays, A. C. Bradley attempts to disprove the Burke-Kant notion that the beautiful and the sublime are distinct *in essentia* and yet goes on to maintain the tenet of dualism in the aesthetic experience. He suggests that the words "pretty, graceful, 'beautiful,' grand, sublime," be arranged in some such order as the one adopted here, and, he is inclined to think, that if a gradual substitution of one word for another in the series (beginning with pretty) were to be made, the difference would not seem egregious. Nonetheless he believes that there is a cardinal difference between the psychology of the experience of the beautiful and that of the sublime. The experience of the beautiful he declares to be wholly affirmative. There is an immediate sense of harmony between the beautiful object and the contemplating subject expressed in an unchecked expansion, in a feeling of sympathy and pleasure. In the experience of the sublime there are *two* stages. The first is negative. There is a sense of feebleness in the presence of an object that cannot be mastered sensuously, there is a sense of being weighed down and crushed. The second is affirmative. A rebound occurs, a powerful reaction takes place, and there is a feeling of heightening self-expansion, of adoring union with the object.

This is on a much higher level than Burke's conception of terrifying astonishment as the final moment in the experience of the sublime. It is preferable to Kant's thesis of the moral conquest of nature as the unique mark of the sublime. In addition, Bradley rightly discards Kant's distinction between a mathematical and a dynamical sublime, and its corollary that the sublime consists merely in might or magnitude. Bradley asserts that it is the quantity of the quality that is of fundamental import in the sublime.⁸⁹

But the crucial question is: Does the experience of the sublime really involve two antithetical stages? How does the first stage pass into the second? Is there not an element of the melodramatic in this conception of the metamorphosis of a strongly negative feeling, tinged with mortification, into a delightfully affirmative feeling, overflowing with ecstasy? It is easier to ask, than it is to answer, these questions. It is, however, plausible to assume that all aesthetic experience is an apprehension of the qualitative aspect of nature, an apprehension in which emotion is the subjective complement or counterpart or consummation of the objective quality. In all aesthetic experience there is an imaginative sympathetic identification with, a going out to, the object of contemplation; there is an undulation, there is an ebb and flow, and there is at last peace and calm and serenity. The experience of the sublime is the highest and most intense form of aesthetic experience; it is intricate and passionate, and at once elemental and spiritual. But there are not two definite (negative and affirmative) stages, as Bradley feels, and surely no conquest of nature, as Kant thinks, and under no conditions a terrifying astonishment, a stupefaction of mind and senses, as Burke believed. There is a dramatic movement, a variety of fragmentary feelings, a crescendo, but all within the pattern of a fundamental emotion of identification with, of sympathy for, of joy in, the sublime object or act. (An act or object which is, as Alexander says, at once attainable and unattainable, which is felt and believed to be at the heart of things.) In the experience of the sublime the "still small voice"⁹⁰ Elijah heard upon the mount does not come *after* the "great and strong wind" that rends the mountains, *after* the devastating earthquake and the consuming fire, but is present and is sweetly, softly audible *in* the wind and earthquake and fire. Wordsworth knew it when he learned

To look on nature, not as in the hour
 Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes
 The still, sad music of humanity,
 Nor harsh, nor grating, though of ample power
 To chasten and subdue . . .⁹¹

In *The Tempest* Ferdinand says:

. . . Sitting on a bank,
 Weeping again the king my father's wreck,
 This music crept by me upon the waters,
 Allaying both their fury and my passion
 With its sweet air . . .⁹²

And as Hamlet so well knew the very whirlwind of passion
 must beget a calm,⁹³ and as Shelley sang:

The tumult of thy mighty harmonies
 Will take from both a deep, autumnal tone,
 Sweet though in sadness.⁹⁴

Thus it becomes possible to proclaim with Keats:

. . . to bear all naked truths,
 And to envisage circumstance, all calm,
 That is the top of sovereignty.⁹⁵

That *is* the top of sovereignty and that is the top of sublimity.

IV

SCHILLER'S AESTHETIC THEORY

KANT'S *Critique of Judgment* was acclaimed, not only by his own disciples, but also by the Hegelians. Despite his aversion for metaphysics, Goethe knew and esteemed it. It left, however, the strongest impact upon the mind of Schiller.

1. KANT AND SCHILLER

In the very first of his *Letters upon the Aesthetical Education of Man*,⁹⁶ Schiller writes, "In truth, I will not keep back from you that the assertions which follow rest chiefly upon Kantian principles" (p. 26). Indeed, the *Letters* and the long essay, entitled *Grace and Dignity*, are permeated with the Kantian notions of spontaneous harmony, of the free accordance of the faculties, of suitableness, as constituting the source of aesthetic pleasure. Schiller's theory of the sublime bears definite traces of Lessing, of Winckelmann, but above all, of Kant. In the presence of the sublime, there is discord between sense and reason, and, consequently, "Here the physical man and the moral man separate in the most marked manner. . . . The very thing that lowers one to the earth is precisely that which raises the other to the infinite" (p. 134).

Schiller concurs in the Kantian antithesis between the physical and the moral, the natural and the ideal, the phenomenal and the noumenal, and, like Kant, sees in the aesthetic experience the bridge that spans the abyss between them. Man "ought to be neither one nor the other . . . nature ought not to rule him exclusively; nor reason con-

ditionally. The two legislations ought to be completely independent and yet mutually complementary" (p. 102).

The spirit of Goethe was at times alien to Schiller. In the *Letters, Grace and Dignity, On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry*, he was really striving to achieve a synthesis of Kant and Goethe. In *Grace and Dignity*, he defined Grace as the quality of a beautiful soul, and Dignity as the attribute of a noble mind. In *Naïve and Sentimental Poetry*, he equates naïve poetry with nature, and sentimental poetry he lifts above nature; the naïve poet is the child of nature, and therefore "the thing that touches us in the ancient poets is nature . . . modern poets touch us through the medium of ideas" (p. 286). But Schiller is in quest of a naturalistic-idealistic synthesis and he, therefore, adds, "the idea of a beautiful humanity is not exhausted by either, but can only be presented in the union of both" (p. 332). This synthesis Schiller did not achieve; Kantian he was and remained. Goethe intensified his poetic apprehension of life by a real interest in the problems of the natural sciences, while Schiller—as Hegel suggests—absorbed himself "in the study of the ideal depths of the *mind*." ⁹⁷

2. ART AS PLAY AND AS AESTHETIC SEMBLANCE

As with Kant, Schiller's conception of beauty and of art is inseparable from his view of the nature of man. And man is to him, as has been already indicated, a being at once sensuous and spiritual. The material instinct (*Stofftrieb*) fetters man to time and to space, renders him receptive and determined, expresses the impulses of his lower nature. The formal instinct (*Formtrieb*) lifts man to the spiritual level, transforms him into a self-active, determining being. It represents the legislation of reason in moral volition and in theoretic cognition. Now since man is neither wholly matter nor wholly spirit, art and beauty are the product of the interpenetration of both impulses, of the

sensuous and the rational; of the *Stofftrieb* and the *Formtrieb* in the unification of the *Spieltrieb*, the play-impulse.

This conception of the play-impulse is taken from Kant. In the aesthetic relation, Schiller affirms, things refer to our faculties in their entirety without becoming—as in a physical, logical, or moral relation—the determinate objects of any one faculty. He says quite explicitly: “. . . *only* that is play which makes man complete and develops simultaneously his twofold nature . . . man is serious *only* with the agreeable, with the good, and with the perfect, but he plays with beauty . . . Reason also utters the decision that man shall *only play* with beauty, and he *shall only play* with *beauty*. For, to speak out once for all, man *only* plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and *he is only completely a man when he plays*” (p. 71).

The object of the play-impulse is beauty. And beauty is *lebende Gestalt*. But not living form in a physiological sense; since, patently, not everything that is alive is beautiful, nor is everything that is inanimate thereby excluded from the sphere of the beautiful. In the aesthetic experience, creative or appreciative, natural necessity loses its recalcitrance, and form and matter appear to be wedded in an unpremeditated reconciliation. A marble block, for example, may be invested with a *living form* by the sculptor and architect, while a man may lack it. To live physiologically is not enough. To achieve beauty, a man's life should be a form, and his form should be life; his life should live in our understanding and his form in our feeling. Beauty is at once an object and a subjective state. To think solely of the form is to render it inane and abstract; to feel solely the life in the object is to transmute it into an evanescent and amorphous impression.

To clarify his views of the beautiful object more fully, Schiller develops the doctrine of aesthetic semblance (*aesthetischer Schein*). Kant had written (in the *Critique*

of Judgment) of poetry, "It plays with illusion, which it produces at pleasure, but without deceiving by it; for it declares its exercise to be mere play, which however can be purposively used by the Understanding" (p. 215), and he defined poetry as "the art of conducting a free play of the Imagination as if it were a serious business of the Understanding" (p. 207). The play-impulse in man, is a longing and a love for the world of illusion, of appearance, of aesthetic semblance. But Schiller, like Kant, insists, it is no deception, and it is not, as Plato would have us believe, a land of shadows. It is, by some strange alchemy, more substantial than the reality of practical experience: "It is only by being frank or disclaiming all reality, and by being independent or doing without reality, that the appearance is aesthetical" (p. 109).

In the joyous realm of play and appearance man is emancipated from all physical and moral constraint. He enjoys the privilege of unperturbed and unfettered contemplation. He has won his citizenship as a form in the sphere of beauty. He has entered the world of ideas without having renounced the world of sense, as happens in the perception and acknowledgment of a logical truth. He has become integrated, self-active, a complete whole, a harmonious fusion of spirit and matter which are distinct in duty, cognition, and pleasure. He is free because he has attained an inner harmony of laws. Beauty is the great uniter and unifier; it does not merely oscillate, pendulum-like, between sense and reason, but "By beauty the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by beauty the spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense . . . (p. 78). All other forms of perception divide the man, because they are based exclusively either in the sensuous or in the spiritual part of his being. It is only the perception of beauty that makes of him an entirety, because it demands the coöperation of his two natures" (p. 117).

Beauty—the realm of play and appearance—is the unification of the spiritual and the sensuous. It is the unification of the Kantian necessity and freedom, universal and particular, noumenal and phenomenal. And it is a social, a formative unification: “The aesthetic communication alone unites society, because it applies to what is common to all its members . . . Beauty alone can we enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing a race . . . Beauty alone confers happiness on all, and under its influence every being forgets that he is limited” (p. 117).

3. THE AESTHETICAL EDUCATION OF MAN

It is now possible to see why the full title of Schiller's work is *Letters upon the Aesthetical Education of Man*. Needless to say that Schiller is not ascribing to beauty and to art a didactic-pedagogic value. He says unequivocally that “the idea of an instructive fine art (didactic art) or improving (moral) art is no less contradictory, for nothing agrees less with the idea of the beautiful than to give a determinate tendency to the mind” (p. 92). Art is a beacon-light leading sensuous man to reason. Aesthetic experience is an interval, a sweet and lucid interlude, a free contemplation; it is a sacred moment in which man is released from the servitude of the senses and is not yet determined by reason and duty. In this holy rite of serene and undimmed contemplation he is neither pure matter nor pure form, and yet he is unified and integrated. In this state, he is morally undetermined, and therefore, the immanent ethical and educational value of art resides in the possibilities it offers of moral determination.

It is not then by moral precept that art teaches, that is, by the specific determination of the mind. It leads sensuous man to duty and to reason; it prepares him, in general, for the fulfillment of the imperatives of conscience and the functions of reason. Aesthetic education reconciles nature

and reason in man. It permeates the sensuous with mind and confers concreteness upon the spiritual and rational. Individual man carries within himself a purely ideal humanity. This pure ideal man is represented by the state which is the objective and canonical form, in which the separate individuals strive to fuse and concentrate their differences in a conformative unity. There are two ways in which man in the temporal process can agree with ideal man, and in which the state can assert itself in the individual: "One of these ways is when the pure ideal man subdues the empirical man, and the state suppresses the individual, or again when the individual *becomes* the state, and the man of time is *ennobled* to the man of *idea*" (p. 32). The second way—the elevation of the individual to the generic conceptions of law, morality, and reason, incarnate in the state—can supersede and supplant the first way—the suppression of the individual by the state—by means of aesthetic education. Clearly, aesthetic education effects a harmony between the sensuous and the spiritual in man, and by doing so, it also effects a harmony between individual man and the state.¹¹²

4. CONCLUSION

Schiller took his central aesthetic doctrines from Kant. Like Kant, he was opposed both to sensationalism and to conceptualism in art, that is, to the determination of the mind either in the direction of pleasure or of abstract truth or moral action.

Schiller circumspectly asked his readers not to identify his *play* with the games of real life which are concerned with material things, nor with the phantasmagorias of the imagination in sheer dream. But there is an emptiness and a vagueness in this sphere of play, and there is a haunting realization that, in the final analysis, the author of the *Bürger-Spiele* was really carving out an art-theory per-

fectly suited to the bourgeoisie of the time, to the "tired business-man" (*für den erschöpften Geschäftsmann*). Despite his, and Kant's, opposition to hedonism, to sheer pleasure, to sensationalism, their doctrines of aesthetic were *zeitmässig*; they flattered the intellectual vanity of the rising middle classes and sanctioned in effect the demand that art deal not harshly with life and society:

Ja, danket ihr's, dass sie das düstre Bild
Der Wahrheit in das heitre Reich der Kunst
Hinüberspielt, die Täuschung, die sie schafft,
Aufrichtig selbst zerstört und ihren Schein
Der Wahrheit nicht betrüglich unterschiebt:
Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst.

(Yea, rather, give her [the Muse] thanks that she transfers
The gloomy picture of reality
To art's serene domain. The illusion
That she creates quite frankly blots it out
And substitutes its semblance for the truth
In such a way as causes no deception.
Life, it is serious; Art, it is serene).⁹⁸

Kant and Schiller reflect the social order in which humanity is cut in two—the idle rich and the working poor. They cut life in two—into work and play:

Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst.

According to Schiller man plays with aesthetic semblances, with appearances which are more real than the things of common-place experience. And their greater reality does not mean that the aesthetic semblance is a penetration to the inmost core of life, but simply that it is vision for vision's sake, that it is less dependent upon the senses, and released from practical desire: "In the eye and the ear the organs of the senses are already freed from the persecutions of nature, and the object with which we are immediately in contact through the animal senses is remoter from us . . . in sight and hearing the object is a form we create . . . As soon as he [man] begins to enjoy

through sight, vision has an independent value, he is aesthetically free, and the instinct of play is developed" (p. 108).

Schiller builds his theory of aesthetic appearance upon a sort of psychical dualism. He attributes *form* to sensations of sound and sight, but not to those of taste, touch, and smell. But, as Bosanquet justly asks, how is it possible to consider one kind of sense-perception as semblance and another as reality? Is not every sensation of an organism a reaction? Kant, too, was baffled by the same problem in his distinction between aesthetic pleasure as dependent on form, and sense-qualities. But Kant was consistent and always differentiated *form*—the essence of aesthetic appearance—from that quality in objects which excites the senses.

There are rich kernels in Schiller's philosophy of art. But they are lost in the husk which envelops them. Upon the most generous interpretation the play-theory and the doctrine of aesthetic semblance are an evasion of the problems of life, are an escape from reality, are a mere conversion of art into an amusing toy, into a highly-valued plaything.⁹⁹ It is no wonder that Schiller became one of the ancestors of the theory of art for art's sake and that the earliest known instance of the phrase *l'art pour l'art* (in Benjamin Constant's *Journal*) was coined with reference to the views of Kant and Schiller.¹⁰⁰ In Germany K. Lange developed the doctrines of art as play and semblance into the notion that art is *eine bewusste Selbsttäuschung*; and K. Groos, having shown in *The Play of Man* that play is a free, conscious, self-deceptive activity, went on to consider art a form of recreation for the adult as play is a form of recreation for the child. It is not necessary to dwell upon the social causes and aspects of these theories. They speak with an unmistakable clarity and point to the social rift, disorganization and division in the modern polity.

HEGEL'S AESTHETIC THEORY

I

HEGEL'S AESTHETIC IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS METAPHYSICS

HEGEL'S aesthetic, like his general philosophy, was for a time the most celebrated and the most widely heralded in Europe. It is probably true that, with the exception of Plato and Aristotle, no philosopher had more strings to his lute. The lectures, which constitute a prodigious work of four volumes,¹ are replete with historical discussions and with acute analyses of art and works of art. It may be also said that, despite the intricate convolution of his metaphysics, they are rich in appreciative aesthetic criticism and insight.

1. ART AS THE HIGHEST BEAUTY

It was art—the beauty of art as consciously produced by the mind of man—that absorbed Hegel's interest. Both by temperament and by the dialectical exigencies of his philosophy, Hegel was disposed to fathom in consciously created beauty a higher manifestation of the Absolute, of Spirit. He excludes, therefore, the beauty of nature from his aesthetic; “. . . we are justified in maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands *higher* than Nature. For the beauty of art is a beauty begotten, a new birth of mind; and to the extent that Spirit and its creations stand higher than Nature and its phenomena, to that extent the beauty of art is more exalted than the beauty of Nature” (I, p. 2).

The beauty of art is, according to Hegel, an effulgence of Spirit more radiant than the beauty of nature. Hegel could not say, as Joyce Kilmer does:

I think that I shall never see
A poem lovely as a tree.

Poems are made by fools like me,
But only God can make a tree.

For God, to Hegel, is Spirit, and Spirit manifests in man most fully its ideal presence.

In the products of art this ideal presence of God, of Spirit, is felt as precisely and more deeply than in the phenomena of Nature. Indeed, the spiritual import of beauty is in direct ratio with the degree of organic development. A flower is more beautiful than a stream, an animal is more beautiful than a flower, the human form is more beautiful than an animal, but true and genuine beauty is the beauty begotten of Spirit.

Obviously, Hegel did not banish the beauty of nature from the realm of aesthetic in order to make provision for a hedonistic or, as Tolstoy did, for a moralistic theory of art. His evident intention was to elevate, and not to degrade art. He goes on, therefore, to inveigh against the conception of art as a superfluous luxury or as a moralistic-pedagogic instrumentality. To the theory of art as sheer amusement, he retorts: "For in human Art we are not merely dealing with playthings, however pleasant or useful they may be, but with the liberation of the human Spirit from the substance and forms of finite condition" (IV, p. 349).

He is equally averse to any theory which would transform art into a homily, or a tool useful in the realization of an extraneous and independent end. He writes: "A work of art would in that case be merely a useful instrument in the realization of an end which possessed real and independent importance outside the realm of art" (I, p. 77).

2. KANT AND HEGEL

On the one hand, then, Hegel confines his aesthetic to a consideration of the beauty of art; on the other hand, he

definitely impugns the validity of any philosophy of art which ascribes to art an extrinsic moralistic design or denies it an intrinsic worth. What then is the meaning and what is the function of art? In what sense is art at once an expression and a consecration of Spirit?

To answer the question it is essential to contrast briefly the *leitmotif* of Hegel's metaphysics with that of Kant's. Now Kant called his philosophy *critical* because he believed he had shown simultaneously the efficacy and the limits of Theoretic Reason. Kant thought that he had rendered phenomenal experience coherent by means of the a priori categories of the Understanding, that he had reaffirmed the noumenal truths by means of the a priori apodictic postulates of the Practical Reason, and finally, that he had spanned the chasm between the natural and the supersensible realm by means of the Judgment. Hegel's pan-logical Idealism was in conflict with the Kantian dichotomization of reality into a phenomenal and a noumenal world. Hegel exalted reason to an eminence from which it could have an adequate and coördinated knowledge of the *whole* of reality—of reality as the incessant temporal forward-march of the Absolute, of Spirit, of God. But, obviously, a reality which is the grand unfolding or development of Spirit is, by implication, inherently rational, and can, in consequence, be apprehended by human reason (which has, indeed, now ceased to be a mere instrument of knowledge and has become itself part of, or akin to, reason). It follows that all distinctions between phenomenal and noumenal experience must find their source and fulfillment *within* reality. The scene of reason is the universe and its season is eternity; but its holy of holies is human consciousness and its blossom time is the flaming hour when all thought—art and religion—will have flowered into the Sabbath language of Spirit which is divine Philosophy. Meanwhile the entire sensible world is animated with an indwelling somnolent

rationality in a process of gradual emergence until that sacred moment shall have arrived, until the full self-consciousness of Spirit shall have been achieved.

In this rational Hegelian universe pervaded by Spirit, beauty is the sensuous presentation of the Idea (*das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee*). And by Idea Hegel means nothing less than the concrete cosmic process in its integrated unity. What is this unity of the world-process? It is Spirit construed neither as an abstract, transcendent, and empty universal nor as a series of atomistic, particular, limited exemplifications but as the single totality of both, as the unity of Kant's phenomenal and noumenal, of necessity and freedom, of the natural and the metaphysical. Hegel insists upon the concreteness of the Idea; it is basic to his philosophy. He criticizes the Platonic Idea as transcendent to experience. He conceives the Idea to be Mind (*Geist*), at once infinite and all-inclusive, and yet individual and determinate: ". . . we cannot more succinctly define the *absolute Idea*, in the above use of the expression, than by saying it is mind (Spirit): and we may add that the mind thus referred to is not mind regarded as finite, that is, subject to the conditions and limitations of sense-perception, but the universal and *absolute* Intelligence (*Geist*), which, out of its own free activity, determines Truth in the profoundest signification of the term" (I, p. 126).

3. ART AS AN EXPRESSION OF SPIRIT

As the sensuous presentation of the Idea, art is in the sphere of Absolute Mind, together with Religion and Philosophy. It is, therefore, one of the three forms wherein the freedom of Spirit is expressed and realized. It is the first manifestation of the Absolute; it is the sensible expression of Truth.²

The beautiful is, thus, coördinate with Religion and

Philosophy, and is distinguished from them only in its form³—that is, in its sensuous expression, in the plasticity of its images which render the Idea accessible to sense:

Accepting, then, this fundamental similarity of content, these three spheres of absolute Spirit only differ in the *forms* under which they present their object, that is, the Absolute, to human consciousness . . . The form of *sensuous perception* is appropriate to art in the sense that it is art which presents truth to consciousness in its sensuous semblance; but it is a semblance which, under the mode of its appearance, possesses a higher and profounder meaning and significance, although it is not its function to render the universality of the notion wholly intelligible through the medium of sense (I, p. 139).

It follows that the beautiful is a seamless, but nonetheless metaphysically distinct, combination of the rational Idea—its content—and the sensible vesture—its form. Art is not, according to Hegel, an apprehension of qualitative experience in which content and form indissolubly blend and constitute in their aesthetic-metaphysical unity a revelation of the truth of life. Art is the sensuous presentation of an ideal content, and the word *ideal* does not refer to the completed art-product in which both content and form have been fused and transmuted to issue as an ideal continuation of life. The word *ideal* definitely refers to the content before its aesthetic transformation. Hegel says: "The content of art is the Idea, and the form of its display the configuration of the sensuous or plastic image."

This diminishes the significance of Hegel's insistence that the end of art is in itself, and that the artist should speak from the fullness of life. In fact, this bifurcation between content and form is fraught with serious consequences. It culminates in Hegel's notion of art as the sensuous sign and symbol of a metaphysical content. It leads Hegel to define art as a propaedeutic to philosophy, and, therefore, to proclaim its inevitable mortality, that is, its

absorption in philosophy. It induces him to announce the doctrine of the types of art and to assign accordingly to the history of art three periods of development upon the basis of the relationship subsisting between content and form.

II

THE STAGES AND TYPES OF ART

WHAT is Hegel's view of the dialectical continuity underlying the history of art? And what is his criterion?

Art is the sensuous incarnation of the Idea. The *Idea* is the content and the *sensuous* embodiment is the form. The Idea as art is, therefore, "an individual configuration of reality whose express function it is to make manifest the Idea—in its appearance" (I, p. 100).

The value of an art-type will, consequently, be determined by the adequacy of the sensuous form to the Idea expressed. The adequacy will be measured in terms of the concreteness with which the Idea is rendered and the nature of the medium employed to render it. Each historical art-type is most suitably, although not exclusively, represented in a determinate material or medium. Finally, an art-type is merely a mode of relation between the Idea and its configuration as concrete realization.

The development of art in a series of historical grades corresponds to the stages in the temporal emergence of Spirit in a process of self-recognition, of a knowledge of the meaning of its own absolute essence. The three historical relations of the Idea to its sensuous form are the symbolical, the classical, and the romantic.

1. SYMBOLICAL STAGE: ARCHITECTURE

In the symbolical stage, art "with its yearning, its fermentation, its mystery and sublimity" (I, p. 104), is symbolic not in the sense in which all art may be said to depend upon a certain natural symbolism wherein emotion,

thought, and experience assume aesthetic meaning, but in the restricted sense in which the symbol is put over against or outside of the idea or experience: "Natural objects are thus in the first instance left just as they are, while, at the same time, the substantive Idea is imposed upon them as their significance, so that their function is henceforth to express the same, and they claim to be interpreted, as though the Idea itself was present in them" (I, p. 103).

Symbolical art reveals man as just beginning to come to spiritual self-consciousness, and to recognize himself in nature. Hence the Idea is indefinite, obscure, and ill-comprehended. It cannot subjugate the matter to embody it. There is a defectiveness in the Idea, in the *content* of art, and, inevitably, in the *form* of art. There is, for example, a formlessness, a false conception of shape, an inability to master beauty, in the architecture and sculpture of the ancient Hindus, Egyptians, and Chinese. The reason for this is, in Hegel's view, that the very content, the very thought of their art, lacked determinateness, was not complete and absolute in itself.

Symbolical art resorts to grotesqueness and exaggeration in order to suggest, to adumbrate, the spiritual in natural phenomena. Hegel finds this to be evident in the primitive artistic pantheism of the East. Ancient Oriental art irradiates the lowliest object with the light of the Absolute Idea and constrains natural forms to express world-ideas; and yet it turns the Idea against phenomenal existence as ephemeral and nugatory. But Oriental art does not achieve its purpose. The final inadequacy between form and content remains insuperable, the plastic configuration and the Idea do not coalesce. There is violence between them, there is mutual negation, and the Idea remains apart and alone in *sublimity*.⁴

The supreme and the uniquely characteristic symbolic art is architecture. It raises a temple for the spirit of God

and is "the first pioneer on the highway toward the adequate realization of Godhead" (I, p. 113). It levels a space for the God and erects His house for the concentration of Spirit. And it does more. Against tempest, rain, and wild beast, it builds a safe enclosure for the God's assembled congregation. It overcomes the cosmic duality of Mind and Nature, and purifies the external world and coördinates it under the laws of symmetry.

Architecture builds the temple for the God, but it does not yet express Him. The building and the Idea which it symbolizes are disparate. Idea and form are distinct. The relation subsisting between them is abstract, for the Ideal cannot be realized as concrete spirituality in the material and medium of architecture. The medium of architecture is the most material of all the arts and is subject to the laws of mechanics. The forms of architecture are inadequate to the Idea and are essentially the forms of inorganic nature regulated by the laws of symmetry.

2. CLASSICAL STAGE: SCULPTURE

In the classical stage of art, mind shakes off its drowsiness, dispels the obscurity which has engulfed it, and in its incandescent self-realization divines in the *human form* the harmony of meaning and expression, of Idea and its sensuous embodiment. It conceives of the human form, ideally depicted, as a representation of the universal human mind, as the visible vesture of mind, as individually and concretely determinate spirituality. It divests the human form of the defects that belong to the merely sensuous and liberates it from the finite contingencies relevant to the phenomenal. It is only in its corporeal presence that Spirit can be brought within the periphery of vision, and artistic anthropomorphism is not a degradation of the spiritual but an elevation to the spiritual.

It is in sculpture, therefore, that classical art achieves

its fullness of being. Architecture has purified the external world, has made nature cognate with mind, has set upon it the seal of Spirit, and has erected the sanctuary of the God. And now the God Himself enters the temple "in the lightning-flash of individuality which smites its way into the inert mass, permeating the same with its presence" (I, pp. 113-14). The medium and material of sculpture are still crude and gross but spiritualized by the pervading presence of the God, and His statue is wrought not merely according to mechanical law but in ideal forms of the human shape revealing the spiritual essence in its eternal repose and self-possession and blessedness. Form and content approach each other in sculpture, coalesce in immediate union as spiritual individuality. The human form in sculpture is lighted up with spiritual content and "is employed in the classical type of art not as purely sensuous existence, but exclusively as the existence and natural shape appropriate to mind" (I, p. 106).

3. ROMANTIC STAGE: PAINTING, MUSIC, POETRY

The third and final stage is romantic art. Here there is again, as there was in symbolical art, a conflict between content and form, but on a spiritually higher level. The defectiveness of symbolical art was a consequence of the defectiveness of the Idea which constituted its content. But the incompatibility between Idea and its configurative expression in romantic art manifests the transcendence of the Idea as Absolute Spirit to sensuous form and points to its own realm as the appropriate place for the consummation of its reality.

As for the unity of content and form, of the divine and the human, in classical art, it was achieved only because the Hellenic god was an object of immature thought and sensuous imagination and, hence, could be represented in bodily shape. From the standpoint of art, the classical stage

was the most perfect. But by being so, it displayed the *spiritual* imperfection of art, its inability to render the Idea as Idea, as infinite spiritual content. Classical art could not endure for ever. This unity based upon a naïve anthropomorphism and moving in the restricted sphere of fixed natural relations, had to be dissolved.

The God of romanticism is the God of Christianity. He is presented to Mind as no longer in bodily form but as Absolute Spirit, and the determinate content of His existence is *reason*. The unity of the divine and the human is now possible only in *Spirit*, in *spiritual* knowledge. Spirit—absolute, infinite, and universal—transcends and eludes the sensuous imagination and the sensuous media, and cannot be truly suggested by the temple subject to mechanical law or by the human form, finite and phenomenal. Architecture built the temple for the God. Sculpture has placed His statue in the temple. And now God or Spirit—self-gathered from the vague abstractions of symbolical art and released from the determinate and limited concreteness of classical art—faces the community, the congregation of the assembled.

How is God—revealed as veritable Spirit, as liberated from the prison-walls of bodily shape as well as from the emptiness and abstractness of his unfolded self-identity and self-seclusion—to face the congregation? And how will art proclaim and celebrate the sacred tryst of Spirit and the community? In the *Philosophy of Mind* Hegel writes:

. . . and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form, but as only finding himself in himself, and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. *Romantic art* gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to appearance, and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towards its significance.⁵

And in the *Philosophy of Fine Art* he says:

It [art] must deliver itself to the inward life, which coalesces with its object simply as though this were none other than itself, in other words, to the intimacy of soul, to the heart, the emotional life, which as the medium of Spirit itself essentially strives after freedom, and seeks and possesses its reconciliation only in the inner chamber of spirit. It is this inward or ideal world which constitutes the content of the romantic sphere: it will therefore necessarily discover its representation as such inner idea or feeling, and in the show or appearance of the same. The world of the soul and intelligence celebrates its triumph over the external world, and, actually in the medium of that outer world makes that victory to appear, by reason of which the sensuous appearance sinks into nothingness (I, p. 109).

Spirit is now in the sphere of reason and in the reflected appearance manifest in the heart and mind, in the life of intelligence, in the inner ideal being. Romantic art flows from, and appeals to, the emotions, the heart, the soul, the divine passions. Feeling is the essence of romantic art. It is the great healer and reconciler. The artistic adumbration of Spirit as subjective feeling, as God, as the Absolute, in communion with the human nature, as revealed in His community, is the triumph of the soul over the external world. In romantic art the sensuous medium sinks into insignificance, for Spirit must be expressed in thought, and if not solely in thought, then in the most immaterial of sensuous media, as near to thought as possible.

Painting, music, and poetry express the spirit of romantic art. They are the least material of the arts and represent a more intimate union of sensuous medium and spiritual significance than architecture or sculpture.

a) In painting the quality of visibility, so essential in architecture and sculpture, becomes *ideal*. It is no longer dependent upon a mass of mere weight, as in architecture, nor upon a three-dimensional representation, as in sculp-

ture. Painting can make *apparent*, can induce us to read into it *ideally* a third dimension, and, hence "liberates art from the objective totality of spatial condition, by being limited to a plane surface" (I, p. 117). In so far as it is *ideal*, painting can portray and suggest all the feelings of the human heart, and all the aspects and scenes of nature as evocative of feeling, as consciously produced to appeal to the soul.

b) And yet painting is not adequate as the romantic art. It is too objective. It is still imprisoned in space. It renders at best a nuance of Spirit, in a static material medium. The romantic contrast to painting is music. It is subjective. It does not appear under the form of space as *coexistence*, but as *temporal ideality*, as continuity in the mind. It is liberated from the impediments of matter and extension, and as a permanent work of art can only have an *ideal* existence in memory (since melody perishes the moment it is heard). In painting, visibility has been rendered ideal, but it is still color, it is yet light, playing upon a material surface. In music this material content is negated; it is converted into sheer audibility. Music, therefore, freed from all shackles, enters the sanctuary of the soul, and expresses the essence of the inner life. It is a forward-step from painting, for it embodies "pure ideality and subjective emotion in the configurations of essentially resonant sound rather than in visible forms" (IV, p. 4).

c) But the triumphant art, the supreme romantic art, is poetry. Music is feeling, but feeling vague and indefinite. Poetry is feeling, clear, cogent, and coherent. Music, in its perfect union of sensuous medium and spiritual content, marks a transition from the abstract sensuousness of painting to the abstract spirituality of poetry, just as sculpture, in its coalescence of form and content, marks a transition from symbolical to romantic art: ". . . the realm of idea . . . breaks away on its part likewise from the bond of

music, and in the exclusive art of poetry discovers the adequate realization it demands" (IV, p. 5).

In music, the sensuous medium is sound with its temporal ideality. It is sound as the feeling and quality of the sonorous, and it is wedded to emotion. But the chains (although they have become golden and almost invisible in music) fettering art to the earth, are cast off in poetry. For in poetry the mind uses sound to express an ideal content as the mere external sign for ideal perceptions and conceptions. Sound in poetry has ceased to be the substance it was in music, and has become a sign, a shadow, pointing to something other than itself, to a realm of Spirit. Its function is as instrumental as the function of a letter. Both—the visible and the audible—are only indications of mind, of Idea. And the Idea which poetic sound signifies is concrete, and not vague and nebulous as in painting or music. The true medium of poetry is not sound but the imagination and the intellect, and since imagination is indispensable to all the arts, it may be affirmed that all the arts possess a poetic element. But in poetry, intelligence and imagination are the exclusive medium. Poetry is, consequently, the freest and the most exalted of the arts. Its home is in the sphere of Spirit and it belongs to the life of the soul, of emotion, of reason. At this point—in the noblest of the arts, in poetry—art transcends itself, for "it is just here that it deserts the medium of a harmonious presentation of mind in sensuous shape and passes from the poetry of imaginative idea into the prose⁶ of thought" (I, p. 120).

III

THE DEATH OF ART

IN *What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel* Croce says truly that "for Hegel . . . the [aesthetic] activity . . . became a mode of apprehending the Absolute, of solving the great philosophical problem." ⁷ It is clear that Hegel's definition of beautiful art as the sensuous expression of the Idea is fundamentally and consistently metaphysical. In content the True and the Beautiful are identical and they differ only in form: the True is the Idea as directly accessible to thought, and the Beautiful is the Idea as sensible manifestation. In Hegel's own formulation, the distinction is as follows: ". . . the Idea, viewed as the beautiful in art, is not the Idea in the strict sense, that is as a metaphysical Logic apprehends it as the Absolute . . . The Idea as fine art, however, is the Idea . . . [as] individual configuration of reality whose express function it is to make manifest the Idea—in its appearance" (I, p. 100). Hegel's division of the history of art is made in accordance with "the demand that the Idea and its formative configuration as concrete realization must be brought together under a mode of complete adequacy" (I, p. 100). In symbolical art the form merely suggests the Idea. In classical art Idea and Form are in harmony. In romantic art the abyss between Idea and Form reappears, but now in consequence of the self-recognition of Spirit, of "the *self-aware* inner life of *soul itself*" (I, p. 108) which is beyond sensuous rendition. And because poetry employs a medium almost wholly immaterial, almost irrefragably spiritual, it is the highest of all the arts, the most *ideal*, and can express the profoundest feelings of the inner being.

1. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE SPIRITUAL CONTENT OF POETRY TO ITS SENSUOUS FORM

The salient point to note, however, is that the triumph of poetry is the defeat of art. In consonance with his metaphysical conception of aesthetic, Hegel opens the doors of heaven for poetry because he thinks it can soar aloft without its body, without its form. It can redeem itself, as music cannot:

Spirit consequently withdraws its content from musical tone as such, and declares itself through words, which it is true do not entirely forsake the element of sound, but sink to the purely external sign of the communication. In other words, by means of this repletion with spiritual ideas, musical tone becomes the voice of articulate words; language, in its turn, is diverted from an end in itself to a means of ideal expression which has lost its independent self-subsistency. This constitutes in fact what we have already established as the essential difference between music and poetry. The content of the art of speech is the collective art of the world of ideas elaborated by the imagination, the spiritual which remains at home in its vision, which remains in this ideal realm, and, even in its movement toward an objective world, is only conscious of the same as a symbol that differs from its own conscious content (IV, p. 8).

In poetry, therefore, the cleavage between content and form is wider than in any other art. The tonal quality of the word is meaningless, is divorced from the content, that is, the Idea, the feeling, of consciousness. Its meaning is that of "a symbol that differs from its own conscious content." It is a letter, a sign, indicating the presence of Spirit. What was a blind, groping desire in symbolical art, what was a naïve unity of the spiritual and the material, of the divine and the human in classical art, has become in poetry a pellucid realization. Poetry is a vindication of the freedom of Spirit in the domain of art. In poetry, art has been released from its material, from its *sensuous* embodiment; the sensuous

element in art, spiritualized in painting and music, has been finally fully subjugated by mind and by the ideas of mind. This ascent of art has been from an architecture dependent upon mass and mechanics to three-dimensional sculpture depicting the human form in repose and self-possession, and from sculpture to painting which is pure visibility upon a plane surface and to music with its temporal ideality. But the peak of the ascent, the ultimate home of art, is poetry in which sound—the only formal element—is completely extraneous to the spiritual content, the ideal perceptions and conceptions, of poetry.

Hegel divorces form from content; he denies the indissoluble unity of feeling, thought, image, experience, rhythm, sound, *in* the poem. He enunciates a fantastic historical division of art into three stages and promulgates a theory of the specific arts which is paradoxical, which is self-frustrating. For it must be observed that, to Hegel, the *fundamentum differentiationis* of art is the fact that it is the *sensuous* embodiment of the Idea, and yet the inner striving of art is not to achieve its own *ens* and *essentia*, its own inalienable selfhood, but to transcend itself, to soar above itself. To be sure Hegel's theory is untenable. No hierarchy of the arts can be established upon the basis of the medium employed, although it is imperative to stress, as Hegel did, the importance of the specific medium in each art. But the function of the medium is a *positive* one. It is not *negative*, as Hegel thought. The medium challenges the artist to do a certain thing. Its recalcitrance is fruitful. It is in the process of overcoming the refractory medium that the artist's conception begins to live, to assume clarity and reality, to become prehensible. Indeed, far from being a stubborn impediment, the medium—the clay, the metal, the word, the color—gives distinction and unique quality to the finished product. Hegel's dichotomy between conception and medium or material, between content and form, is crucial

in his aesthetic theory. To say, as Hegel does, that in poetry art "deserts the medium of a harmonious presentation of mind in sensuous shape and passes from the poetry of imaginative idea into the prose of thought" (I, p. 120), is to confuse the function of language in science and in poetry. In science, words are signs or references pointing to something beyond themselves, to an external object or idea. In poetry, words are mutually reflexive in the contextual symbolization of the total aesthetic structure.⁸ Scientific language indicates facts which are either true or false, but cannot reveal the quality of a lake in the dawn or a landscape in the sunset or the laughter of a child or the eternal enchantment of love. By the magic incantation of poetic words the immediate delight of experience is bodied forth and the expression of emotion is achieved. Prose, Professor Parkhurst tells us, is propositional, and poetry is rhythmical and expressive.⁹ In strict consistency, Hegel's doctrine really means that a poem does not constitute an experience in which sights, sounds, emotions, thoughts are interlaced in an expressed unity, but that the poem is a sign and symbol of a transcendent spiritual content.¹⁰

Hegel's elevation of poetry to a plane of almost pure ideality, in which *imagination is the only true medium*, leads logically to Croce's doctrine of art as completely ideal, that is, as spiritual intuition consummated before the act of exteriorization has begun. Croce extends the ideality of poetry to the entire sphere of art and identifies aesthetic with intuition, and logic with the concept. Art is, therefore, according to Croce, not the intuition of a concept, not the sensuous representation of the Idea. It is an autonomous expression of Spirit preceding in time but not in dignity the logical concept. Art, in Hegel's view, is the sensuous representation of the Idea, and poetry, as the highest art, has climbed to the threshold of the Idea, of philosophy. It would seem then that Hegel separated form from content

in poetry for the purpose of exalting its spiritual quality and value. But nothing of the sort happens. Hegel's philosophy of art is subsumed under his metaphysical logic, and it eventuates that the ultimate home of art, of the Idea in art, proves to be too spiritual, too frail and fragile, and deliquesces in the sunlight. Like Moses upon Mount Nebo, poetry is doomed to die precisely at the moment when it is in sight of the promised land:

. . . poetry is the specific art in which a point is reached which marks the beginning of the disintegration of art itself, a point at which the philosophical consciousness discovers its bridge of passage to the notion of religion as such, as also to the prose of scientific thought . . . (IV, p. 15), poetry . . . carries the process of negating its sensuous medium so far that instead of transforming that which stands in opposition to gross spatial matter, namely tone, as architecture does with its material into a significant symbol, it rather reduces it to a mere sign of no significance. But by doing so it destroys the fusion of spiritual ideality with external existence, so thoroughly that to this extent it ceases to be compatible with the original notion of Art. In other words it comes dangerously near to bidding good-bye to the regions of sense altogether, remaining wholly absorbed in that of ideality. The fair mean between these extremes of architecture and poetry is secured by sculpture, painting, and music (IV, p. 16).

2. THE IMMINENT MORTALITY OF ART

This is the fate of poetry, the highest of the arts. Surely then the lower arts cannot hope to escape this imminent death, this absorption into a loftier spiritual activity. The progress of the Absolute cannot be halted, and, as the semi-Hegelian Croce testifies, Hegel was "firm in his belief that every form of spirit (save the ultimate and supreme form) is nothing but a provisional and contradictory way of conceiving the Absolute."¹¹ Now art is merely the sensuous expression of the Idea—its *first* expression. Therein lies its glory and therein lies its tragedy. If its concern were not

the same as that of philosophy—the Absolute, Truth—if it dealt with some inferior realm of being and of knowledge, it could be spared, it would have a permanent function to fulfill. But since its function is metaphysical, that is, to render Spirit accessible to sense, its historico-cultural role has been accomplished. It cannot continue to be our mode of knowledge of the Absolute. In an act of self-oblation art must yield to thought, plenary, wholly free from the refraction of a sensuous medium and a material embodiment. Hegel tellingly writes: “. . . neither in respect to content or form is art either the highest or most absolute mode of bringing the true interests of our spiritual life to consciousness. . . . It is only a particular sphere and grade of truth which is capable of being reproduced in the form of a work of art. . . . (p. 11). The type peculiar to art-production and its products fails any longer to satisfy man's highest need. We are beyond the stage of reverence for works of art as divine and objects deserving our worship . . . Thought and reflection have taken their flight” (I, p. 12).

The fact is that Hegel—like Vico and Macaulay¹²—really propounded a static philosophy of history and of art. Despite his very creation of such words as *genesis*, *evolution*, Hegel looked upon art as the self-unfolding of the Idea of Beauty in a dialectical-mechanical fashion, serving its purpose and fulfilling its function in a definite historical period, in a definite series of stages. He did not see life as a concrete ever-growing natural process (in which culture is not the automatic gradual self-recognition of the Idea but is the product of the active interaction between man and his objective environment), not to be described by, nor exhausted in, a dialectical formula, and he did not appreciate art as the ever-growing, ever-intensified revelation of the qualitative meanings of experience. Art is then historically and culturally an elementary philosophy, a propae-

deutic to a metaphysical Dialectic or a dialectical Metaphysic. It is a longing and a striving to reach beyond itself. And it bears within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. Although, in the final paragraph of his long introduction, Hegel writes that "It is as the external realization of this idea that the wide Pantheon of art is being raised; and the architect and builder thereof is the spirit of beauty as it gradually comes to self-cognition, and to complete which the history of the world will require its evolution of centuries" (I, p. 122), he has all along had no doubt that this evolution has been completed. At the beginning of the very same Introduction he proposes that art be immured in a morgue for the purpose of a scientific autopsy. Like the unfortunate white mice of the modern biologist and psychologist, art is to be dissected for a post-mortem discovery of a thing these non-Hegelian scientists probably would not understand—the processes of Spirit, of the Absolute. In the captivity of Babylon, Ezekiel had prophesied that the dry bones in the valley would be covered up with flesh and skin, and the breath of life would be instilled in them; and twenty-four centuries later, Hegel suggests that the life in art has been extinguished, that its value and validity have ceased to be. He says: "In all these respects art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest possibilities, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost its genuine truth and life, and is rather transported to our world of *ideas* than is able to maintain its former necessity and its superior place in reality . . . A *science* of art is therefore a far more urgent necessity in our own days than in times in which art as art sufficed by itself alone to give complete satisfaction" (I, p. 13).

3. THE ABSORPTION OF ART IN PHILOSOPHY

What happens to art? According to Hegel, both art and religion are absorbed in Philosophy.

In the *Philosophy of Mind* Hegel writes:

This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the vision-method of Art, external in point of form, is but subjective production and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes, and whereas Religion, with its separation into parts, opens it out in mental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out; Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a total, but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by thought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content are cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free.¹³

And in the *Philosophy of Fine Art* he says:

For art carries in the notion that gives it life a limit; and it is from this boundary that the human consciousness passes beyond into forms more adequate to its spiritual import. It is this inherent *shortness of the mark* that fixes the subordinate position we are only too ready to assign to art in our daily life nowadays. For us European art is no longer the highest means in which the actuality of truth is possessed. Speaking generally, thought has long ago pronounced a verdict upon art when it defined it as the portrayal of the Divine by concepts which appeal to sense-perception. This was the judgment passed on it by the Jews and the followers of Mohammed. Nay, we find it present among the Greeks themselves, as the strong opposition of Plato and Homer and Hesiod to the popular conception of the gods proves clearly. There is a period in the education of every civilized nation, when art becomes a sign-post, as it were, to that which stands beyond her border. The evolution of Christendom is itself an illustration. The historical features of that religion, the resurrection of Christ, His life and death, have doubtless offered to the art of painting a mighty field on which to exercise its imaginative bounty; and the Church has either surrounded such art with its magnificent protection, or suffered it simply to work on unheeded. But as the love of knowledge and scientific research, and yet more the felt want of a more intimate and personal spirituality necessitated the Reformation, the religious imagination was called away from the sensuous medium which enwrapped it, and centred once

for all upon the inward spirituality of emotional life and conscious thought . . . We may, indeed, express the hope that art will rise to yet higher grades of technical perfection; but in any case Art in its specific form has ceased to meet the highest requirements of spiritual life (I, pp. 141-42).

The sphere of conscious life nearest to that of art is that of religion. The form which belongs to the religious consciousness is that of the *imaginative concept*. The Absolute is here removed from the externality of artistic production, and received in a more spiritual way by the imagination, so that the heart and emotions, the inner life of the individual that is to say, become its vehicle . . . Devotion is a type of emotional existence which is, strictly speaking, outside the province of art. It originates in the fact that the individual suffers that object which art has rendered visible to sense to penetrate the arcana of his emotional life, and so completely identifies himself with it that this inward presence, which the imagination and the inherent might of feeling has rendered possible, becomes an essential phase in the manifestation of absolute reality . . . (pp. 142-43).

The *third* and last form or phase in the evolution of absolute mind (spirit) is *philosophy* . . . The inwardness of devotion which is born of the emotions and the imagination is not the highest form of inwardness. We are bound to recognize that the purest form of knowledge is conscious *thought* in its freest activity . . . In the purview of such a philosophy, art and religion, as two aspects of one truth, become related under a unifying conception . . . For while human thought is the most inward and appropriate vehicle of subjective life, such thought, in its fullest grasp of truth, the Idea, is actuality in the most objective and universal sense of the term, and is only to be apprehended by pure thought in the medium native to itself (p. 143).

This is nothing less than a funeral-oration. Hegel is chanting: *le roi est mort; vive le roi*—that is, art is dead; long live philosophy. And Hegel does not seem to be shedding any tears of lamentation. He is speaking of the death of art in no metaphorical sense but in a definite historical and cultural sense. He is not granting, as Vico did, the recurrent *psychological* role of art in the spiritual

education of the individual—the role of awakening the mind, of enabling it to pass from imagination to thought, from the intuition to the universal. On the contrary, like Collingwood at present, he consigns art to its death without hope of resurrection. To Collingwood, religion, science, art, are not autonomous forms of cultural and spiritual expression but philosophical errors. They contain truth only implicitly, as when we say: this is what he *really* meant but he does not know it. Consequently, “philosophy is . . . the self-consciousness of experience in general.”¹⁴ Hegel was quite as consistent. Art dies without hope of resurrection; Spirit does not retrace its steps. In the *Phenomenology* art is declared to be superior to natural religion as the worship of Spirit as subject is superior to the naïve superstitious adoration of material object-fetishes.¹⁵ In the *Encyclopaedia*¹⁶ and in the *Philosophy of Fine Art* art is considered inferior to religion as religion is inferior to philosophy as a mode of apprehending the Idea as pure thought “in the medium native to itself.” In the *Philosophy of History* Hegel writes: “It is thus *One Individuality* which, presented in its essence as God, is honoured and enjoyed in *Religion*; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in *Art*; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception in *Philosophy*.”¹⁷ But consistently enough art and religion are throughout regarded as destined to pass into philosophy. In the *Philosophy of History* Hegel also says: “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom . . . The destiny of the spiritual world . . . the *final cause of the world at large*, we allege to be the *consciousness* of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto*, the *reality* of that freedom.”¹⁸ Art is an elementary, an imperfect, an incomplete philosophy. It is the representation of the Idea as *sensuous appearance* in that culture-period in which “the *consciousness* of its freedom on the part of Spirit” has not been yet achieved. And

Freedom is Reason. Its historical expression is the progressive self-consciousness of thought "in the medium native to itself."

There is no message for us in Hegel's philosophy of art. Indeed, his philosophy of art is a long, eloquent epitaph upon art. Nor should his view of the death of art be grouped with the conceptions of philosophers like Plato, Plotinus, and Schopenhauer, to whom beauty was also a stepping-stone to some superior state of vision and blessedness. "The Platonic idealist"—Santayana tells us—"is so wedded to perfection that he sees in everything not the reality but the faultless ideal which the reality misses and suggests . . . Platonic idealism requires a gift of impassioned contemplation, an incandescent fancy that leaps from the things of sense to the goals of beauty and desire." ¹⁹ To Hegel the actual and the rational are synonymous and the mortality of art is conditioned by his metaphysical dialectic, which identifies the *method* of triadic synthesis with the *processes* of reality. The death of art illustrates very nicely Hegel's notion of reality as the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute, of the Idea, in a series of opposites which cannot be separated but are fused in a unity, which, in turn, generates its antithesis, until the final synthesis, the complete self-recognition of Spirit, is achieved. Now according to this method of triadic synthesis, beauty itself is a synthesis of the rational and the sensuous; romantic art is a synthesis of classical and symbolical art, philosophy is a synthesis of art and religion. And philosophy is the definitive, authorized edition of the Absolute. By a process of sheer dialectical deduction Hegel infers the death of art; it is necessitated by the conceptual determinism of his metaphysical-dialectical absolutism.²⁰

Hegel sacrifices art upon the altar of an abstract and formal logical necessity. He equates logic with life and the substance of the universe is to him not material but con-

ceptual. As Santayana says, Hegel was a solemn solipsist making discourse the key and essence of reality and attributing to the universe a certain dramatic-dialectic necessity in our mode of reflection.²¹ Hegel's dialectic necessitated the death of art and he might have said with Doctor Bahys in Molière's *L'Amour Médecin*: "It is better to die through following the rules than to recover through violating them." It is, however, much easier to believe with the simple folk in Andersen's story that the naked king is wearing golden garments than it is to agree with Hegel that art has lost its witchery, its wisdom, and does not suffice any longer "by itself alone to give complete satisfaction" (I, p. 13). In fact, seldom has humanity found itself in such imperative need of the light and guidance of a true art, an art able to clarify and to coördinate contemporary experience. Hegel's dialectic entails many grand confusions, since it is applied alike to logical universals and to concrete historical events, but nowhere is it more misleading than in his aesthetic theory.

IV

HEGEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY

HEGEL'S theory of tragedy merits special attention. There is a scope and a depth and a gravity in the views he propounded. They cannot be ignored, no matter how averse one may be to them. To speak of Hegel's philosophy of art without considering his conception of the nature of tragedy is almost like playing *Hamlet* without the role of the Prince of Denmark.²²

1. ANCIENT TRAGEDY

What then is the metaphysics of tragedy to Hegel? Tragedy is rooted in spirit. Its source is a division in the ethical substance, that is, in the spiritual forces that rule and propel the realm of men's deeds and desires. It is a violent collision—not of the good with the bad—but of the good with the good, of spiritual powers, of an ideal or an institution, such as the state, with—for example—the family. It is a conflict between two rights. Hegel says: "The sphere of this content, although capable of great variety of detail, is not in its essential features very extensive. The principal source of opposition, which Sophocles in particular (in this respect following the lead of Aeschylus) has accepted and worked out in the finest way, is that of the *body politic*, the opposition, that is, between ethical life in its social universality and the family as the natural ground of moral relations. These are the purest forces of tragic representation" (IV, p. 318). He goes on to cite as illustrations of his thesis the *Seven before Thebes* of Aeschylus, especially the *Antigone* of Sophocles, the *Iphigenia in Aulis* of Euripides,

the *Agamemnon*, the *Choephoroe* (the *Libation-Bearers*), and the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, and the *Electra* of Sophocles. Now in all of these plays, in all Greek tragedy, there is this division in the ethical substance, and there are, as a consequence, two incompatible allegiances. And the tragedy is precisely that there is no question of innocence or guilt, of wrong or right, but simply one of incompatibility between two rights, between two loyalties. It is essentially a strife in the sovereign ethical substance governing human will and action. In the *Antigone*, for instance, Creon, the king of Thebes, denies the rites of burial to Antigone's brother who has rebelled against the state. Antigone obeys the dictates of heart and religion, and her penalty is death. Is Creon guilty? Is Antigone innocent? Both are right. Creon represents the state; Antigone represents the family. The right of the state becomes the substantive aim of Creon as a tragic character; it becomes inwoven in his personality; his strength is the strength of an ideal, of an institution, and, in turn, it is this very strength of character which compels him to fulfill this right, to strain it to an extreme. The right of the family, the law of heart and conscience, the light of devotion, become the substantive aim of Antigone as a tragic character; they cannot be detached from her individuality; sustained by the unshakable conviction of the rightness of her determination, she, too, by virtue of this very strength of character, bends the bow of her right too far.

The reconciliation takes place in the assertion of the ethical substance, in the restoration of its unity by an act of eternal justice—a justice which invalidates and denies the extreme demands of both claims. For, if it may be said that both claims are equally right, they are also equally wrong. And the aspect of wrongness consists in the extremeness of the right, in the character's blind oblivion of the spiritual unity, of the ethical substance, as embracing many

other rights. The reconciliation does not always necessitate the death of the protagonists: there may be a yielding on one side, as in the *Eumenides*; there may be a fine inner purification, as in the *Oedipus Coloneus*. But a reconciliation there must be, and the vision of eternal justice must irradiate the conclusion of the tragedy; and since the characters unmitigatingly represent their *relative* claims, are identified as personalities with those *relative* rights, their destruction is the indispensable condition of the restored harmony of the ethical substance. Hegel writes: "The true course of dramatic development consists in the annulment of *contradictions* viewed as such, in the reconciliation of the forces of human action, which alternatively strive to negate each other in their conflict. Only so far is misfortune and suffering not the final issue, but rather the satisfaction of spirit, as for the first time, in virtue of such a conclusion, the necessity of all that particular individuals experience, is able to appear in complete accord with reason, and our emotional attitude is tranquilized on a truly ethical basis" (IV, p. 321). The reconciliation, therefore, is an affirmative one. The equal validity of both rights or powers engaged in conflict *when* the collision took place, is established. And the necessity of the issue is not an irrational fatalism, but is, indeed, the rationality of destiny.

2. MODERN TRAGEDY

Turning to modern tragedy, Hegel notes that its striking trait is absorption in the personality of the character, in his passions and feelings and adventures. Characters no longer embody institutions; they have ceased to represent a collision of spiritual forces. Of course, there are some modern tragedies resembling the ancient type: such as *Faust* (in which an individual is in strife with the Absolute) or Schiller's *Robbers* (in which an individual is in rebellion against the whole order of civic society) and *Wallenstein*

(in which an individual proclaims the ideal of national unity in opposition to the imperial authority). But essentially modern tragedy is concerned, not with a division in the ethical substance, but with the problems, the passions, and the experiences of individual characters.

Hegel contrasts Shakespeare's tragedies with those of the Greeks. His basic contention is made very clear in his comments upon *Hamlet*. There is a fundamental collision in *Hamlet* similar to the one in the *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus and in the *Electra* of Sophocles. In all the three plays, the father-king is murdered, and the mother-queen marries the murderer (the two Greek plays, of course, deal with the same characters). But in the conception of the Greek tragedians the murder assumes an aspect of sanctified ethical justification—for is not the death of Agamemnon brought about in consequence of the sacrifice of Iphigenia? In the Shakespearean play the mother is innocent of the crime, the heinous deed is committed by the fratricidal king in the name of no claim or right or institution, and therefore:

The real collision . . . does not turn on the fact that the son, in giving effect to a rightful sense of vengeance, is himself forced to violate morality, but rather on the particular personality, the inner life of Hamlet, whose noble soul is not steeled to this kind of energetic activity, but, while full of contempt for the world and life, what between making up his mind and attempting to carry into effect or preparing to carry into effect its resolves, is bandied from pillar to post, and finally through his own procrastination and the external course of events meets his own doom (IV, pp. 334-35).

So, likewise, Lady Macbeth may be compared with Clytemnestra. Clytemnestra surely represented a right, and what right does Lady Macbeth embody?

Consequently there is vacillation in the hearts and minds of the characters in modern tragedy, and a lack of resolve in their actions, and they are placed in a wide expanse of contingent circumstances and relations. Interest is shifted

from the substantive claim to the character himself, to his passions and seekings and gropings. In ancient tragedy there were two rights represented by two individuals in bitter antagonism; in modern tragedy there are two opposed passions in the bosom of one character, which sway and toss him fluctuatingly from one resolve or act to another. Since interest is diverted from the ethical substance to the individual characters, since crime is perpetrated no longer in behalf of a right, there is obviously such a thing as innocence or guilt in a modern tragedy. The reconciliation is no longer an act of eternal justice, the restoration of harmony in the spiritual world. Indeed, the catastrophe is either a result of unhappy circumstance and external accident or is a consequence of the commission of a sin against the ethical powers. In neither case is there true reconciliation: in the first, there is not any, because pure commiseration for noble natures who are victims of unhappy circumstance and external accident is devoid of meaning; in the second, there is not any, because the punishment is deserved. True compassion is evoked by the comprehension of the causes and the sources of the suffering, that is to say, by a realization of the substantive aims championed by the characters.

3. CRITICISM

Now Hegel's apparent denial of moral guilt or innocence in tragedy, his insistence upon the tragic issue as being a division in the ethical substance, would imply that he is suggesting a truly ethical theory of tragedy. But, in fact, and, perhaps, in intention, Hegel's entire doctrine is permeated with a vicious moralism²³—with a flaming justification of the socio-political and the historico-cultural *status quo*. Hegel postulates the equal validity of both claims—that of the individual and that of the abstract institution—but he postulates them as being in opposition,

in irreconcilable conflict. He puts the individual and his ideals over against the institution and its laws, and the reconciliation consists in the common destruction of both representatives. The doom is the doom of the individuals. The majesty and sovereignty of the institution remain sacred and inviolable—of the institution distinct from, and transcendent to, the individual and his heart and conscience. There is no provision in Hegel's theory for the tragedies of Euripides and Ibsen with their deep, poignant protest against the moral absolutes, the petrified traditions of the "state," the "institution," of Dr. Stockmann's bitter cry in *An Enemy of the People*—"he is strongest who stands most alone."²⁴ For Hegel did not question the fundamental criteria of social life and of moral judgments. In the *Philosophy of History* he writes: "Law is the objectivity of Spirit; volition is its true form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself—it is independent and so free . . ." But he adds immediately: ". . . The morality (*Sittlichkeit*) of the State is not of that ethical (*moralische*) reflective kind, in which one's own conviction bears sway."²⁵ In his rational-dialectical universe there was not—as there was to Schopenhauer—a problem of evil: "Before the pure light of this divine Idea—which is no mere Ideal—the phantom of a world whose events are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances, utterly vanishes."²⁶ He therefore conceived of tragedy as a division in the ethical substance, that is, he transferred the crisis from the hearts and actions of men to the grand ideas and the sanctified standards directing the deeds of men, but he did not doubt the inherent logic of the ethical substance, the infallible rightness of ideas, standards, and institutions. He could not do otherwise in a world in which *Was ist, das vernünftig ist; was vernünftig ist, das ist*. It is in this sense that Hegel's negation of the notion of guilt or innocence in tragedy is to be interpreted, that is, as the rightness and

in consequence the official philosopher of Prussia. In his theory of tragedy Hegel put his dialectic—the dissolution of contradictions, that is, of thesis and antithesis in the unity of a new synthesis—in the service of the metaphysics of the state. In the *Philosophy of Law* Hegel writes: “The State is the march of God through the world . . . True reality is necessity. What is real is eternally necessary . . . We must therefore worship the State as the manifestation of the divine on earth.”²⁹

Hegel’s concept of necessity in tragedy means, therefore, the inevitable attrition of the characters representing the conflicting or antagonistic rights. It is a necessity which accords with reason, which eventuates in the death of men but in the triumph of eternal justice and in the perpetuation of the state, of law, of abstract principles. In full accordance with Hegel’s theory is the answer of Orestes to Clytemnestra in the *Libation-Bearers* (*Choephoroe*) of Aeschylus:

CLYTEMNESTRA: Oh! Wilt thou kill thy mother? O my son!

ORESTES: I kill thee not. Thy sin destroyeth thee—³⁰

or Clytemnestra’s own reply to Electra in the *Electra* of Sophocles:

. . . for not I alone

But Justice slew him; and if you had sense,

To side with Justice ought to be your part—³¹

or the Grand Inquisitor’s justification for the execution of the only son of Philip II (as fomenting rebellion against the state) in Schiller’s *Don Carlos*:

PHILIP II: . . . And can you not

Establish some new creed to justify

The bloody murder of one’s own son?

GRAND INQUISITOR:

To appease eternal justice, God’s own Son

Expired upon the cross.³²

It is a necessity predetermined by the dialectic of a formula,

and not by the experiential dialectic of real and inexpugnable life, by the fatal *nemesis* of life itself in consequence of some *hybris* in character and conduct *as such*. And it is life *as such*, in the unanswerable veracity and concreteness of its sorrows and its joys, that tragedy reveals and clarifies. Surely neither Antigone nor Creon is guilty or innocent in a narrow moral sense—the question of guilt is extraneous to the tragedy—both are animated and motivated by passions and ideals *their own*, flowing from, but not embodying or vaguely symbolizing, the socio-spiritual beliefs and aspirations they cherished; both experience internal conflict and clash of emotions and are not merely the mechanical proponents of their respective “rights.” Creon is not the firm, inflexible, self-conscious representative of the sovereignty of the state, but a weak, vacillating, superstitious and yet sceptical man in the throes of a fanatical devotion to the state, who lacks nonetheless in *The Phoenician Maidens* of Euripides the courage to sacrifice his own son for the welfare of the polity in obedience to a divine command. Antigone is the deep-suffering, yet proud descendant of a family of *rulers over men* but the *playthings of gods*, exulting in the anguish of her martyrdom, and in the intensity of her love almost welcoming this bitter woe as her birthright, as the bond that will unite her with her own, that will allow her to say with her father Oedipus in the *Oedipus Coloneus*:

. . . My life

Hath more of wrong endured than of wrong done.³³

No doubt the reader or spectator of the *Antigone* does not calmly accept Creon and Antigone as the proponents of two equally valid “claims”; the reader feels and knows that Creon is wrong and Antigone is right, or, in the words of Lewis Campbell, “every spectator must have felt that it is better to die with Antigone than to live with Creon.”³⁴ The truth of Antigone’s words is ineffaceable, and inefface-

able is their bitter-sweet memory in the heart and mind of reader or spectator:

ANTIGONE: Death knows no difference, but demands his due.

CREON: Yet not equality 'twixt good and bad.

ANTIGONE: Both may be equal yonder; who can tell?

CREON: An enemy is hated even in death.

ANTIGONE: Love, and not hatred, is the part for me.³⁵

And this memory becomes more deeply graven, upon reading or hearing these last words—the final wish—of the dying Polyneices, Antigone's brother and Jocasta's son, in *The Phoenician Maidens* of Euripides:

Mother, our death is this. I pity thee,
And thee, my sister, and my brother dead.
Loved, he became my foe: but loved—yet loved!
Bury me, mother, and thou, sister mine,
In native soil, and our chafed city's wrath
Appease ye, that I win thus much at least
Of fatherland, though I have lost mine home.³⁶

To say that the spectator feels and knows that Antigone is right and Creon is wrong is not to assert that the play is meant to leave the spectator with a feeling of hatred for Creon. To do that would be tantamount to the conversion of Sophocles's great tragedy into a melodrama. On the contrary, it is only by realizing the rightness of Antigone's love and loyalty, as well as by perceiving the emotional roots of Creon's fanatical deification of the prerogatives and the sanctity of the state above personal sympathy and forgiveness, that a truly ethical reconciliation can take place at the end of the play. The significance of the tragedy dwells in the glimpse it has offered (through the concrete portrayal of men and women) of the possibility of a polity in which the dictates of the individual conscience and the law of the community, of the objective social order, will be in harmony, where it will no longer be necessary to repine with sad irony:

. . . Man, proud man,
 Drest in a little brief authority,
 Most ignorant of what he's most assured

 Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
 As make the angels weep.³⁷

Hegel thinks that the reconciliation in modern tragedy is not satisfactory. The unity of the ethical substance is not restored. There is no moral justification for the crimes committed. The causes and the sources of suffering—the conflict and division in the ethical substance—are not unraveled. He objects to Shakespeare's characters because they are vessels driven by passion and hate and love and doubt and fear and desire. But therein resides the ethical value of tragedy, ancient and modern; and if the emphasis is put upon *modern* it is because, as Butcher says, "The ancient stage furnishes us with no such complete instance of character-development as we have, for example, in *Macbeth*."³⁸ There is no ethical justification for crimes committed in tragic poetry. That is not the province of tragedy. For tragedy is the portrayal of *life*. And life is love and hope and beauty and suffering and birth and death, and the conflict between the desires of the heart and the imperatives of conscience, and the clash between the individual with his vision and the social order with its accumulated traditions.

Tragedy is the artistic-dramatic projection of experience. It is the revelation of the forces operative in life, of the collision of emotions and ideas, of character and circumstance, of the self-division and wastage of spirit. This notion of men (that is, kings and princes) as representing "rights" (that is, the hallowed politico-economic and socio-moral laws and conventions) permeated the dramatic theories of the Renaissance. Lessing with his profound human sympathy had already remonstrated that "we pity

them as human beings, not as kings.”³⁹ But none realized so deeply as Schopenhauer the inseparability of tragedy from life. “The true sense of tragedy”—he tells us—“is the deeper insight, that it is not his own individual sins that the hero atones for, but original sin, i.e., the crime of existence itself.”⁴⁰ And it is thus that a contemporary philosophical critic of drama—Mr. Krutch—can truly say: “In the midst of a great comic spectacle, a great tragic novel, or a great elegiac poem we have the sense of having discovered the key to existence. . . . Life seems to assume a recognizable and consistent character and we experience something like that relief which we feel in the presence of a stranger when we have got a certain insight into his character . . .”⁴¹ The evocation of this insight, the creation of this sense of intimacy, of union, with the universe, is the height of drama. It is not the acquiescence in “rights”—that is the abnegation of the sovereign human quest for truth. It is thus that Castor can say to Orestes in Euripides’s *Electra*:

. . . and, here withal
 Being come, have seen thy mother’s bloody fall,
 Our sister’s. Righteous is her doom this day,
 But not thy deed. And Phoebus, Phoebus . . .
 Nay;
 He is my lord; therefore I hold my peace.
 Yet though in light he dwell, no light was this
 He showed to thee, but darkness!⁴²

To shed light upon this darkness—the light the gods begrudge, though in light they dwell, is the high mission of tragic poetry. Tragedy brings to light the *lacrimae rerum*, the tears that are in things. But in Hegel’s view, the tragic stage is an arena for the battle of two abstract and mythical “claims.” Hence he thinks that the protagonists of ancient tragedy were neither abstract symbols nor individual persons but midway characters representing ideals. But again

it must be averred that all great tragedy—ancient and modern—is the delineation of real men and women, of inimitable characters in the warp and woof of life. And the suffering of these men and women *as such* elicits pity and comprehension. Tragedy discovers the logic of suffering, the meaning in the cry of Job and Lear, in the despair of Hecuba in the presence of her martyred grandchild, and of Anna Karénina (for tragedy is not confined merely to drama) in the presence of her living but sequestered child. There is nobility, there is a poignant beauty in the serene endurance of sorrow in the face of tragedy. This suffering, this self-division in spirit, renders all genuine tragic poetry precious and truly ethical, and is the common bond that unites the defender of Thebes and Macbeth, Clytemnestra and Lady Macbeth and Christine,⁴³ Medea and Othello, Oedipus and Lear, Antigone and Hedvig “the wild duck” (for—discarding Hegel’s “claims”—are not both victims of a fanatical unquestioned moral absolute?). Because tragedy is the clear rendition of life—and not the dramatic portrayal of two skeletal “rights,” we are more eager—when in its presence—to understand and to allay than to judge and to punish. For then tragedy speaks to us with the words Adrastus, King of Argos, addressed to Theseus, King of Athens, in *The Suppliants* of Euripides:

Not for a judge I chose thee of mine ills,
But as to a healer of them, king, we come.⁴⁴

Because in tragedy “life seems to assume a recognizable and consistent character,” we experience a sense of relief, we are eager to heal and we are healed. And if our longing for a *moral teleology*, for a perfect and a happy world is not fulfilled, it is yet made more perfect and happier by the perfecting and the deepening of our sympathy for human failure and sorrow, for the destiny of “our brother,” by the intensification and illumination of that “profound sense of

the community of human suffering which all force deepens and all freedom assuages." Tragedy—Aristotle said—is the complete and serious imitation of an action in suitable language and form "with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions."⁴⁵ The true tragic purgation, Mr. I. A. Richards suggests, consists in the reconciliation of pity (the impulse to approach) and terror (the impulse to retreat). In the tragic experience the mind foregoes illusion and comes face to face with reality. It is above subterfuge and suppression and stands self-reliant in the presence of baffling issues. And the mind does not rest complacent in the fragile and precarious truce of a "moral" or "religious" solution. The peace of tragedy is an anguished but secure victory in the midst of stress, and it is peace by the inclusion of impulses, by the absorption of experience, and by the ultimate affirmation of life. It is in this sense that tragedy is perhaps the most all-ordering, the most valuable experience known. It is thus that Bertrand Russell can say: "Of all the arts, tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant; for it builds its shining citadel in the very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain."⁴⁶ But once more, tragedy attains this composure by facing reality, by depicting the conflict between good and evil (not in a moral or religious, but in a naturalistic sense—according to which the *good* is that which leads to human happiness and worth, and *evil* is that which produces human misery and degradation) and, therefore, makes possible the fullest and the most enduring reconciliation with life, with fate (the unaccountable element in life). Such tragedy *does* break our hearts, only so that we may do what Hamlet would have his mother-queen do:

QUEEN: O Hamlet! thou hast cleft my heart in twain.

HAMLET: O, throw away the worser part of it,

And live the purer with the other half.⁴⁷

*Postscript: THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY UPON
HEBBEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY*

Hegel's philosophy, and especially his theory of tragedy, had a profound influence upon Hebbel. There is no doubt that Hebbel was acquainted with Hegel's philosophy of history. He also tried to read the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology*, but candidly confesses—what so many will sympathetically understand—that he was unable to seize their inmost meaning. Hebbel used constantly the Hegelian term *Idea*, but by *Idea* he meant the social, moral, and religious institutions of humanity.

It is perhaps fortunate that Hebbel did not penetrate the arcana of the *Logic*. It left him free to view life at first hand, and, fortified by a powerful dramatic instinct, to see life as a *tragic*, and not as a *dialectic* process. Life and logic were synonymous concepts to Hegel; he conceived the evolution of history as proceeding according to the mechanism of dialectical reasoning. To Hebbel life was tragic; the infinite evolution of history, the progress of the human race, could only be wrought—as Heraclitus, the dark philosopher, had taught so long ago—in the crucible of *strife*. There is a dualism in life—*das Leben in seiner Gebrochenheit*—which posits the individual over against the *Idea*, the social institutions. The conflict between the individual and his piercing vision into the future, on the one hand, and the moral order with its accumulated traditions, on the other hand, can be resolved by the tragic sacrifice of the individual upon the altar of human progress. The individual is the temporal lamp that illuminates the eternal *Idea*.

Now Hegel held that in tragedy two valid rights are represented, and that the unity of the ethical substance is restored by their common doom. Hebbel's advance is to render the conflict truly tragic and significant by interpreting it as a clash between an individual and the *Idea*. According to Hebbel, then, tragedy is not a puppet show in which midway characters merely represent "rights." It becomes the grand and serious portrayal of human ideals and aspirations, and of the hunger of the heart for love and happiness, set against the background of the *Idea*, that is to say, the moral, social, and religious institutions in which human life is expressed and by which it is so very often crushed. It is really a conflict *within* the *Idea*, within

the institutions, engendered by the laws of progress, by the law of unlimited evolution; it is a conflict between the old and the new. And the herald and harbinger of the new is the victim that must be sacrificed to the jealous gods of the old.

What is the rationale in Hebbel's philosophy of tragedy? Tragedy must represent the life-process, and tragedy must represent it not merely as a *Sein* but also as a *Werden*. Indeed, in the conflict between the *Sein* and the *Werden* is the tragic issue. In the *Tagebücher* he says: "It is the first and the last aim of art to make the life process itself visible, to show how the innermost core of man's being develops within the surrounding atmosphere, whether that be favorable or not."⁴⁸

In tragedy, the individual is an integral part of this life-process; he is a character moulded by his social and moral environment and yet impelled to sustain a critical relation to the life-process and his *Begebenheit*. His full stature as a character, as a spiritual being, is attained in this conflict for an ideal. The tragic hero is guiltless. His guilt, if any, is that he bears too passionately the torch of truth in the hands of love—so passionately, that he does not heed the warning that his torch may set the world aflame. This is the heart of tragedy. In the Preface to *Maria Magdalene* Hebbel says: "The drama as the acme of all art should portray each state of the world and of man in its relation to the Idea, that is, the moral center conditioning all that we in the world-organism must accept if only for self-preservation" (p. 40). But the tragic character is no mere proponent of an ideal. The character and the ideal *grow* in the tragic action. The hero is not "ready-made" to be the proper bearer of a "claim." In *Mein Wort über das Drama* he writes: "Of the greatest importance is the treatment of the characters. In no case should these appear as ready-made and enacting their specific relations in an external fashion, dealing with happiness and unhappiness, but not gaining an inner essence of their own" (p. 4). The character that has an inner essence flowers into spiritual fullness in the tragedy, and in the tragic action this essence is revealed. He perishes in behalf of an ideal and the tragic purgation, the ethical reconciliation, does not flow from a moral preachment concretely presented upon the stage, but from our—and the hero's—clear realization of the tragic dualism in life, of the inevitability of this tragic resolution of the *Gebrochenheit* of life.

HEGEL

Hebbel's view of life and of tragedy is historical, evolutionary. It is natural that he should think that the conflict between an individual and the Idea as social institution, should be most intense at a critical juncture in history—at a moment when the old system of values is beginning to crumble and the new has hardly uttered its cry of parturition. The great historical-dramatic crises, he thinks, are crystallized in Greek and Shakespearean drama, the one portraying the conflict between man and Fate, and the other, the dualism in man himself. But these discords and fluctuations in private and public life have not ceased. They have become intensified, and are rooted in the sub-soil of modern culture: "Dramatic art should help to complete the world historical process which unfolds itself in our days and which does not want to overthrow the existing institutions of the human species, political, religious, and moral, but to provide a more solid foundation, that is, to protect them against such overthrow" (pp. 47-48).

Hebbel's conception of tragedy is more dramatic than Hegel's. Tragedy, according to Hebbel, deals with social development and evolution. And the ethical import of tragedy resides in its immanent social evaluation. Hebbel's characters are not the abstract proponents of "rights" but confused, seeking, groping, hoping, hating and loving men and women. Their strength is the strength of an ideal-motive animating all their acts. It was exactly on this ground that Hebbel was attacked by the Danish critic, J. L. Herberg, and in reply, he wrote: ". . . they reproached me for . . . the deduction of (Judith's) act out of this confusion. It is only because of this confusion that her act could become a tragic act, that is, an act necessitated by the world-historical process but at the same time destroying the individual charged with this act because of the partial violation of the moral law. They imputed to me as a fault what is really a merit" (pp. 61-62).

This discloses the difference between Hebbel and Hegel, but also what they have in common. Like Hegel, Hebbel imposes upon drama a mythical, metaphysical theory. It is not the world-historical process that necessitates the act of Judith (who kills Holofernes in a frenzy of tribal patriotism). It is the dark, deep, unplumbed power of human emotion and passion that propels her deed and leads to her destruction. Nor does one need a world-historical process to discern in the father's

baffled and bewildered cry in *Maria Magdalene*—"Ich verstehe die Welt nicht mehr" (inherent *in* and not grafted *upon* the tragedy) the resonance of a social and moral order which circumscribes life, which deifies the "idols of the tribe," which denies happiness. It is life, and the tragic, fascinating play of love and hate, of aspirations and ideals and frustration, that nourishes the poet's imagination. Tragedy is the revelation of the eternal verities of the human heart against the background and within the framework of the milieu, the social and moral institutions. Human happiness and grief do not occur *in vacuo*, but are conditioned in large measure by social forms of life. The social and the ethical function of tragedy is to shed light upon life, and is neither to provide nor to demolish the foundations of institutions *as such*, but, as Hebbel writes in the *Tagebücher*: "The modern drama, if we are to have such a drama, must necessarily transcend the Shakespearean and differ from it in this respect—that the conflict of dramatic reasoning is to be not only within the characters but is to be transferred to the idea itself. Thus not only shall the relations of men to moral concepts be debated, but the validity of those very concepts" (p. 43). Drama cannot arrogate to itself a higher mission. It is only by fulfilling this mission that art can become the "conscience of mankind" and that it may be said of the poet that "like the priest, (he) drinks the sacred blood, and all the world feels the presence of God," that is, of truth.

SCHOPENHAUER'S AESTHETIC THEORY

I

SCHOPENHAUER'S AESTHETIC IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS METAPHYSICS

THE philosophy of Hegel was anathema to Schopenhauer. The Hegelian apotheosis of the triumphant temporal unfolding of the Absolute, the unctuous identification of the actual with the rational, went against the grain of Schopenhauer's own metaphysics. Although Schopenhauer criticized unsparingly the Kantian philosophy, he retained all his life a feeling of deep reverence for Kant, and found his own initial speculative impulse in Kant's epistemological idealism and in his metaphysical doctrine of the thing-in-itself.

1. THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

The title of Schopenhauer's book is *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.¹ In the first sentence of the book Schopenhauer announces: *Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung*. And by speaking of the world as idea, he simply means that his idea of the world is his idea, that the world can be posited only in relation to something else, that is, to consciousness; that what man knows "is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth" (p. 3). Schopenhauer is not denying the existence of matter—of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure—but affirming that the *esse* is dependent on the *percipi*, that *esse* and *percipi* are convertible terms, that matter has no essence independent of mental perception. It is only so, in Schopenhauer's view, that the compatibility of *empirical reality* and *transcendental ideality* can be established. Schopen-

hauer simplifies the Kantian table of a priori categories to include merely time, space, and causality. It is by virtue of these a priori forms of the intellect that the one being of each Idea (the Platonic Idea or the Aristotelian species) is conceivable as a multiplicity of being, having a temporal and spatial existence and perceived as ideas (as representations, as *Vorstellungen*). In his doctoral dissertation—*The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*—he speaks of a fourfold causation in terms similar to Aristotle's four causes: material, efficient, formal, final. But—Schopenhauer asserts—this world of cause and effect, of time and space, *this world as idea*, would prove to be an empty dream, an alluring *fata morgana*, a mad delusion, if it were not something more than idea, something more real metaphorically and more compelling emotionally.

And the world, according to Schopenhauer, *is* more than idea. The world as idea is the externalization, is the objectification, of something prior both to matter and to consciousness, of an ultimate reality, of a cosmic force, impulse, desire, striving, of an *élan vital* (but not manifesting itself in a *creative evolution*, since time to Schopenhauer, like space, is a necessary illusion),² of a blind universal instinct, of the true thing-in-itself, of—*Will*:

Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea, of whatever kind it may be, all *object*, is *phenomenal* existence, but the *will* alone is a *thing-in-itself*. As such, it is throughout not idea, but *toto genere* different from it; it is that of which all idea, all object, is the phenomenal appearance (p. 142) . . . Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will. Therefore life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow accompanies the body; and if will exists, so will life, the world, exist (p. 354).

Will is the underlying cosmic reality. As such it does not merely elude the certainty of theoretical knowledge,—it can not be an object of cognition at all. It can only be

known in its objectifications, which constitute a series of grades comparable to the Platonic Ideas. The Will differs then both from Kant's thing-in-itself and from Plato's Idea. The whole purpose of Kant's second *Critique* was to show that somehow the noumenon or thing-in-itself could become knowable as an object of Will in the realm of the Practical Reason, that is, in moral experience. Fichte's divagation from Kant consisted in his promulgation of the sovereignty of the Practical Reason. Inevitably, the thing-in-itself, was—to Kant and to Fichte—intrinsically rational. To Schopenhauer, the thing-in-itself was a blind, irrational cosmic striving, an impetuous universal impulse, defying intelligence and rational analysis, asserting itself, objectifying itself, in accordance with its own inscrutable cunning—the cunning of primeval instinct, of ineluctable Will.³

The Platonic Idea differs from the Will in being an object of cognition, but an object of cognition as the Idea in general, as the quintessence of the multiplicity of particulars which are to the Idea as copies are to the archetype. These particular things—this multiplied plurality of being—are subsumed under the principle of causality and are imprisoned in a spatial and temporal existence. Their Odyssey is described by the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason (the logical reason of knowing, the physical reason of becoming, the metaphysical reason of being, the moral reason of motivation. Reason is used here synonymously with cause). Their Iliad is a poignant tale of illusion, of mutability, of tragic transience and evanescence, of a deceptive severance from the whole, the Idea, by the *principium individuationis* of time and space. These fluctuating, atomistic objects are, therefore, an oblique, an indirect objectification of the thing-in-itself, of the Will. Between them and the Will stands the Idea which is the Will as Idea.

The Will is universal; it is ultimate reality. It objectifies itself at levels of development. These levels are the Platonic Ideas, the Aristotelian species, the type; they constitute a connected series of grades representing in their totality the Will and in their individuality the Will at lower or higher stages according to their completeness and distinctness.

Schopenhauer sharply distinguishes the Idea from the concept. The Ideas are fixed, eternal patterns; the underlying, unchangeable forms of all phenomena; they can be glimpsed only in *aesthetic vision*. The concept is abstract, discursive, definable. *Science* is the creation of the intellect and consists of conceptual relations under the law of causality, and is (as with Bergson) a vivisection of reality for the purpose of practical utility. The *Idea* is the *unitas ante rem*, the unity that is shattered into a multiplicity of débris by the principle of sufficient reason, by the temporal and spatial forms of the Understanding. The *concept* is the *unitas post rem*, the unity that is rehabilitated by the abstract, schematic reason. Art reproduces, penetrates to the eternal Ideas; "it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course" (p. 239). Science is a pursuit of the delusive phenomenon and the laws of its relations and connections, according to the principle of sufficient reason.

Schopenhauer's metaphysics may then be summed up as follows. The world has two aspects: it is Will in its inner content, in its essence; it is Idea as the objectification of reality, that is, of Will. These objectifications form a hierarchy of definite grades—from matter to man—with regard to the fullness and clarity with which they manifest the Will. These grades are the Platonic Ideas, the immutable forms and the eternal qualities of all things. The plurality of the individual particulars, which are to the Ideas as copies are to the archetypes, is conceivable through

space, time, and causality which are a priori to the Understanding. The Platonic Ideas neither have multiplicity nor are they subject to mutability but, rather, transcend the principle of sufficient reason which governs conceptual science.

2. THE TWO ROADS TO SALVATION

Now Schopenhauer's work consists of four books. In the first, he deals with the world as idea (the world of empirical reality, the world of science) and in the second he is concerned with the world as Will (in its objectification). In the third book he discusses art as a release and an emancipation from the pragmatic world of science, from the land of shadows, of abstract, naked relations having a reference to our needs—a release and a flight to the empyrean of Ideas, to the eternal objects of a will-less, unfettered, disinterested aesthetic contemplation. In the fourth book he is preoccupied with the permanent, absolute denial of the Will itself, with that final state of spiritual enfranchisement which is sainthood. It is consequently impossible to consider Schopenhauer's theory of art without anticipating briefly—for the subject will require fuller consideration later—his pessimism, that anthology of woe contained in the last part of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. The fundamental tenet in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of pessimism is derived from the belief that the world conjured up by the intellect is inadequate to the demands of the Will, that happiness is merely negative, that the satisfaction of desire is not a positive joy but a temporary appeasement of a need: "Thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout. The wish is, in its nature, pain; the attainment soon begets satiety; the end was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the need, presents itself under a new form; when it

does not, then follows desolateness, emptiness, ennui; against which the conflict is just as painful as against want" (pp. 404-5).

Happiness, Schopenhauer believes, is merely deliverance from want, assuagement of pain, alms thrown to a beggar. Life is an endless longing, a bitter complaining, a mirage-like groping through sickness, despair, old age, to the peace that is annihilation, to the haven that is death. The unhappiness of the race is relieved by relentless internecine struggle, by the blind assertion of the will of one against the other, and by such mockingly telling amusements as gambling, the hunt, and, we might add, the prizefight, the ballgame, the burlesque, the Coney Islands of the world. In life, there are two avenues leading to salvation, two open roads to self-integration. There is the enfranchisement of artistic contemplation, there is the self-transcendence of will-less knowing in the aesthetic perception of Ideas; it is a piercing to the eternal patterns, to the enduring verities of things. That is one path. But it does not lead to the summit. It is not a permanent departure from the world of desire, of delusion; it is more like a chain of single exalted experiences, or like a garland of flowers strewn along the road, or like a number of beautiful landscapes occasionally intersecting a long and tedious journey. The second path leads to the height from which the entire world may be viewed with the nonchalance, with the unfaltering freedom from the thralldom of desire which is the bliss of the saint. This perfect freedom is Nirvana, is absolute self-oblivion, is the denial of the will, is the *quieting* of all volition, is the spiritual state of asceticism, of sainthood. For one who has attained this height it is no longer sufficient to remain content with the practice of prudential morality, of a social ethic, of loving others as himself and of doing for them all that he would do for himself. He must now abhor the very reality of which his own phenomenal exist-

ence is an expression, that is to say, the will to live, the innermost kernel of the world. He must disown his own nature by extinguishing at the source all sensual desire and gratification, by the voluntary acceptance of poverty, by the mortification of the body which is the visible objectivity of the will.

II

BASIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCHOPENHAUER'S AESTHETIC

ART is an escape, an interlude of peace; it is a transition from Will to *Vision*, from Desire to *Contemplation*.

1. THE AESTHETIC IDEA AND IDEAL

In the Sabbath of aesthetic contemplation the wheel of Ixion stands still, the sieve of the Danaïds is put aside, the stone of Sisyphus is at rest, the agony of Tantalus is in abeyance. In such a moment, a man has ceased tracing the reticulation of causal relationships—a tracing and a weaving having as its source and end a relation to his own will. He has become oblivious of his own selfhood. He is now the undimmed mirror of the object of perception. The distinctions between the subject, the object, and the process of perception are obliterated: they have become one. The subject of perception has become a *pure subject of knowledge* and the object of perception has become the *idea of its species*, and Schopenhauer suggests that this was running through Spinoza's mind when he wrote: *Mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit*.⁴ Schopenhauer says:

If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things . . . if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the *what*; if further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely

in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be . . . if thus the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the *Idea*, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for in such perception the individual has lost himself; but he is *pure*, will-less, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge* (p. 231).

In this passage Schopenhauer's philosophy of art is epitomized. It is, therefore, vitally necessary to separate the chaff from the wheat, the baser metals from the pure unalloyed gold. Schopenhauer holds rightly that aesthetic vision pierces through the common way of looking at things to the very heart of being, that it is a contemplation of the eternal essences of things, that the object of aesthetic perception is liberated from all relations, that the consciousness of the beholder is wholly filled with it. But to Schopenhauer the termination of the aesthetic experience is a sense of truancy from life, a feeling of escape from reality, a flight from objects in their concrete, unimpeachable meanings and significance. But art is not transcendent to life, and the universal of art is not a substance accompanied by shadows. Art is a continuation and an intensification and a clarification of experience, and the universal of art is the intrinsically coherent, the immanently real, of things and emotions and thoughts. The consummation of the aesthetic experience is a deeper comprehension, a finer sensitivity, a subtler response, to the realities of the market place, of the gateway. The indispensable condition of all great art is the disinterestedness, the objectivity, the pure absorption in, the identification with, the qualities of the object of contemplation; but in Shelley's and Arnold's and

Keats's sense, that is, a disinterestedness flowing from a passionate interest in the unclouded truth of life, in "the agonies, the strife of human hearts."⁵

To Schopenhauer the holiness of art consists in the fact that it releases from the bondage of life, and the imperfection of art is due to the fact that it is only a tentative release. And in this process of aesthetic emancipation from the exigencies, from the thralldom of reality, there are two correlative elements: "In the aesthetical mode of contemplation we have found *two inseparable constituent parts*—the knowledge of the object, not as individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as individual, but as *pure, will-less subject of knowledge*" (p. 253). It follows that in the contemplation of the beauty of inorganic nature, of the vegetable worlds, of works of architecture, the element of will-less cognition, of the liberation of the subject of perception from his individuality, will be primary. This is owing to the fact that the Ideas thus apprehended are low grades of the objectivity of Will, and lack significant content. In the aesthetic contemplation of animals and man, in nature and in art, the pleasure in the apprehension of the Idea will be primary—an Idea representing the highest grades of the objectivity of Will, profound and full of meaning. This conception is reminiscent of Hegel, and the distinction between the two constituent parts in aesthetic perception—even if only for dialectical purposes—is arbitrary, fanciful, and annuls Schopenhauer's thesis of the oneness of subject and object in aesthetic perception. Indeed, the consequences of this view—as with Hegel—are graver yet. To begin with it destroys the *oneness* of beauty, of aesthetic experience, since Schopenhauer is led to discard the doctrine that every aesthetic experience is unique, inimitable, final, a revelation of quality *sui generis*, and

therefore judged only according to the intensity and clarity with which it apprehends *that quality*. Indeed, Schopenhauer, although opposed to the causal, spatial, and temporal dichotomizations of the world perpetrated by the intellect, imposes upon reality a series of qualitative gradations. He considers, for example, architecture a lower art than painting or poetry or music because it deals with a lower grade of the objectivity of Will. But the world of art is the world of *omnis existentia est perfectio*, and the arts are one in their revelation of life, each art having its own medium and material, its own defeats and triumphs.

Yet Schopenhauer believes that everything may be, in some degree, beautiful. In what fashion then, does his conception differ from the Spinozistic *omnis existentia est perfectio*? He writes:

Since, on the one hand, every given thing may be observed in a purely objective manner and apart from all relations; and since, on the other hand, the will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its objectivity, so that everything is the expression of an Idea; it follows that everything is also *beautiful* (p. 271) . . . But one thing is more beautiful than another, because it makes this pure objective contemplation easier, it lends itself to it, and, so to speak, even compels it, and then we call it very beautiful. This is the case sometimes because, as an individual thing, it expresses in its purity the Idea of its species by the very distinct, clearly defined, and significant relation of its parts, and also fully reveals the Idea through the completeness of all the possible expressions of its species united in it, so that it makes the transition from the individual thing to the Idea, and therefore also the condition of pure contemplation, very easy for the beholder. Sometimes this possession of special beauty in an object lies in the fact that the Idea itself which appeals to us in it is a high grade of the objectivity of the will, and therefore very significant and expressive. Therefore it is that man is more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and expression are the most important objects of plastic art, and human action the most important object of poetry (p. 272).

In Schopenhauer's view, hence, a thing is beautiful only as an expression of the Idea, of the species, of the Will at a certain grade of objectification. It is beautiful relatively, with reference to the Idea of the class, of the order of reality, it represents; it is not, as with Spinoza, beautiful in its own right, as an expression of its own self, of its inalienable individuality. It is an example, a sample, a paragon, a distilled essence; it is not a qualitatively unique thing. Schopenhauer's view accords with that of Keats and Spinoza on the selflessness, on the objectivity, of contemplation, on the whole-souled absorption in the object of vision; but with Schopenhauer, this vision does not issue from a love of life, from a longing for beauty as humble reality, from a passionate desire to apprehend the qualities of experience, but flows from a feeling of disdain and is rooted in a wish to forget. It is a passing from the compulsions of every-day things and experience to the ivory tower, to the "golden dream" ⁶ of essences, of iridescent Ideas, of a "disembodied joy." ⁷ As with Kant, ⁸ the tremendously important notion of beauty as "easy contemplation" is divested of real significance. With Kant, the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is derived from the perception of the harmonious consonance of the Understanding with the Imagination without the aid of a concept, in the apprehension of the form of an object, apparently designed by God for such "easy" contemplation. With Schopenhauer, beauty is the light of the Idea irradiating the particular object, and in its dazzling luminousness obscuring all individual traits and qualities, and pointing to the possibility of total release from the bondage of practical, particular, concrete reality to the peace and resignation that are Nirvana. Finally, it is curious to note that Schopenhauer is at one on a vital point with the archfiend of philosophy, with Hegel himself. Both eulogize the human face and form as the highest expression, in

the one case, of the Absolute Idea; in the other, of the Cosmic Will. Indeed, there is cunning in the irrational universal Will; in fact, it is like the blind prophet Teiresias in Sophocles's tragedy, who yet could see more clearly than open-eyed Oedipus. There is then an optimistic teleology or a teleological optimism, on one issue, at least, in Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer described beauty to be the quality of the world when contemplated, apart from all willing, for its own sake. This accords with the view of Spinoza and Keats. But his conception of the beauty of things as the beauty of the Ideas (the species), and the beauty of Ideas as determined by their place in the hierarchy of the objectifications of the Will, allies him with Ruskin.⁹ In addition, the positive and passionate character which Keats attributed to aesthetic contemplation as leading *to*, and not *from*, reality, as consummating in an *amor intellectualis Dei*, in a *chief intensity*, was not in the stream of Schopenhauer's thought.

It is only by realizing the central role of the *Idea* in Schopenhauer's aesthetic, that it is possible to see what he means by the *Ideal* in art:

One would suppose that art achieved the beautiful by imitating nature . . . has nature ever produced a human being perfectly beautiful in all his parts? It has accordingly been thought that the artist must seek out the beautiful parts, distributed among a number of different human beings, and out of them construct a beautiful whole; a perverse and foolish opinion (p. 286) . . . And in the true genius this anticipation is accompanied by so great a degree of intelligence that he recognizes the Idea in the particular thing, and thus, as it were, *understands the half-uttered speech of nature*, and articulates clearly what she only stammered forth. He expresses in the hard marble that beauty of form which in a thousand attempts she failed to produce, he presents it to nature, saying as it were, to her, "That is what you wanted to say!" . . . This anticipation is the *Ideal*. It is the *Idea* so far as it is known *a priori*, at least half, and it becomes practical for art, because it corre-

sponds to and completes what is given *a posteriori* through nature (p. 287).

The *Idea* and the *Ideal* are then, as in Plato's *Meno*, synonymous. The things of empirical reality can only approximate the *Idea* which is the *Ideal*, and cannot adequately embody or represent it. What is given *a posteriori* through nature is to Schopenhauer and to Plato—for the *Meno* and the *Phaedrus* complement each other in this—a half-truth, a reminiscence of the *Ideal* seen *before experience* as in a dream, as in a wonderful vision beyond, in the great adventure of the soul-charioteer with the two horses. Schopenhauer, consequently, rejects both the concept of imitation and the doctrines of idealization as enunciated by the critics of the Renaissance and the period of neo-classicism. In this he is right. But his rejection is not based on the clear fact that literal imitation implies a duplication of nature and an abstract idealization entails a denudation of nature; he is averse to them because phenomenal nature *cannot* be ideal, because the ideal surpasses nature, is transcendent to nature. Now art *does* complete nature, *does* penetrate to the ideal, but to an ideal that resides in nature, that is throbbingly real, that is the inner dialectic of experience, that is beautiful only in the sense that it is revealed and unraveled in its fundamental and essential verity. It is thus that *Macbeth* and *Ghosts* and Rodin's *Courtesan* are beautiful. Indeed, in the contemplation of these, artist and beholder may say, "This is what you are. You do not surpass nature. You *are* nature truly seen." ¹⁰

2. GENIUS AND MADNESS

According to Schopenhauer, the capacity to apprehend the *Idea*, the *Ideal*, constitutes genius. For genius implies becoming a *pure subject of knowledge*, contemplating in-

dependently of the principle of sufficient reason the *Ideas* of things. This faculty must exist in a measure in all men, since it is the *sine qua non* for aesthetic enjoyment, for susceptibility to beauty in art and in nature. But with most men, these sacred moments of disinterested beholding are rare; they subject their faculty of knowledge to the servitude of the will, they transform it into a lamp to lighten their feet. To the men of genius, the wise and emancipated, their faculty of intuitive knowledge is a sun illuminating the universe. Now with what holier oil could Schopenhauer, like Samuel in ancient Israel, have anointed these first kings of the world? But unhappily, like Samuel's first anointed king of Israel, these chosen children of the earth are also doomed to suffer madness. By some strange paradox—or is it rather the logic of his irrationalism?—Schopenhauer is compelled to associate the man of genius with the madman:

We see, from what has been said, that the madman has a true knowledge of what is actually present, and also of certain particulars of the past, but that he mistakes the connection, the relations, and therefore falls into error and talks nonsense. Now this is exactly the point at which he comes into contact with the man of genius; for he also leaves out of sight the knowledge of the connection of things, since he neglects that knowledge of relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, in order to see in things only their *Ideas*, and to seek to comprehend their true nature, which manifests itself to perception, and in regard to which *one thing* represents its whole species, in which way, as Goethe says, one case is valid for a thousand. The particular object of his contemplation, or the present which is perceived by him with extraordinary vividness, appear in so strong a light that the other links of the chain to which they belong are at once thrown into the shade, and this gives rise to phenomena which have long been recognized as resembling those of madness . . . he therefore sees everywhere extremes . . . he lacks soberness. . . . He knows the ideas completely but not the individuals (pp. 250-51.)

This is the tragic and inevitable result of a philosophy that considers art as antagonistic and superior to science. It is—with Schopenhauer, Bergson, Spengler—as insidious culturally, as the antithetical view which elevates science to a higher eminence than art—the view of Plato, Vico, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten. Schopenhauer opposes the Idea to the concept, divorces art from any relationship with the principle of sufficient reason, and discovers, in consequence, that his genius is a madman. Surely, art and science are different and distinct spiritual activities, but are not, by that token, antithetical. Both are rooted in life; both grow out of life; science, to become a practical manipulation and a theoretical comprehension of the quantitative aspect of nature; art, to become a concrete clarification and a lucent apprehension of the qualitative meanings of nature. Art *is* the qualitative apprehension of the quantitative, the conceptual, the causal, in nature; it is the law of sufficient reason experienced as authentic reality. It follows, then, as is quite evident, that the genius is not a madman, that he too operates with the laws of cause and effect in the processes of selecting, arranging, and organizing his materials, and employing, controlling, mastering his medium; that he is lucidly sane, aware, thinking ardently and long, seeing deeply and widely, exercising the imaginative reason. He deals with concepts, but they are immanent concretely in his work of art; he possesses superb intelligence, not expressed in general formulae, but in the *life* he profoundly and coherently depicts. If the man of genius and the madman converge in their freedom from the law of sufficient reason, in their ignorance of, or ineptness for, empirical reality, in their extremeness and lack of soberness—where is to be found that *fundamentum differentiationis* which transforms the one into a genius and the other into a lunatic? Where is to be discovered the reason for scientific genius, that is, for genius

in the realm of concepts, of causality? The *fundamentum differentiationis* resides precisely in the fact that the genius in art is supremely sane and supremely sensitive to the qualities of experience. He is so sane and sensitive that he knows quite seriously (but not literally: that is the *fundamentum differentiationis* of the madman) that a metaphor is *that* quality of life, that there is no other way of rendering *that* quality, that it is the crystallized quintessence of an experience which can be scientifically described in terms of cause and effect; and he avails himself *sanely* of the laws of cause and effect to express that quality in a metaphor which will render it perspicuous, diaphanous, and apprehensible as an experiential meaning. That the genius is often capricious, that he lacks soberness at times, that he seems to be maladjusted, is frequently, although not necessarily, true. In any event, it is not the lamentable effect of a sort of madness, but is the laudable result of a deep sensitivity, a clear sight, in a sadly disordered world. In a profound sense, as Shelley pointed out, the great artist is always more self-integrated, more finely organized with reference—not to Schopenhauer's empyrean of Ideas—but to stark, diurnal reality.

Schopenhauer is unduly emphasizing, indeed, is reducing *ad absurdum*, an element in aesthetic experience which is present there more potently than in any other kind of experience. It is the element of "inspiration," of the sudden and luminous perception of the quality of a thing that cannot be described, explained, formulated, but can be most felicitously rendered in a metaphor—a metaphor which seems to defy the logical laws of identity and contradiction. But it must be remembered that in an authentic work of art the metaphor clarifies the experience and not the experience the metaphor; that is, the experience is not chosen deliberately as material for a metaphor. It is not less logical to say with Wordsworth that Lucy is "as fair

as a star when only one is shining in the sky"—than it is to say with the politician that "if George Washington *were alive* he would be opposed to the League of Nations"—since both aid in the clarification of a *present* experience. Both are intrinsically part of the present experience and it is the total present experience that is A and cannot be B.

The artist's wonderful capacity to seize and communicate in words, melody, color, or marble, the qualities of nature without "knowledge"—as Plato protested—of their scientific character, has led many to speak of the artist as a vessel of inspiration, as a "madman."¹¹ Obviously there is an element of truth in this tradition which Schopenhauer inordinately emphasized. But the absence of order and connection which Schopenhauer assigns to the aesthetic experience is rather characteristic of the dream-experience. A dream is subjective and in it "the time is out of joint,"¹² but what Richards says of the poet is true of all artists. He writes that "the availability of his past experience is the first characteristic of the poet. The second is his normality."¹³ If the aesthetic experience is to be compared to a dream-experience, it must be borne in mind, as Lamb pointed out, that "the poet dreams awake. He is not possessed by his subject, but has dominion over it . . . He ascends the empyrean of heaven and is not intoxicated."¹⁴

Art and science *are* different—as Schopenhauer maintains—but difference in method and aim does not imply antithesis. Both art and science are products of the creative intelligence, in which reason, imagination, sense, and intuition are comprised. The distinction is one of emphasis. The aesthetic process is guided by the imaginative reason and the scientific process is directed by the abstractive reason. Both art and science—the category of quality and the category of quantity—have their origin in experience, and are, in effect, a continuation and completion of nature. The provisional character of science is no disparagement

and no diminution of its worth and importance. It is a result of the fact that science is a mathematical-conceptual formulation of the underlying quantitative invariants and relationships subsisting in the flux of phenomena. Inevitably, a revision and expansion in a scientific universe of discourse, involves a new and more inclusive formulation which invalidates the one it supersedes as an instrument of theoretic comprehension and of practical control. But the preceding knowledge is either directly incorporated or indirectly contributory to the cumulative scientific heritage. The character of permanence which *some* works of art possess is due to the fact that they are an intuitive-imaginative concretization of the qualitative aspect of nature. But art, too, has a *history*. It was thus that Arnold valued the great art of the Greeks and yet felt that it was adequate to *their* needs and could not fulfill all of *our* spiritual demands.¹⁵

Schopenhauer's doctrine of "madness" or "inspiration" as a distinctive trait of aesthetic genius, complemented by the sharp antithesis between art and science, is a particular menace at present. In a disorganized, groping, changing world, poetry—nay, all art—is indeed, in part, "our stay and consolation."¹⁶ That stay and consolation it can be, provided its rationality and its intelligibility are fully recognized and acknowledged.¹⁷

III

THE SPECIFIC ARTS

ART releases from the thralldom of desire. Art induces a mood of calm, serene, will-less contemplation. The source of art is the knowledge of Ideas; the aim of art is the communication of this knowledge. Art is an emancipation from the world of the principle of sufficient reason, of spatial and temporal multiplicity. In what way, then, do the individual arts perform this function, achieve this end? It has been seen that Schopenhauer arranges the arts in a hierarchy; and their value is determined on the basis of the grades of objectification of the Will which they manifest and express. Like Hegel, Schopenhauer is aware of the importance of the *material* of the specific arts. The arts reproduce the Ideas, the recurrent universals, the frozen eternalities, and they are sculpture or painting, poetry or music, according to what their material is. The material and the grade of Idea are attuned to each other, there is a "preëstablished harmony" between them.

1. ARCHITECTURE, PAINTING, AND SCULPTURE

Of architecture Schopenhauer says: "Properly speaking, the conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic material of architecture; its problem is to make this conflict appear with perfect distinctness in a multitude of different ways" (p. 277). ". . . Architecture does not affect us merely mathematically, but also dynamically, and . . . what speaks to us through it, is not mere form and symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature, those first Ideas, those lowest grades of the objectivity of will" (p. 279). The end of architecture is to manifest the permanent quali-

ties of matter, its everlasting structures; architecture brings to light the very qualities of its material: rigidity, gravity, cohesion. Schopenhauer is, therefore, at one with Plotinus,¹⁸ with Bacon,¹⁹ in his rejection of symmetry as the criterion of architectural beauty—of beauty, in general. In his theory of the dynamic effect of architecture upon the beholder, he distinctly anticipates the contemporary empathy (*Empfindung*) theory. Schopenhauer's grave error and grave injustice to the art of architecture consists in his limitation of its end to the mere expression of these "first Ideas," these "lowest grades of the objectivity of will"—the mythical *conflict* between rigidity and gravity. Architecture, like every other art, beginning with a broad universal quality autochthonous to, and inseparable from, the material and medium it employs, goes on to express a multitude of qualities in nature and to evoke a multitude of emotions in man. It manifests stresses and strains and yet cohesion, gravity, and light. The province of architecture is not the "first Ideas," the "lowest grades," but the wonderful interplay of gravity and rigidity as a pattern and form for a myriad qualities and feelings. Architecture exhibits the stability and permanence, the cohesion and endurance of things, the utilization of the forces of nature in behalf of beauty, of human happiness, of the fulfillment of human needs.

As to painting and sculpture, Schopenhauer writes: ". . . But a far higher grade is revealed by animal painting and sculpture (p. 283) . . . The great problem of historical painting and sculpture is to express directly and for perception the Idea in which the will reaches the highest grade of its objectification (p. 284) . . . *Human beauty* is an objective expression, which means the fullest objectification of will at the highest grade at which it is knowable, the Idea of man in general, completely expressed in the sensible form" (p. 285). The accents of Hegel are here

unmistakable. Not only is human beauty, the human face and form, the expression of the highest grade of the objectivity of Will; it is the Idea expressed in sensible form.

2. POETRY

Turning to poetry, Schopenhauer speaks of it in glowing words: ". . . Whoever desires to know man in his inner nature, identical in all its phenomena and developments, to know him according to the Idea, will find that the works of the great, immortal poet present a far truer, more distinct picture, than the historians can ever give" (p. 318). This passage is reminiscent of Aristotle. But it is not Aristotle's view of poetry that Schopenhauer espouses. And the cause is to be sought in the irremediable cleavage he has made between the percept and the concept. Schopenhauer had rightly extruded allegory from the realms of the graphic and plastic arts, for "An allegory is a work of art which means something different from what it represents" (p. 306). He had condemned allegory as an end foreign to the work of art, as an aesthetic transgression committed by those for whom art holds little or no appeal, as a subsumption of the work of art under an external concept. He had not minced words and defined symbolism in art as a degenerate allegory, that is, as an adventitious, arbitrary, and conventional association of signs and things signified, of a concept and a representation. But with reference to poetry he uses the word allegory in an odd manner, and counsels its use: "In poetry . . . the conception is the material, the immediately given, and therefore we may very well leave it, in order to call up perceptions which are quite different, and in which the end is reached. Many a conception or abstract thought . . . is often made perceptible by means of some example which is subsumed under it. This takes place in every trope, every metaphor, simile, parable, and allegory . . . Therefore, in the arts which employ language

as their medium, similes and allegories are of striking effect" (p. 310).

After all, Schopenhauer is loyal to the German metaphysical tradition; it is bone of his bone and blood of his blood. Poetry is, to him, an illustration of a concept extraneous to the poem; a metaphor is, in that sense, an allegory. He thinks that Cervantes's image of sleep as "a mantle that covers all mankind" is very beautiful, is a striking expression of a concept, an allegory of the thought that sleep liberates us from spiritual and physical suffering. He cites *Don Quixote* and *Gulliver's Travels* as exemplifications of his theory. It is the old-new fallacy of considering a metaphor as a second way of saying something, of separating the image from the idea, the percept from the concept, the emotion from the thought. It denotes a failure to discern in the poem the integration of form and content, the expression of qualitative experience with its inseparable values and its concrete meanings. *Don Quixote* and *Gulliver's Travels*, too, must contain all their philosophical implications intrinsically, and these implications must be inextricably woven in their revelations of life. As works of art these books, and as characters these men, do not point to any external concepts. They are not allegories or symbols of something else. They are *themselves*, their own *experiences*, their own hopes, ideals, aspirations. Unless this is granted, a *reductio ad absurdum* is inevitable: any pretension to literary art may then be defended as an accomplished masterpiece on the ground that it points to an important and exalted *external* concept, that it is a percept subsumed under a concept. The fallacy in this kind of reasoning has been clearly shown by A. C. Bradley:

Poetry in this matter is not, as good critics of painting and music often affirm, different from the other arts; in all of them the content is one thing with the form. What Beethoven meant

by his symphony, or Turner by his picture, was not something which you can name, but the picture and the symphony. Meaning they have, but *what* meaning can be said in no language but their own: and we know this, though some strange delusion makes us think the meaning has less worth because we cannot put it into words. Well, it is just the same with poetry. But because poetry is words, we vainly fancy that some other words than its own will express its meaning. And they will do so no more—or, if you like to speak loosely, only a trifle more—than words will express the meaning of the Dresden Madonna.²⁰

The allegorical explanation is an alien imposition and incrustation upon the poem whose substance differs in kind from the substance and quality of poetic experience. The true poet speaks to us in the universal language of the heart, in words, quick, immediate, throbbing with the pulse of life and tremulous with the quality and overtones of experience. The less artificially symbolic the word is, the more nearly it is released from the nebulous abstractions and connotations of ordinary speech—the more uniquely and fully does it flower into the lovely rendition of an experience. A metaphor is not—as Dante ²¹ and Schopenhauer thought—a “rhetorical figure,” a “cloak” veiling some hidden allegorical secret, nor is it a second way of saying something. It is a sacred rite, a holy moment when the mind becomes aware of, becomes one with, an imaginative beauty, when it pierces to the heart of some living thing. Of poetry, it may be said what Professor Woodbridge says of love; for poetry turns experience, as love turns the body, into a lovely metaphor “to carry over from the wonderful world of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’—thy soul and mine—meanings which miraculously transform the acts they celebrate. With love, intimacy cannot be too intimate, for intimacy has become a sacrament. The spectator must worship, or, like Acteon, be turned into a chased and hounded thing. All this, with love; without it, all the glory’s gone. Intimacy becomes then a thing for ribald laughter, for

moral condemnation, or for aesthetic disgust.”²² The concentrated beauty of poetic metaphor is dispersed and the intensity of its light fades when it ceases to be the metaphor, the revelation of experience, and becomes the sign and symbol, the cloak and mantle for an alien and transcendent concept. It is rightly then a thing to be laughed at by the Philistine, to be denounced by the moralist, to be scoffed at by the logician and grammarian. But if the metaphor is the interfusion of percept and concept—as body and spirit are one in love—if it is the imaginative apprehension of the quality of a thing or an experience, then the rhythm and music of the poem are as inseparable from the metaphor as the reverberations of emotion and the movement of thought are inseparable from the experience the complete poem exultantly expresses.

3. TRAGEDY

Schopenhauer thinks that the highest poetical art is tragedy. It is a representation of the terrible side of life, of the ubiquitous conflict of the Will with itself at the highest levels of its objectivity:

It sees through the form of the phenomenon, the *principium individuationis*. The egoism which rests on this perishes with it, so that now the *motives* that were so powerful before have lost their might, and instead of them the complete knowledge of the nature of the world, which has a *quieting* effect on the will, produces resignation, the surrender not merely of life, but of the very will to live. Thus we see in tragedies the noblest men, after long conflict and suffering, at last renounce the ends they have so keenly followed, and all the pleasures of life for ever, or else freely and joyfully surrender life itself (p. 327).

Tragedy is the suffering of men; it is a division in the Substance of the world, in the Will; it is an internecine struggle among its phenomena. Tragedy proceeds from man, that is, from his destiny; but also from chance and error, from those conditions and circumstances, which

bring about irrationally the eventuation of this destiny.²³ Schopenhauer's view of tragedy is simpler and truer than Hegel's; it is less metaphysical. It is the acknowledgment of life as tragic, as a conflict and strife of Will, that is, empirically speaking, as a clash and collision of human emotions, instincts, desires, ambitions, hatreds and loves. The reconciliation of tragedy, the peace and quietude it offers, are born of vision and comprehension, of a clear penetration to the heart of being, to the tragic essence of the universe. In the wake of such reconciliation, selfishness deliquesces, frail little ambitions and their concomitant passions and delusions vanish.

Schopenhauer scornfully contemns the moralistic notions of poetic justice: "The demand for so-called poetical justice rests on an entire misconception of the nature of tragedy, and, indeed, of the nature of the world itself" (p. 328). And surely Schopenhauer is right. Only he does not perceive that therein is congealed the significant *ethical* value of tragedy—that it is not the falsification of reality, the withdrawal, the resignation, from life, but the clarified comprehension of reality, the clarified and purified participation *in* life.

4. MUSIC

To Schopenhauer the art of arts is music. It does not—as the other arts do—merely manifest the Ideas, that is, the objectifications, of the Will. It is a direct expression of the Will; it is the systole and diastole of the heart of the universe. Music does not represent; it does not contemplate; it is the Will become audible; it is the inmost metaphysical reality of the cosmos proclaiming in irresistible, in bitter-sweet melody, its essential being. The world is as much embodied music as it is embodied Will: . . . This is why the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only

of shadows, but it speaks of the thing itself (p. 333) . . . Therefore it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and of passion, as words are the language of reason (pp. 335-36) . . . But it must never be forgotten . . . that music has no direct, but merely an indirect relation to them, for it never expresses the phenomenon, but only the inner nature, the in-itself of all phenomena, the will itself. It does not therefore express this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind; but joy, sorrow, pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind *themselves*, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without accessories, and therefore without their motives. Yet we completely understand them in this extracted quintessence (p. 338).

Music peals forth the metaphysics of our own being, the crescendo, the climax, the crises, the resolutions, of our own striving, impetuosity, peace, and the retardations and accelerations, the surging and passivity, the power and the silence of things. The emotions of music are the essential, timeless feeling-patterns of life: joy, sorrow, longing—in their vast, elemental, plaintive threnodies. Indeed, Aristotle, too, had spoken of music as the most representative of the arts, as the very reproduction of human emotion. And Lotze, after Schopenhauer, divined in the movement of tones the incessant and imperious movements of the cosmos, the goings on of the world, the drama of nature.

Schopenhauer adds that the appeal of music is to pure emotion: "The unutterable depth of all music by virtue of which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet ever distant from us, and by which also it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable, rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and far removed from their pain" (p. 341). It was a profound insight that prompted Schopenhauer to emphasize the lack of emotional definiteness, of specific content in music; but it was the exigency of his philosophy that compelled him

therefore to deny to music contact with humble reality. The sacrifice of definiteness in music is not made upon the altar of a false god—the god who commands flight from authentic experience. It is a sacrifice in the sanctuary of life. The very consolation of music, the very thing which explains the cause of its universal appeal—aside from physiological reasons—or rather upon the basis of physiological reasons—is the fact that it allows, as no other art does, the recipient to become a creator, to invest the feeling-pattern of music with the immediate, irrefragable content of his own mood, of his own being; the joy floating through the consciousness becomes a specific, individual joy, and the sorrow a definite, personal sorrow, and the line of demarcation between life and music is obliterated. Music, like all art, in its own supreme fashion consummates and clarifies and organizes experience and renders it nearer to the heart's desire.

Schopenhauer's treatment of music is surely one of the triumphs of his book. His prose, liquid and melodious throughout, becomes fuller, reverberates more deeply, when he speaks of music. It is regrettable that he should not have seen fit to view all the other arts, too, as direct revelations of Will, that is, of reality. He had repudiated all theories of art as imitation. Such a view, of course, would have been in flagrant contradiction to the substance of his aesthetic, which defined beauty as the quality of the world when contemplated, apart from all willing, for its own sake. He should have realized that all genuine art is a direct and luminous expression of Will, of reality, of human emotion, of love, hope, desire, and not a mere manifestation of the intermediary Ideas.

5. NIETZSCHE AND SCHOPENHAUER

Schopenhauer's metaphysical distinction between music and the representative arts is the basis of Nietzsche's division

of art into Dionysian and Apollonian (and the conception of Dionysian art embraces Schopenhauer's notion of genius and madness). In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer, although he does not mention him by name: "This extraordinary antithesis, which stretches like a yawning gulf between plastic art as the Apollonian, and music as the Dionysian art, has revealed itself to only one of the great thinkers."²⁴ Nietzsche is thinking of Schopenhauer's contention that music has a character different from, and an origin anterior to, the other arts; that it is the language of the universal Will, of the cosmic thing-in-itself.

Nietzsche, accordingly, declares explicitly what was implicit in Schopenhauer's aesthetic. He derives the arts from two principles, sharply opposed in origin and aim, and symbolized by the art-deities of the Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus:

. . . In contrast to all those who are intent on deriving the arts from one exclusive principle, as the necessary vital source of every work of art, I shall keep my eyes fixed on the artistic deities of the Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus, and recognize in them the living and conspicuous representatives of *two* worlds of art differing in their intrinsic essence and in their highest aims²⁵ . . . The Apollonian art of sculpture, and the non-plastic, Dionysian, art of music.²⁶

Apollonian art is lovely, frail, and fantastic. Apollo is a soothsaying god, and the art that bears his name possesses a prophetic quality and is a dream-art. Apollonian art is to the sensitive lover of beautiful forms what existence is to the philosopher. It adumbrates—like the *Transfiguration* of Raphael—an appearance beyond appearance. It suggests a deeper, a more intense reality. But the reality it *suggests* is not *too* deep, is not *too* intense. For there is measure and restraint in Apollonian art, and freedom from the wild and uncontrollable turmoil of elemental emotion. The sculptor-god is "sunlike." He is a calm god, a harbinger of peace, a

giver of light. He reconciles man to the underlying and irremediable agony of life in the joyful illusion of "appearances," of the *principium individuationis*.

Dionysian art is passionate, torrential, primordial. From the smile of Dionysus—torn and dismembered by the Titans—sprang the Olympian gods, and from his tears sprang man. Tears and anguish and mad ecstasy—as in the song and dance of primitive tribes, as in the acts of those under the influence of the narcotic draught or the magic potency of spring—are the stuff and substance of Dionysian art. *Drunkeness* is the mood Dionysian art induces. With its mystic, exultant cry it pierces the veil of Maya, and seals the union of man with man, and of man with nature and god. It opens up the floodgates of the Primordial Unity and proclaims the annihilation of all individuality. This is the wisdom of Dionysus and it is a wisdom born of his own agony. For was he not, as a boy, torn to pieces by the Titans, and then, dismembered, worshipped as Zagreus? *That* was his suffering, and it was the suffering of individuation—the prime cause of all anguish.

But this impetuous, this passionate, anguished, rapturous god, must not be left to brood and bleed alone in desolation. It is better for him to be gently led, as with an invisible thread, by the tranquil and healing god Apollo. The union of the Apollonian and Dionysian—their sacred and mystic wedlock—occurs in tragedy. For tragedy is the absorption and transmutation of the purest, primordial music-pain and the deepest, passionate music-ecstasy in the service of a tragic myth and a tragic hero. Tragedy is the fusion of two otherwise variant tendencies whose antagonism cannot be resolved in the superficial truce of the common term "art." In tragedy, that is, in the presentment of supreme joy through annihilation and havoc, in the imagined apprehension of the metaphysics of being, of the heart-beat of the world, the spectator divines a promise and a pledge of pro-

found peace, of ultimate reconciliation with the stark sorrow and the blind irrationality of life and will.

Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* is a beautiful and original development of some phases of Schopenhauer's aesthetic. It contains one of the finest interpretations of the spirit of Attic tragedy. His fundamental confusion is the acceptance of Schopenhauer's distinction between music and the representative arts as a distinction in substance, in essence. A differentiation between "formal" and "representative" art is perhaps allowable, but surely not for metaphysical, but merely for technical and dialectical reasons. The Apollonian and the Dionysian are elements, tendencies, nuances, *in art, in a work of art*, and are not two separate categories "only superficially reconciled by the common term 'art.'" In a moment of clear vision Nietzsche perceives that the Apollonian—order, restraint, intelligence—must complement the Dionysian—spontaneity, freedom, emotion, "that music is essentially the representative art for an Apollonian content." All art is the expression of feeling in the apprehension of the qualitative aspect of nature and—whether sublime, elemental, and tragic or blithe, lovely, and delicate—will contain, with differences in degree, both the Dionysian and Apollonian elements. But such art is neither a narcotic-art nor a dream-art. It is a life-art.

It is not a narcotic-art. It has been truly said: ²⁷ "In the most intense dancing paroxysm of the primitives there is form, a certain clear and cooling discipline." And, on the whole, Darwin²⁸ corroborates this assertion. Did not Nietzsche himself, in one of his profound utterances, proclaim: "Die Erde war zu lange schon ein Irrenhaus."

It is not a dream-art. In *The Fall of Hyperion* Keats tells us:

The poet and the dreamer are distinct,
Diverse, sheer opposite, antipodes.
The one pours out a balm upon the World,
The other vexes it.²⁹

The dream-world of the Imagination is not a fantastic *other* world. It is the continuation, it is the consummation, and it is the clarification of the workaday world. In a letter Keats wrote: "The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream—he awoke and found it truth." ³⁰ The artist, Santayana informs us, "is a dreamer consenting to dream of the actual world . . ." ³¹

IV

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOPEN- HAUER'S AESTHETIC THEORY AND HIS ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS

SCHOPENHAUER'S aesthetic cannot be dissevered from his metaphysics and his ethics. And the fundamental point must not be obfuscated that his theory of art is devoid of satisfactory validity and of full import because he prizes art as an escape from life, as an evasion of reality. In fact, he equates his ethics and his aesthetic by the identification of the good man with the art-connoisseur and the bad man with the art-Philistine. To the very good man art becomes a sort of spring-board from which he jumps into sainthood. That art and ethics have a great deal in common is true and excellent, but their trysting place is, and ought to be, the city gates and not the ivory tower, the hearts of men and not the shrine of Buddha, the avenues of life and not the deserts of Nirvana.

1. THE "GOOD" MAN

The bad man is an exile from the realm of Ideas. He is enmeshed in the net of Maya, in the web of illusions. He is a captive in Babylon and he knows it not. He is aware of his own individuality directly and sees the world as through a fog, as covered with a veil. He thinks his ephemeral self, his momentary present, his immediate gratification, is the sole reality. He does not perceive the illusoriness of the *principium individuationis*, of the phantom-world of time, space, and causality; and, in consequence, he does not divine that *his* joy and the sorrows of the many *others* are

alike manifestations of the same blind, single, striving, Cosmic Will. The happiness of the bad man is like the dream of the mendicant in which he is a king; it is a dream rudely blasted by the daylight of reality. The ultimate significance of pity is not merely moral, but metaphysical. It is an expression, in the land of Maya, in the phenomenal world, of the essential unity of all humanity, of all life, of the entire universe. Man, as artist, as contemplator of the Ideas, pierces through the principle of individuation, sees the oneness of all reality, pities sufferer and inflicter of suffering at once.

The good man is, then, essentially an artist. He has penetrated the mystery of the Vedas. He looks at all the beings in the world, the living and the lifeless, and communes with his own soul, pronouncing: *Tat twam asi—This thou art*. Indeed, in ancient India, as in Plato's *Republic*, the good life was to be based on a myth accessible to the common people. The Indian myth of the transmigration of souls concretized in an image and specified in a dogma the recondite and abstruse doctrine of the oneness of the universe, of mankind, of life, by affirming that all suffering inflicted upon another must be expiated in a subsequent life in this world, through precisely the same suffering: "It teaches that wicked conduct involves a future life in this world in suffering and despised creatures, and, accordingly, that one will then be born again in lower castes, or as a woman, or as a brute, as Pariah or Tschandala, as a leper, or as a crocodile, and so forth. All the pains which the myth threatens it supports with perceptions from actual life, through suffering creatures which do not know how they have merited their misery . . . As a reward . . . it promises rebirth in better, nobler forms, as Brahmans, wise men, or saints" (pp. 459-60).

The transition from *badness* to *goodness* is conditioned by the transcendence of the principle of individuation. The

good man has succeeded in lifting the veil of Maya from his eyes; he has learned that love (*agape, caritas*) is sympathy; he has allayed his own suffering by identifying himself with the world, with the suffering of the world. But that is not all. The good man can not remain in this state of social perturbation, of a loving concern for empirical reality. He must completely liberate himself from the Babylonian captivity of mundane interests and inclinations. He must become a saint.

It would seem, in strict consistency, that Schopenhauer should advise suicide. He replies that suicide is a capitulation to the Will, its strongest assertion; it is not an extinction of the will to live, but a manifestation of a desperate will to live. It is a surrender of life—not of the will to live—because of an awful sorrow, a great grief, because of a dissatisfaction with the circumstances of life. It is the same will to live that is manifested in *Siva* (destroyer of life) as in *Vishnu* (preserver of life). The one act of free-will, the *transcendental change*, is the negation of the joys of life, the desires of the flesh, the demands of the senses, the blandishments of the body; and the corresponding acceptance of poverty, chastity, sainthood. It is not the choice of death out of a love of life, the passing of the threshold of death with a terrible longing for life; it is a sort of voluntary, self-appointed, intentional *death in life*.

This is the path to true salvation. And it is no philosophical fable. It was taken by many: “. . . it was the enviable life of so many saints and beautiful souls among Christians, and still more among Hindus and Buddhists, and also among the believers of other religions (p. 494) . . . to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways—is nothing.” Such effacement of the will is the *summum bonum*, the *telos*, the *finis bonorum*, the return of the soul to its beloved fatherland, to the haven of peace.

This is the state of the saint; it is a transcending of prudential morality, of discursive rationality; it is a flight from the phenomenal world.

2. ART AS A SPRINGBOARD TO SAINTHOOD

This transition to, and this laying hold of, the real are made possible by art, by aesthetic contemplation in which the object is the eternal Idea and the subject is a pure, will-less subject of knowledge. Art is ancillary to sainthood. It facilitates the flight from life; it gives wings. It offers, for a moment, a glimpse of what sainthood gives for ever:

. . . The aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists in great measure in the fact that in entering the state of pure contemplation we are lifted for the moment above all willing, i.e., all wishes and cares; we become, as it were, freed from ourselves . . . And we know that these moments in which, delivered from the ardent strain of will, we seem to rise out of the heavy atmosphere of earth, are the happiest which we experience. From this we can understand how blessed the life of a man must be whose will is silenced, not merely for a moment, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed altogether extinguished, except as regards the last glimmering spark that retains the body in life, and will be extinguished with its death (p. 504).

But the beauty of art is a transient consolation, a temporary withdrawal from the seething market-place. The contemplator has not yet wholly conquered his own nature; he has not finally severed the cords that bind him to the earth, to its agonies and frustrations; he has, like the wife of Lot, not yet completely averted his eyes from the flames of Sodom. He falters in the penal servitude of the will, and his hot breath "stains the white radiance of eternity."³²

Art is then to Schopenhauer, as to Hegel, instrumental to something else—to something worthier and more real, that is, to something surpassing and, with Schopenhauer, negating experience. To both philosophers, as to all ideal-

ists, reality is *not* experience. To Schopenhauer the one element of reality in aesthetic experience is its liberation, for the nonce, from the compulsions of experience, is its offer, for a brief interlude, of that which sainthood bestows permanently. Now there is a pregnant sense in which art is an "escape"—an escape from the superficial to the deep, underlying substratum in the flux of experience. But it is an "escape" which becomes an interpretation and a clarification of life, which pierces through the principle of individuation, to the inmost core and essence of life which are hope and love and sorrow and joy. It is then that one may say with the Persian poet "I am Thou," and with Ruth "whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge." But Schopenhauer's "I am Thou" is an ontological abstraction bearing the same relation to palpable human suffering and actual ideals of social solidarity and spiritual sympathy among men as the teleological conception of a divinely guided universe bears to individual and real (in the experiential sense of the word) wretchedness, misery, need, maladjustment. Schopenhauer exalts art as the contemplation of Ideas, that is, as a contemplation of reality wholly dissociated from experience, from the problems of life. He couples genius with madness because both involve a disregard of the principle of sufficient reason and a consequent forgetting: madness brings oblivion, as a blessedness after a great grief; and genius is a tentative forgetting of will and desire and implies a flight from life. He eulogizes music above the other arts because it gives the essential nature, the form, of emotion, divested of all concrete content, of all reality.

3. CONCLUSION AND CRITICISM

In truth, Schopenhauer, like Plotinus, like all mystic and ascetic philosophers, despised the world, wished to attain serenity, self-integration, and beatitude by a process of nega-

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tion, by a process of exclusion. Like Plotinus, he lived in a period of social avalanche, in a period of moral revaluations. He saw the rise of the industrial revolution in Germany, the mad pursuit of materialistic interests, the consolidation of the bourgeoisie, the transformation of the peasant with his simple life into the city worker in the factory with the division of labor. He was himself the son of a merchant and had been destined by his father for a business career despite his own opposition, just as Heine had been urged by his family to become a lawyer-banker. This, of course, does not exhaust the causes of Schopenhauer's mysticism and pessimism. There was something in his temperament, in his tragic quarrel with his mother, in his misanthropy, in his disappointments, which nourished and prepared his soul for the doctrine of the Upanishads.³³ But no doubt these seeds of personal, of psychological discontent, of self-division, found a congenial soil in the social milieu. This is the common factor in the pessimism of so many of the great spirits of the century, of Leopardi and Heine, of Pushkin and Lermontov and Byron, of Chopin and Musset. The point is that Schopenhauer was not able to surmount his disillusionment by an act of social vision, like that of Karl Marx or John Stuart Mill, nor his mysticism by a naturalistic philosophy, like that of Spinoza, and to find in their union and integration a way of life. Instead, he wrought an ethic, which, by its own terms, is meant for a few, for the potential saints of the world. For mankind, it offers no salvation. Its fundamental dogma is flight from the earth; its inevitable result is an Icarus-like return, crushed, broken, frustrated. For the very conflict in the soul which he wished to efface is accentuated by this inveterate hatred of, and struggle with, the will, and issues in bitter inner discord as Freud and Pavlov have so clearly taught us to see (from two divergent viewpoints and yet essentially sustaining and corroborating each other). There

is truer salvation in Spinoza. Like Schopenhauer, he enunciates the omnipresence of the will, that is, the *conatus*, but gives it a positive, and not a negative, status; and transmutes it into a good by the organizing power of the higher emotions. Spinoza accepts nature as the source of our being, and this acceptance blossoms into the *amor intellectualis Dei*—the all-inclusive and the all-organizing emotion—which sees the things of nature *sub specie aeternitatis*. Schopenhauer “disowns nature” and laments in unison with Seneca: “*Tota rerum natura umbra est aut inanis aut fallax*,”³⁴—and sings with Leopardi:

. . . Noble indeed is he . . .
 Who ever proves himself,
 In suffering, great and strong,
 Nor sets on man the blame for human grief,
 Adding thereby to all our weight of woe
 A burden heavier still: hatred and wrath
 Of those that should be brothers—
 But gives the blame to her
 Whose is the guilt—to her whom mortals call
 Their “mother” nature, though she is indeed
 Step-mother in her malice.³⁵

This is the most vicious of pathetic fallacies. It leads from the Spinozistic positive acceptance of nature as the source of our being, and from the socio-ethical ideals to reconstruct society upon the basis of an active and serene acceptance of nature, to an attitude of futile hostility to nature and an acquiescence in the order of things. Such a view is implicit in Schopenhauer's pessimism.

Schopenhauer is obsessed with the metaphysical conception of evil. He is impervious both to the concrete politico-economic and the socio-ethical evil in the world, and to the ethical implications of metaphysical evil as concrete sympathy and love, that is, as ends in themselves and not as means to asceticism. He decries the illusion that man is or ought to be happy; and he is doubtless right. But cannot

man find a worth and dignity in the pursuit of the humble goods of life—food, family, friendship, delights of the senses and the mind—and in the devotion to truth, beauty, and goodness, not for the sake of a dear dogma, a jealous prejudice, but in behalf of life, of a fuller, richer, happier social life, of a higher human horizon? Only so can man be lifted—in Professor Sidney Hook's rendition of the beautiful thought of Karl Marx—from "the plane of the pitiful to the plane of the tragic."³⁶

There is a salutary and courageous element in Schopenhauer's pessimism, in his metaphysical revolt against Hegel's identification of the actual with the rational, or against the Stoic-pantheistic teleology which, by a grand *petitio principii*, explains away cosmic evil in a God-permeated world and proves the existence and universality of God by the alleged harmony of the world. There is surely tragedy at the very roots of life, and the doom of death hangs over all. Nor was Schopenhauer the first to realize the inadequacy of the world to satisfy desire. Spinoza, defining the good—like Hobbes—as the object of desire, divined the great disparity between the anticipated fulfillment of desire and the actual fulfillment. It was his pessimism that actuated Schopenhauer to make some clear and true remarks on the nature of tragedy. In a sense, Schopenhauer could have been among the greatest and most beneficent of philosophers; precisely because he was deep-sighted enough to fathom the essential sorrows and frustrations of life, the abortiveness of will, the force and fatality of impulse and desire. Schopenhauer, however, became enmeshed in his own web and remains, in effect, if not in intention, one of the most metaphysical of thinkers. It is no contradiction for a pessimistic philosophy to accept nature as tragic and yet gladly and serenely, with a sense of piety and reverence, as the source of our being, of our griefs and joys, and to formulate an ethic—not counseling the selfish flight of

the ascetic—but one of social solidarity and spiritual communion. But Schopenhauer was devoid of social perception. He did not understand the social causes of that spiritual *ennui* and that emotional *malaise* of his own generation. In his praise of the Indian doctrine of the transmigration of souls as a popular statement of the principle of cosmic unity, he did not discern at all its socio-historic aspect, that is, the use of a religious myth to maintain the socio-political *status quo*, to justify the existence of social and economic castes, of poor and rich, of privileged and oppressed, as divinely ordained, as in *rerum natura*, and more—to stigmatize the poor and oppressed as morally inferior, as *wicked*. Had Schopenhauer been aware of life *in concreto*, that is, had he thought of the *good* as the *good part* of life (frail and precarious as that may be)—friendship, love, knowledge, social ideals—he would have invested his metaphysical pessimism with an affirmative social content as the redeeming ray of light in the world, and he would have propounded a theory of art in the service of life. For art communicates and shares and coördinates human experience, and offers man light and guidance on his brief day of doing and dreaming in the frost and in the sun. It can help bring him a vision of immortal things and of enduring values, and it can help give him an awareness of membership in a harmonized social order—Professor Edman tells us—that will not be inferior to the “awareness of membership in the *City of God* that St. Augustine envisioned,” for “it will be citizenship in the *City of Man*, and the virtues chiefly requisite thereto will be Hope and Charity.”³⁷

It is only such an art—an art that reveals and clarifies life—that can become the great healer, the great quieter. Schopenhauer's remarks on humor are very inadequate.³⁸ And that is significant. Humor comes *after* satire, that is, *after* the social attempt to heal the *world*, to lift the horizon of human happiness a little higher, follows the attempt to

heal the *soul*, to reconcile oneself to life and to reality, to see life and reality as a pure subject of *vision* and to see them *sub specie aeternitatis*. All great art partakes of this quality of humor, as the supremely objective and disinterested contemplation of the world. In such art—as Socrates (in the early dawn, the only sober person, after the most glorious symposium in the memory of man) knew—tragedy and comedy find their confluence.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. In *Art as Experience*, Professor Dewey says "The two great fallacies of esthetic criticism are reduction and confusion of categories" (p. 315).

2. This historically prevalent and persistent tendency to substitute *one* of the constituent factors of art for art as an autonomous spiritual activity might perhaps be characterized as the *fallacy of metonymy*. I note that the Earl of Listowel in his recent *Critical History of Modern Aesthetics* similarly criticizes the play theory of art as a confusion of partial resemblance with complete identity.

3. A perusal of the history of aesthetic from Plato to Tolstoy will verify this assertion. Indeed, the moralistic conception of aesthetic which has found its most solemn and celebrated expression and formulation in Plato and Tolstoy is at once the oldest and the most widespread and enduring. Historically it has assumed the following forms: (a) as *social and political* moralism it has urged the subservience of art to a specifically defined system of social tradition and economic organization of society; (b) as *religious* moralism it has inveighed against art as an allurement of the senses and yet has utilized its instrumental efficacy; (c) as *pedagogic* moralism it has considered art a propaedeutic to the more serious disciplines of science, philosophy, ethics, theology; (d) as *Philistine* moralism it has disparaged art as practically useless and condoned it partly as a trivial and tolerable form of amusement.

4. The science of sensuous cognition, the theory of the fine arts, the theory of the inferior kind of knowledge, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of analogical reasoning.

Aesthetic, par. 1. See Croce: *Aesthetic*, p. 212.

5. Baumgarten, so far as is known, was the first to use the word *Aesthetic* as the name of a special science. It appeared in his doctoral dissertation *Meditationes Philosophicae de nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus* (Philosophical Meditations concerning Some Things Pertaining to Poetry, 1735). In 1750 he used it as a title. He thus elevated the word *Aesthetic* and degraded the philosophy of the beautiful in art and nature; for while the objects of logic are *noeta*, Aesthetic deals with *aistheta*.

6. The Leibnizian continuous ladder of existence from the lowest beings to the monad of monads, that is, to God. Baumgarten's application of this law—and the role of aesthetic according to this law—is touched upon in note 8.

7. Baumgarten insisted however upon the distinction between an *oratio perfecta sensitiva* (a perfected sensuous utterance) and an *oratio perfecte sensitiva* (an utterance altogether—*omnino*—sensuous. See Croce's *Aesthetic*, p. 218.

8. Leibniz's clear but *not distinct* cognition corresponds to Descartes' *confused* cognition. In his doctoral dissertation Baumgarten applied this to poetry: "Ideas which can be distinctly conceived, and which are adequate and perfect, are not sensuous and, consequently, not poetical (par. 14).

Since clear or vivid ideas are poetical, but distinct ideas are not, it is only confused (i.e., sensuous) but vivid ideas which are poetical (par. 15)." Now, since *natura non facit saltus*, confused or sensuous knowledge leads from obscure to clear ideas. "So aesthetic truth, which should rather be called probability, is that grade of truth, which, though not carried to complete certainty, yet contains no obvious falsehood" (*Aesthetics* par. 483). I am, borrowing Professor Carritt's translations (in his book *Philosophies of Beauty*).

Ex nocte per auroram meridies. Aesthetic truth is the *aurora*. And Baumgarten was obtuse enough to believe that he was echoing Aristotle, that his *probable* was Aristotle's *eikos*.

9. Provided this difference is in some form recognized it does not matter what terms are specifically used.

10. This continuity of tradition is evident not only in their *approach* but at certain points in the *content* of their aesthetic. Despite the ocean of difference between Wolff and Baumgarten on the one hand, and Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer on the other, Baumgarten's fundamental tenet finds its way in some devious subterranean manner into the aesthetic of all the three. Kant used Baumgarten's book as a text in his lectures on *Metaphysics*. His first work on aesthetic bears vivid traces of, and manifests a mental kinship to, Baumgarten. But the important point is this: Kant's fatal dichotomization of beauty into *free* and *dependent* beauty was a result of his concealed allegiance to the Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten view. The effect, then, upon Kant was negative. It led him to exclude from the sphere of pure beauty almost all of art. Hegel's conception of art as the sensuous presentation of the Idea is in accordance with this accepted tradition. Of course Hegel defined the Idea in a wholly novel and rich sense, but from the viewpoint of aesthetic, the substantive identity remains. Schopenhauer, who drew such a sharp line of demarcation between art and science, considers poetry the highest of the arts (apart from music which is in a category of its own as the direct embodiment of Will) because it can, unlike architecture, painting, and sculpture, express and render the concept.

These issues are more fully and more specifically discussed in the appropriate places.

11. In *L'Esthétique*.

12. In the first chapters of *What Is Art?*

13. In his book entitled *Academic Illusions in the Field of Letters and the Arts*.

14. No brief is held here for an empirical-impressionistic "philosophy" of art without standards and without regulative, directing ideas. It is merely suggested that these standards and ideas should at once help to elucidate the nature of art and aesthetic experience and should themselves be elucidated—altered, expanded, developed—in consequence of the objective study of art and the spiritual enrichment of deep and wide aesthetic experience. That is, they should be the fine projections and yet the theoretic illuminations of art, beauty and aesthetic experience. By "antecedently determined demands upon aesthetic," emphasis then is made to bear upon *demands* which are extraneous, transcendental and are results of the philosopher's metaphysical needs. They are rooted in the ontological passion for a neatly organized spiritual universe.

KANT

1. Quotations are from J. H. Bernard's translation (second revised edition, Macmillan, 1914). Page numbers are indicated in parentheses after quotations. The sources of all other quotations are given in the following notes.

2. At the beginning of the *Prolegomena* (Paul Carus translation, p. 7).

3. Needless to say, there are notable differences between Plato's idealism and that of Kant. Plato's ideas can be apprehended by thought. Kant's noumena are not accessible to thought. To Plato, science involves the intellectual cognition of ideas emancipated from all sense-perception. To Kant, science is sense-data woven into a system of knowledge by the Understanding and its a priori logical forms. Science is knowledge of phenomena. Against the rationalists (Leibniz, Baumgarten, Wolff) Kant affirms that the a priori is independent of, and antecedent to, any *particular* experience, but not experience in general.

4. Smith translation, p. 27.

5. *Critique of Practical Reason, and other works on the Theory of Ethics*. Abbott translation, p. 119.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30. 7. *Ibid.*, p. 219. 8. *Ibid.*, pp. 220-21. 9. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

10. Kant's *Reflective Judgment* is dealt with at length in Macmillan's *The Crowning Phase of The Critical Philosophy* and in Meredith's *Introductory Essays* in his translation of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*.

11. It may seem necessary to justify this use of the word *form* to the student of the *Critique of Pure Reason* where the forms are possessions of the mental faculties and are imposed by the mind upon the manifold of sensation. In the *Critique of Judgment* form has a locus outside the mind, is part of the given. The specific aesthetic pleasure is subjective, is the mind's enjoyment of its own state, is the pleasure flowing from the accordance of the imagination and the understanding—but an accordance occasioned by the apprehension of the form of an object outside the mind.

Thus Dr. Dunham in his recent book, *A Study in Kant's Aesthetics*, writes: "The whole meaning of subjective purposiveness lies in the principle that nature provides objects in forms especially adapted to cognition— . . . as to lure the mind away from its logical activity into an enjoyment of its private state. . . . There is something in the given which is meant to harmonize with the mind which receives it . . ." (pp. 62-63). He adds that at times Kant seems to be concerned with the harmony of the faculties *within* the subject and at other times he is stressing the subject-object relation.

12. In Bernard's introduction. 13. Genesis, XXVII, 22.

14. The famous letter to Reinhold (December 28, 1787), in which Kant announces the plan embracing the complete structure of his philosophy, sheds light on this whole issue. Quoted in part in Meredith's *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*; contained in full in Vol. X of Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 487-89. (Berlin 1900-1934.)

15. The English influence—that of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume—is more palpable in Kant's *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and*

the Sublime (1764). There is an empirical strain in the *Observations* and an attempt is made to fuse morals and taste. It is a matter of controversy whether Kant was acquainted with Burke's *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1756) when he composed his *Observations*. Burke's essay was translated into German in 1773. Kant was not able to read English fluently. In 1767 Herder wrote to Kant about Burke's *Inquiry*. The tone of the letter seems to indicate that the essay was new to Herder as well as to Kant.

This issue is discussed, and part of Herder's letter quoted, in Dunham's *A Study in Kant's Aesthetic*, pp. 1-2.

16. Book II, Part I, Section 8. Kant was acquainted with Hume's *Inquiry*. There is some doubt as to his knowledge of the *Treatise*. The *Sceptic* is mentioned in the *Critique of Judgement*. (See A. D. Lindsay: *Kant*, p. 15.)

17. In the *Morgenstunden*, quoted in Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*. Vol. II, p. 528 (English translation).

18. Introduction I (p. 172 in J. W. Semple's English translation).

19. *The World as Will and Idea* (p. 231, Haldane translation). There are important differences between Kant's and Schopenhauer's views. Kant's approach to the problem of disinterestedness in aesthetic contemplation is logical and the doctrine of disinterestedness becomes the precondition for the universality of the judgment of Taste. Schopenhauer is concerned with the psychological state of consciousness in aesthetic contemplation and he exalts the disinterestedness characteristic of aesthetic experience as a manifestation of genius and as conducive to a feeling of personal blessedness flowing from a cleavage of personality—the emancipation of the intellect from the thrall of the will. (See also note 5 on Schopenhauer.)

20. Page 35. See also Shaftesbury: *Characteristics* (especially Vol. III, pp. 179-80, 5th ed.); Hutcheson: *Inquiry* (especially Section I, 15, Section VI, 7); and Alison: *Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste*. The doctrine of disinterestedness was not unknown in English aesthetic literature.

21. Vol. II, p. 35. 22. *Art as Experience*, pp. 253-54. 23. *Defence of Poetry*, Cook edition, p. 14. 24. Letter 69 (Oct. 27, 1818) to Woodhouse.

25. The first half of the quotation is from *The Study of Poetry* (*Essays in Criticism*, second series, 1903, p. 5), and the second half is from the essay on Wordsworth (*Ibid.*, p. 144).

26. My translation, from *L'Art Au Point De Vue Sociologique*, p. 28. The original is as follows: "Mais le propre du génie poétique et artistique consiste à pouvoir se dépouiller non seulement des circonstances extérieures qui nous enveloppent, mais des circonstances intérieures de l'éducation, des conjonctures de naissance ou de milieu moral, du sexe même, des qualités ou des défauts acquis."

27. In *Vision and Design* Roger Fry seriously attempted to provide this distinction with a physiological-psychological basis. He invested man with "the possibility of a double life; one the actual life, the other the imaginative life. Between these two lives there is this great distinction, that in the actual life the processes of natural selection have brought it about that the instinctive reaction, such, for instance, as flight from danger, shall be the important part of the whole process, and it is towards this that the man bends his whole conscious endeavour. But in the imaginative life no such action is necessary, and, therefore, the whole consciousness may be focussed upon the perceptive and the emotional aspects of the experience.

In this way we get, in the imaginative life, a different kind of perception" (p. 12, Brentano edition). It is only necessary to put in juxtaposition the following passage from Professor Dewey's *Art as Experience* to be able to discern the ray of truth as well as the confusion and fallacy of Fry's dichotomy. Professor Dewey is distinguishing between what he calls *recognition* and *perception*. *Recognition* would correspond to Fry's (and Kant's) "actual" response to a stimulus and *perception* to the "imaginative life." He writes: "Recognition is perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely. In recognition there is a beginning of an act of perception. But this beginning is not allowed to serve the development of a full perception of the thing recognized. It is arrested at the point where it will serve some *other* purpose, as we recognize a man on the street in order to greet or to avoid him, not so as to see him for the sake of seeing what is there (p. 52). Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy (p. 53)."

28. Letter 22, December 22, 1817. 29. *Alpha and Omega*, p. 216. 30. Keats: *Endymion*, I, 779. 31. Keats: *Fall of Hyperion*, I, 157. 32. *Reason in Art*, p. 171. 33. Translated by Carritt in his *Philosophies of Beauty*, p. 82. 34. *Ibid.* p. 85.

35. To Kant, Beauty resides in the purity of the aesthetic judgment. To Baumgarten (and to Leibniz and Wolff), it dwells in the perfection of the object. But it is important to note that aesthetic does not represent, to Baumgarten, an expression of Truth in its own manner. Aesthetic is an *inferior* expression of Truth; it is *pulchritudo cognitionis*. It differs from conceptual knowledge, not in content, but in the form of apprehension, which is *Sensuous*. Truth, as clear and distinct ideas, can only be cognized by the intellect unobscured by emotion and sensibility. Kant pointed out, very emphatically, in *The Critique of Pure Reason* that Leibniz's distinction between conceptual and well-ordered, and sensuous and confused, cognition is merely logical. Kant maintains that the distinction is one that affects not simply the form but the origin and contents of knowledge, since by sensibility the nature of things is not known merely confusedly but is not known at all. The form of a sensuously intuited object is always determined by subjective conditions. (See *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 84, Smith translation.)

36. The remainder of this paragraph is also relevant to Kant's fourth moment—the necessity of the judgment of Taste. 37. Page 105. 38. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

39. In a footnote (in the essay entitled *The Sceptic*) Hume wrote: "Though colors were allowed to be only in the eye, would dyers or painters ever be less regarded or esteemed? There is a sufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind, to make all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners."

In the introduction to the essay on the *Sublime and Beautiful* Burke also defends the possibility and necessity of standards of taste. And Lord Kames is occupied with the same problem in the last chapter of his *Elements of Criticism*. Now Kant would not deny standards of taste but his peremptory retort would be that they are only empirical.

40. In his *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland* Lotze makes many significant comments on Kant's four moments. His remarks on the second moment (and a brief comment on the first) are appropriate at this point.

As to the first moment Lotze says that he can agree with half of Kant's result: "*Schön sei, was ohne Interesse gefällt.*" He states his modification very sharply and clearly in the following sentence: "*Schön sei, was der Phantasie in der Anschauung gefalle, ohne eine andere Wirklichkeit zu bedürfen, als die, welche nöthig ist, um es eben zum Gegenstand der Anschauung machen*" (p. 46).

He points out that Kant's second moment—*schön sei, was ohne Begriff allgemein gefällt*—provides no objective rule for aesthetic and for art. To Kant the difference resides in the quantity of the judgment, but Lotze avers that even if the judgment of Sense were universally valid, it would not become, by that token, beautiful,—that is, a judgment of Taste. The difference between the judgment of Sense and the judgment of Taste is a difference in value. Sensation, Lotze maintains, is a faculty of passive, recipient impression; the Judgment is an active, relating faculty: it is in a state of active relationship to its manifold. Even if the mind—*Seele*—were to exercise an influence on a sense-perception, there would be no conscious awareness of it, and the mind would only know the final product, the completed perception, and the accompanying feeling of pleasure. But in the process of contemplating and experiencing the beautiful, the mind—even if it is unable to achieve a logical knowledge of the grounds of its judgment—feels itself active and knows that its pleasure dwells in the perceived conformity of the external impressions with the conditions of its activity with reference to them.

Lotze senses that the emphasis upon the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment would seem to endanger the ontological status of the Beautiful, would possibly lead to the doctrine that the truly beautiful is the "*I*," the subject, whereas the object is only beautiful in the reflection which the aesthetic movement of the soul throws upon it. The enjoyment of the contemplator of the beautiful is not an enjoyment with reference to the object, but with reference to the subject. It is a process of aesthetic self-idolation, self-adoration, self-worship. Lotze attempts, therefore, to modify, or, more precisely, to complete his clarification of the nature of the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment. He says that, in truth, the harmony of the mental powers does not constitute, for Kant, the beautiful thing. The beautiful is for him, as it is for common sense and as the word means in ordinary language, the object whose impression produces aesthetic pleasure. The ground of the beautiful lies neither merely and wholly in us nor in the object. It consists in the agreement, in the reciprocal adaptation between the object and ourselves. There is no beauty as such except in the spiritual feeling of enjoyment and admiration. And the connection of things is so ordered that they can stimulate the spirit to experience this feeling. "*Es gibt keine Schönheit als solche, ausser in dem Gefühl des Geistes, der sie genießt und bewundert; aber der Zusammenhang der Dinge ist so geordnet, dass er dem Geiste die Formen der Bewegung erregen kann, in denen ihm jener Genuss zu Theil wird und der Gegenstand seiner Bewunderung entsteht*" (p. 66). To deny this quality to objects is to affirm, by implication, an ontological dualism, is to affirm that the living waters of spirit flow only over half the world, is to affirm, indeed, that the real world is independent of us. But under such conditions, beauty would have little value, beauty would become a semblance. Spirit is the essential constituent of the universe. To become permeated with this thought is to perceive that beauty

has a subjective locus in spirit. Beauty, like virtue and love, attains value only when living spirit feels or exercises it. Virtue, and love are acts of spirit. But the feeling of the beautiful is a longing and desire to admire what *we ourselves are not*. It is only in our inmost being that what would remain indifferent to us becomes beautiful. What we enjoy in the feeling of the beautiful is the union of world and spirit, is the sense of a general world-order.

41. Kant recognizes several aesthetic pleasures: the pleasure in the harmonious interaction of the imagination and understanding, and the specifically aesthetic pleasure resulting from the judgment that the first pleasure flows from the mere reflection on the purposive adaptation of the form of an object to the contemplating subject. Thus, for example, Professor Alexander writes in the Kantian vein: "The judgment of beauty arises in respect of an object when the concept of it which is made by the understanding works in harmony with the imagination which it sets going; that describes in my language a blending of data supplied by the subject-matter itself and the elements which are imported into or imputed to it by the mind imaginatively" (*Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 28). Kant's conception of the *specific* aesthetic pleasure and Alexander's notion of imaginative elements which are imported into, or imputed to, the object by the mind lead imperceptibly to the theories of Empathy. The universality of the judgment of Taste which Kant defended dialectically is merely the *psychological condition* of aesthetic judgment precisely as the theory of the projection or infusion of feeling into objects in aesthetic perception is advanced by its exponents as a psychological explanation of aesthetic experience. That Kant was really dealing only with the psychological basis of the universality of aesthetic judgment (which he disdained to consider experimentally and concretely but developed dialectically and abstractly) is quite clear to Alexander, who states explicitly that "so far as the analysis goes of the *psychological* conditions of the apprehension, I have done little more than repeat in another form the doctrine of Kant, the greatest name in aesthetics" (p. 28).

42. Page 44. 43. In a letter. 44. *An Enquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, Section I, 17. 45. *Elements of Criticism*, Ch. III. 46. *Summa Theologica*. 47. *Ibid.* 48. *A Modern Book of Criticism*, p. ii.

49. Directly or obliquely the formalism of Kant has percolated into contemporary aesthetic theory. Thus Vernon Lee writes: "One of the most valuable negative results of modern aesthetics . . . is the distinction between the qualities of a visible figure, pattern, or more summarily 'form,' and the qualities suggested by the identification of this form as representing a given object" (*Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 14). And again: "Yet this explanation (of beauty as adaptation to an end) has little philosophical credit, and was thoroughly refuted already by Kant, whose *Urtheilskraft* is, by the way, an important contribution to aesthetics" (p. 9). She goes on to deny the expressiveness of sense-qualities and to confine aesthetic significance to *shapes* which satisfy a desire for harmonious relations among our modes of motor imagery. Satisfaction, she believes, ensues when the relations embodied in an object are reenacted by our motor imagery. Clive Bell's conception of "significant form" is probably better known. In his book entitled *Art* he writes: "The objective quality in visual art which appeals to all

connoisseurs is Significant Form . . . to appreciate a work of art we need bring nothing from life . . . only a sense of form and color and a knowledge of three-dimensional space . . ." (Ch. I). Bell, like Kant, disregards the empirical fact that pattern achieves plastic form, that color, line, mass assume significance and evoke significant emotions when colors are of things—of sky and sea and flowers—and when lines define the shapes of objects—of trees, and clouds and men and women. It is as the vivid rendition of objective reality that line, color, mass become magical and enchanting. In *Architecture of Humanism* Geoffrey Scott has caught the very accents of Kant. He writes of the masters of the Renaissance: "Given these [Mass, Space, Line, Coherence], they could dispense at will with sculpture and with colour, with academic precedents and poetic fancies, with the strict logic of construction or of use" (p. 240). It follows that the artistic emotion is concerned with surfaces, with the motion and the strife of lines, with spatial patterns. But once more, art is the revelation of pattern in content and of beauty in life, and it is not possible to establish a bifurcation between them. In fact, perhaps pattern in painting, like rhythm in poetry, is itself content, a sort of basic reverberating cosmic quality arousing a basic human emotion and preparing the beholder and auditor for the communication of the meanings embodied in the work of art. Form is at once the implement and the end of art. It is the implement which enables the artist to communicate experience and it is the testament that the experience has been communicated and the emotional expectation, on the part of the beholder, has been fulfilled.

50. Kant was especially fond of didactic poetry and satire. Pope was one of his favorite poets. He preferred the poetry of Frederick the Great to that of Goethe and Schiller.

51. In a lecture. 52. In a book appropriately entitled *Three Philosophical Poets*. 53. Grosse: *Beginnings of Art*, p. 50. 54. *Ibid.*, p. 26. 55. Hirn: *Origins of Art*, p. 25. 56. Tolstoy: *What Is Art?* especially Ch. XVI. 57. *Defence of Poetry*, Cook ed., p. 14. 58. *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*, pp. 31–33.

59. Kant was influenced by Alexander Gerard's *Essay on Genius*. Gerard's essay consists of three parts: the first treating "Of the Nature of Genius," the second treating "Of the General Sources of the Varieties of Genius," and the third treating "Of the Kinds of Genius."

60. In his *Kant's Begründung der Aesthetik* Herman Cohen makes many illuminating comments upon Kant's view of art. (The line of demarcation between Kant's view, as explained by Cohen, and his own, is at times obliterated. The role and importance of art and the aesthetic experience, in Cohen's own philosophy, cannot, much to my regret, be discussed here. It is, however, intimated in these comments on Kant.)

Beautiful art serves no purpose and is not subject to any rule or concept. Beautiful art is not handicraft. It is play. It is not mechanism but spirit. But this play is not trivial; it is purposive. It is *Beschäftigung*. It is a play of the mental faculties. It is a manifestation of purposiveness on the part of consciousness. Consciousness is the content to which this aesthetic purposiveness refers, that is, to consciousness as such, and not to a specific moment or act of consciousness. Aesthetic purposiveness appears as a psychological symptom of consciousness. There is an inner causality. Pleasure is the expression of this heightening of consciousness. It is a sub-

jective and formal consciousness in the deep sense in which subject and object are united and their conflict is resolved in critical insight. This purposiveness of consciousness takes another direction and elevates the very concept of nature. It is thus a part of purposiveness in general (which imparts spirit to, and imposes order upon, nature), which enables us to judge nature not only on the analogy of a mechanism but also of a Technic. Art and nature are united in a primal relationship through the principle of purposiveness. Consequently it cannot be said that art imitates nature. Art appears now as the original, the ideal or the prototype of nature, as the "amplified" concept of nature. It is our concept of nature. It elaborates and extends the concept of nature from a frame of laws to that of a *Grenzbegriff*. Beautiful nature is the discovery of aesthetic genius. It is under the aspect of art that nature appears as beautiful. When nature is seized by consciousness as beauty, it has ceased to be a mechanism and has even become more than an organism. Art unlocks the beauty of nature precisely as science exhibits her necessity. Thus nature appears, in so far as she is the object of aesthetic contemplation, not as the prototype of art, but as its copy, its *Nachbild*. Aesthetic consciousness expands nature to art, and the character of aesthetic purposiveness is made manifest. Aesthetic purposiveness produces a *Kunst-Natur*. And the full force and significance of aesthetic purposiveness are revealed. The theoretic and the practical a priori beget or engender Nature. As aesthetic a priori, purposiveness elevates begotten nature to the status of art. Aesthetic consciousness thus obtains a sovereign position over nature. Art ceases to be image and metaphor. The content of art becomes an idealistic production.

The Idealism of Purposiveness is the root-principle of the Judgment. We must seek the aesthetic a priori in ourselves. Aesthetic purposiveness must have autonomy, not heteronomy. We must ourselves be law-giving. Hence aesthetic purposiveness is an Idea, that is, an "expanded category," a regulative Principle. The Idea is not appearance; it is always *Das Ding an sich*. The thing-in-itself implies above all the limitation of the Understanding by Reason. That, too, is the function of aesthetic purposiveness. As aesthetic Idea, it affirms the existence of a super-sensible ground, of a thing-in-itself of consciousness. In the thing-in-itself of feeling the realm of nature and the realm of purpose unite to heighten the self-consciousness of art-creating and art-judging Man. Art is the self-consciousness of humanity. The aesthetic Idea indicates not so much the command as the possibility of universal agreement. It suggests that there are means, natural and pure, with which to pierce the Principium Individuationis at the point where it is visibly subdued, at the point of sheer, pure feeling—feeling delighting in the play and harmony of consciousness itself. That is the "aesthetic education of Man." Its reference is the homo noumenon, the thing-in-itself, the intelligible substrate of humanity. The aesthetic Idea should raise man to the consciousness of humanity. With the invention of art the *sensus communis* was discovered. The aesthetic feeling consummating in the consciousness of humanity is not merely the sympathetic *Teilnehmungsgefühl* but is at the same time an inner *Mitteilungsvermögen*. "Die Idee der Persönlichkeit ist die sittliche Idee, die keineswegs und nimmermehr im Gefühle begründet ist. Derjenige homo noumenon, den die Aufgabe des Gefühls begründet, ist der Mensch der Humanität. Das sittliche Noumenon ist der Mensch der Freiheit, die Natur und Sittlichkeit scheidet;

das ästhetische der Mensch der Harmonie, die Natur und Sittlichkeit versöhnt. Der sittliche Mensch ist der Mensch der Pflicht und des Endzwecks; der ästhetische der Mensch der Theilnehmung und des Mitgeföhls, der auch die Mittelzwecke zu scheinbaren Selbstzwecken adelt. Im Ding an sich des Geföhls vereinigen sich das Reich der Natur und das Reich der Zwecke zum erhöhten Selbstbewusstsein des Kunst schaffenden oder Kunst beurtheilenden Menschen. Die Kunst ist das Selbstbewusstsein der Menschheit" (pp. 216-17).

61. To Thomas the *essence* of art consists in integrity, proportion, and clarity or brilliance. The *effect* of art is pleasure in the mere contemplation. By integrity Thomas does not mean undeviating imitative realism (as by brilliance he does not mean, what critics are inclined to believe, mere glitter, but the shining clarity of form in matter)—an imitative representation of nature which would invalidate the art, say, of the impressionists. But art—Thomas holds—is rational and the artist is governed by the laws of the thing to be made. Integrity means then the making of the thing in terms of itself and according to the law governing its making. Likewise the Aristotelian formula—beginning, middle, and end—is no self-evident truism but a serious utterance emphasizing the organic "teleological" unity of a work of art.

62. In *Philosophy of Civilization*, p. 100.

63. Smith translation, pp. 66-67. In the second edition, the sentence is continued, as follows: "or else to share the name with speculative philosophy, employing it partly in the transcendental and partly in the psychological sense."

Also, *either* (*entweder*) follows after the word *advisable*.

The second edition was published in the same year (1787) in which the *Critique of Practical Reason* appeared. It was also the year Kant wrote the letter to Reinhold, see note 140.

64. The notion of art as an appeasement of desire, a reconciliation of impulses, as possessing *in effectum* a soothing spiritual power conducive to peace and serenity, was already faintly glimpsed by Plato. In the *Republic* the moral value of music in building character is thus explained but he exiles the poets because of their tendency to weaken the soul by laughter and by sorrow. This negative side is stressed by Tertullian in his *De spectaculis* against all art, and Saint Basil distinguishes between music that soothes and music that incites. Aristotle formulated the positive principle clearly in the tragic purgation. It is evident in Cicero at his finest. To Saint Thomas the elements of Beauty *in essence* are integrity, proportion, and clarity or brilliance, but *in effect* the beautiful is that which gives pleasure on sight (*id quod visum placet*). Milton dwells on it in the introduction to *Samson Agonistes*, in the *Il Penseroso*, and in lines 68-73 of the *Arcades*. In the Renaissance—the notion of the harmonious effect of art becomes "melodramatic," rhetorical, the *movere* in the formula *docere, delectare, movere*. To Pontano it is wonder; to Fracastoro, *frenzy*; and to Castelvetro, the *marvelous* (*maraviglia*). Dennis develops it in his *Advancement and Reformation of Poetry*.

A truer sense of aesthetic harmony is evinced by the romantic poets. Wordsworth writes in the *Preface*: "Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge." Coleridge stresses it in his lectures on Shakespeare (62-64). Carlyle specifically deals with it in his *Survey of German Poetry* (VIII,

224-25). Shelley writes: "Poetry is the record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best minds." Keats speaks of it at length in his second axiom on poetry.

Of modern writers, it is at the basis—in a sense—of Dewey's whole philosophy of experience as an Odyssey from doubt and confusion to peace and resolution. He develops it fully in his recent book on *Art as Experience*. It is at the root of the contemporary *synaesthesia* theory, whose most important representative and proponent is I. A. Richards. It is given a fine philosophical formulation by Professor Helen H. Parkhurst in *Beauty: An Interpretation of Art and the Imaginative Life* (especially pp. 26-29).

65. The last sentence of the essay on Shelley.

66. To trace the history of the theories of aesthetic which declare art to be subservient to an extraneous end would require a volume. Plato's attitude is well known. Strabo had written in the first part of his *Geography*, "The ancients assert . . . that poetry is a kind of elementary philosophy," and Plutarch, in *How a Young Man Ought to Study Poetry* that to "wed poetry to the doctrines of philosophy . . . invests with seriousness its useful passages." The same type of argument—only substituting for philosophy, religion, is used by the Christian Apologists, especially by Origen in his *Letter to Gregory* and by Saint Basil in his *Address to Young Men on the Right Use of Greek Literature*. It is found in Dante's view of poetry as being "polysemous," i.e., as containing four ascending meanings (literal, allegorical or mystical, moral, and anagogic, Epistle 7), and in Petrarch's allegorical conception of poetry. Poetry as a teacher of Virtue is a common thought to such diverse men as Piccolomini, Vida, Scaliger, Fracastoro, Minutino, Castelvetro, Tasso, Boileau, Racine, Sidney, Bacon, Ben Jonson, Hobbes, Dennis, Samuel Johnson, Gravina, Muratori, Vico, Ruskin, Tolstoy. For lack of space no quotations are given.

67. Lines 942-45. Leonard translation, p. 35. 68. Canto I, stanza 3 (J. K. James translation). 69. Lines 849-50 (B. B. Rogers translation). 70. Lines 163-66.

71. Kant expressly mentions Burke. He calls him the "foremost author in this method of treatment" (i.e., the physiological).

72. *Inquiry*, Part III, section 27. 73. *Ibid.* 74. *History of Aesthetics*, p. 276.

75. It is interesting to observe that Bergson's penal theory of comedy—according to which the comic situation entails a degradation in human dignity on the part of character or victim, a demotion of man from his position of superiority to the plane of mechanical automatism—is the converse of Pascal's and Kant's conception. Laughter—Bergson holds—is the penalty or corrective for a rigidity of habit and behavior, for an inelasticity, for a lack of gracefulness, of *unsprightliness*. "Any incident is comic that calls our attention to the physical in a person, when it is the moral side that is concerned." Bergson: *Laughter*, English translation, p. 51.

It is similarly interesting to note Kant's own theory of laughter, in contrast to his theory of the sublime: "Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation to nothing." P. 223, C. of J.

76. *Inquiry*, Part I, section 17. 77. *Ibid.* 78. Leonard Translation, p. 45. 79. *Inquiry*, Part II, section 1. 80. *Ibid.*, section 2. 81. Everyman Edition, p. 38. 82. Book XVII, 1. 645. (These lines are translated by A. O. Pickard in his translation of Longinus's *On the Sublime*.) 83. Aylmer

Maude translation, Vol. III of *War and Peace*, p. 221. 84. "Sublimity is the note which rings from a great mind." Ch. IX (Prickard translation, p. 14). 85. *Modern Painters*, Vol. I, p. 39 (Everyman edition). 86. *History of Aesthetic*, p. 278.

87. From the famous passage in the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: *The starry heavens above and the moral law within*. . . . The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an *animal creature* The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence" (Abbott translation, p. 260).

88. From the *Ode to the West Wind*.

89. He selects, by way of illustration, Turgenev's beautiful prose poem about the sparrow that poured out its lifeblood in mother love. He points out that the *littleness* of the bird in contrast to the dog seems to accentuate the quality of its courage, of its love, and becomes an element in its sublimity. Bradley also cites these lines from Wordsworth about the dog whose master had died among the crags of Helvellyn, and who was found there a long time after by his master's body:

"How nourished here through such long time
He knows who gave that love sublime,
And gave that strength of feeling, great
Above all human estimate."

Bradley's essay on the sublime is included in the volume entitled *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*.

90. I Kings, XIX, 11-12. 91. From "*Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey*," lines 89-93. 92. Act I, scene II (lines 389-93). 93. Act III, scene 2. 94. From the *Ode to the West Wind*. 95. *Hyperion*, Book II, lines 204-6.

96. All references are to *Essays: Aesthetical and Philosophical*. The first part consists of the *Aesthetical Letters*. The other essays mentioned are contained in the same volume and are referred to in parentheses by page number.

97. *Philosophy of Fine Art*, Vol. I, p. 84.

98. From the Prologue to *Wallenstein*, last six lines (English translation by A. F. Murison).

99. In a paper entitled *The Stage as a Moral Institution*, Schiller tellingly writes: ". . . its very enemies have admitted that it has gained the palm over all other means of amusement. . . . Human nature cannot bear to be always on the rack of business, and the charms of sense die out with their gratification. Man, oppressed by appetites, weary of long exertion, thirsts for refined pleasure, or rushes into dissipations that hasten his fall and ruin, and disturb social order. Bacchanal joys, gambling, follies of all sorts, to disturb ennui, are unavoidable if the lawgiver provides nothing better" (p. 338).

100. "The earliest known instance of the phrase *L'Art pour l'art* is found in Benjamin Constant's *Journal* (10 February, 1804; not published until 1895). As appears from the context, he coined the phrase with direct reference to the aesthetic theories of the Germans—especially Kant and Schiller." Irving Babbitt, in "On Being Creative," p. 171, footnote.

HEGEL

1. That is, in the English translation. All references are to F. P. B. Osmaston's translation (London 1920). Volume and page numbers are inserted in parentheses.

2. Hegel's system consists of three parts: Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit. Under the third, art, religion and philosophy are subsumed. In the first the Hegelian dialectic is concerned with the logic of thinking, in the second with the logic of natural growth, in the third with the logic of history and cultural change.

In his *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland* Lotze defines clearly and succinctly the three main parts of Hegel's philosophical system: Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit. "Die *Logik* ist der Schattenwelt allgemeiner Begriffe gewidmet, welche, bildlich zu reden, die vorweltliche Bewegung des Absoluten darstellen, in welcher dieses sich der ewigen, in jeder künftigen Welt gleichbleibenden Form seiner eignen Handlungsweise erinnert. Die *Naturphilosophie* folgt dem Absoluten aus diesem Ansich in das Anderssein der mannigfachen endlichen Ausgestaltung seines Inhalts in raumzeitlichen Erscheinungen und endet mit der letzten Hervorbringung der Natur, der sinnlichen Empfindung, in welcher das Absolute zu dem Fürsichsein, zu der geistigen Besitznahme seiner unbewusst vollzogenen Entwicklungen zurückkehrt. Die *Philosophie des Geistes* stellt die Stufenreihe der geistigen Lebensformen dar, in denen das Absolute, als einzelner Geist, dann als Geist der Gemeinde, zu dem Höchsten dieses Fürsichseins, dem absoluten Selbstbewusstsein gelangt, für welches jeder Unterschied des Wissens und des Gewussten aufhört" (p. 188).

Now aesthetic is subsumed under the third part—the Philosophy of Spirit. And this part contains three forms, that is, the substance of the Philosophy of Spirit is expressed in three different forms, as Art, as Religion, as Philosophy. The substance is the same, there is only a difference in form. "Die erste Form nun dieses Ergreifens ist ein unmittelbares und eben darum *sinnliches* Wissen, ein Wissen in Form und Gestalt des Sinnlichen und Objectiven selbst, in welchem das Absolute zur Anschauung und empfindung kommt: die *Kunst*. Die zweite Form sodann ist das *vorstellende* Bewusstsein, das Absolute aus der Gegenständigkeit der Kunst als Gegenstand der Vorstellung in die Innerlichkeit des Subjects hineinverlegend, die *Religion*. Die dritte Form endlich ist das freie *Denken* des Absoluten, die *Philosophie*, der geistigste Cultus des Göttlichen, sich zum Begriff aneignend, was sonst dem Glauben und der Kunst nur Inhalt subjectiver Vorstellung oder Empfindung ist" (p. 189). Lotze sees clearly that to Hegel art is a lower form of Philosophy, to be absorbed in, and transcended by, Religion, and then with Religion to be absorbed in, and transcended by Philosophy. "Sie [die Kunst] ist ihm weder der Form noch dem Inhalte nach die höchste Weise, dem Geiste seine wahrhaften Interessen zum Bewusstsein zu bringen. Denn ihrem Inhalt nach ist sie beschränkt; nur ein gewisser Kreis, eine Stufe der Wahrheit, in deren eigener Natur es noch liegt zu dem Sinnlichen herauszugehen und in demselben sich adäquat sein zu können, ist echter Inhalt der Kunst" (p. 190).

3. Eduard Von Hartmann's definition of beauty in *Philosophie des Schönen* as *Das Scheinen der Idee* is, of course, nearer to Kant's than to Hegel's view. Hartmann postulates the necessity of the objective reference of the beautiful as sugar is necessary for sweetness. But beauty is in perceptual appearance.

4. And only God—the Absolute—can be sublime. God is sublime in the subjective and in the objective sense, i.e., in the absolute sense. And though the sublime cannot be rendered—it does want to be *versinnbildlicht*.

5. Paragraph 562. The Philosophy of Mind is the third and last part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (Wallace translation).

6. In his work entitled *Hegel's Leben, Werke, und Lehre* Kuno Fischer says that Hegel associates beauty, like spiritual progress in general, with the consciousness of freedom. He thinks that to grasp this is essential for the clear comprehension of Hegel's aesthetic. He summarizes vividly the characteristics which define the three historical art-stages: "Wie die Weltgeschichte der Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit ist, auf welche sich alle Schönheit gründet, so ist sie auch der Fortschritt im Bewusstsein des Ideals oder des Kunstbewusstseins. Die Entwicklungsstufen des Ideals oder des Bewusstseins nennt Hegel die *Kunstformen*, deren er drei Hauptformen unterscheidet, entsprechend der orientalischen, griechisch-römischen und christlich-germanischen Welt: die orientalische, griechische und christliche Kunstformen. Die beiden Elemente des Ideals sind die Idee und die Erscheinung. Das Verhältnis der Idee zur Erscheinung ist ein dreifaches: 1. Die Idee ist unbestimmt und sucht in der Erscheinung sich zu verbildlichen: die Erscheinung ist bedeutsam, die Kunstformen daher *symbolisch*; 2. die Idee ist bestimmt, sie verkörpert sich vollkommen und geht ohne Rest in die Erscheinung auf, sie wird Mensch: Inhalt und Form sind identisch, die Kunstform ist *classisch*; 3. die Idee ist geistig, und vergeistigt sich im Innern der Menschen, in der Empfindung und im Gemüth: die Kunstform ist *romantisch*" (p. 815).

Fischer emphasizes that the doctrine of Freedom and the doctrine of Beauty depend upon each other. Nothing is of greater importance than the realization of this connection—a connection which Kant discovered, Schelling elucidated, and Hegel developed. It is the key to Hegel's aesthetic and to its most successful inferences and deductions. It is also possible to say in place of Freedom, Truth, and, briefly, Absolute Idea. The subject must be in a state of perfect freedom in order to be able to contemplate and represent aesthetically; the object, likewise, must be in a state of freedom in order to be able to appear aesthetically or to be represented aesthetically. Nature is the realm of Unfreedom—*Unfreiheit*. Nature as the series of stages through which Spirit penetrates and marches forward to *itself*, is the realm "des Aussersichseins der Idee und darum der Unfreiheit" (p. 819). The Ideal is Beauty, born and begotten of Spirit. What objective reality, in the form of natural beauty, strives to achieve but does not fully attain,—that the Imagination produces, creates, completes. In the process of aesthetic creation it is not sufficient that one is overwhelmed by the object; indeed, it is the object that must be mastered. Inspiration or being mastered is material—*stofflich*; mastering *ist gestaltend und formgebend*. Not merely being inspired—a process that seldom takes place on a plane higher

than that of dim and nebulous feeling; but the inspired creation and formation, constitutes specific artistic ability or genius. The contemplation of genius is a seizing of the object in its full force and freedom—a seizing in which the insight of genius and the objective reality are indissolubly bound up.

7. Page 128. 8. I borrow this excellent phrase from Professors Burnham's and Wheelwright's book, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. 9. *Beauty: An Interpretation of Art and the Imaginative Life*, pp. 203-4. 10. Indeed, Hegel writes: ". . . Metaphors, illustrations, similes become in this way an essential feature of poetic creation. We have thereby a kind of veil attached to the content, which concerns us, and which, by its difference from it, serves in part as an embellishment, and in part as a further unfolding of it, though it necessarily fails to be complete, for the reason that it only applies to a specific aspect of this content. The passage in which Homer compares Ajax, on his refusing to fly, to an obstinate ass is an illustration" (IV, p. 60). 11. *What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 122.

12. Vico had, in his *Scienza nuova*, ascribed to the imagination a historically prior role in the ideal moments of the spirit, a culturally earlier "modification of the human mind," later supplanted and transcended by the intellect. Vico interpreted the ideal priority of poetry not only psychologically in the spiritual life of the individual but historico-culturally and denied accordingly primitive civilization any kind of conceptual logic by asserting that its science, morals and politics were poetic. He defined art and poetry as imaginative in essence, and science and philosophy as intelligible truth, and distinguished both from history as the consciousness of certitude. The ideas of poets and painters he held to be identical: the difference being in the respective medium. Great poets, he thought, spread their wings in eras of barbarism: Homer in antiquity, Dante in the middle ages. The composition of poetry in an epoch of intellectual reflection is a form of cultural regression, a survival of racial childhood, for "strength of imagination is in proportion to weakness of reasoning."

Macaulay had an excellent knowledge of Italian literature. He may, and he may not, have been influenced by Vico. He was passionately fond of the classics and a sincere lover of poetry, and yet he wrote in his essay on Milton: "We think that, as civilisation advances, poetry almost necessarily declines . . . Truth, indeed, is essential to poetry; but it is the truth of madness. The reasonings are just; but the premises are false. Hence of all people children are the most imaginative. They abandon themselves without reserve to every illusion . . . Poetry produces an illusion on the eye of the mind. And, as the magic lantern acts best in a dark room, poetry effects its purpose most completely in a dark age . . . He who, in an enlightened and literary society, aspires to be a great poet, must first become a little child" . . . Macaulay therefore considered Milton a poet who wrote in a period in which poetry had been superseded.

13. Paragraph 572, Wallace translation. 14. Robin George Collingwood: *Speculum Mentis*, Ch. III. 15. Chapter VII, *Die Religion*. 16. *Encyclopaedia*. The paragraphs dealing with art, religion and philosophy are from 553 to 577 (Wallace translation). 17. Sibree translation, p. 53 (revised edition 1899, Colonial Press). 18. *Ibid.*, p. 19. 19. *Egotism in German Philosophy*, p. 16.

20. In his incisive book *Academic Illusions in the Field of Letters and the Arts* Professor Martin Schütze says: "In Hegel's system, the dialectic-absolutistic concept and its law of syllogistic chain-movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, each synthesis becoming in its turn the thesis of the next syllogistic link, is the fundamental principle of structure, function, growth, decay, fate, history, value. The dialectic concept becomes thus the primary and universal force of all reality. Individuals, particulars of any sort, are merely its instances and absolute tools; events, its absolute motions . . . The dialectic concept is his essence; the formal mechanism of the syllogism is his absolute primary motor principle of the universe" (p. 29).

Hegel's dialectic of opposites is really an illicit metaphysical use of an important principle—the principle of polarity in science and applicable to logic and philosophy. In *Reason and Nature* Professor Cohen says: "By this [the principle of polarity] I mean that opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity and plurality, the fixed and the flux, substance and function, ideal and real, actual and possible, etc., like the north (positive) and south (negative) poles of a magnet, all involve each other when applied to any significant entity. Familiar illustrations of this are: that physical action is not possible without resistance or reaction and that protoplasm . . . cannot live except by continually dying. The idea is as old as philosophy" (pp. 165-66).

21. *Egotism in German Philosophy*.

22. A. C. Bradley's essay on Hegel's theory of tragedy in his *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* is excellent. In his critique of Hegel's theory, however, he is inclined to accept much that is really in conflict with his own views.

23. I borrow this distinction between the terms *moral* and *ethical* from Professor Parker. He clarifies an important issue by saying that "from the ethical view—the good belongs to all free, creative acts that look toward the growth and happiness of individuals . . . From the moral view—it consists in conformity to law" (*Principles of Aesthetics*, p. 333).

A similar distinction is made by Professor T. V. Smith in his article on "Ethics" in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Science*. Provided this difference is acknowledged it does not matter what terminology is used.

24. At the end of Ibsen's Play. 25. Sibree translation, p. 39. 26. *Ibid.*, p. 36. 27. *Ibid.*, p. 33. 28. *A Modern Book of Criticism*, p. 189.

29. From the third *Abschnitt* of the third part. I am using here Professor Loewenberg's translation (in part) in his selections from Hegel in the "Modern Student's Library." First sentence is on p. 413, the second is on p. 416, and the third is on p. 447.

30. Campbell translation, p. 191 (Oxford University Press edition). 31. Campbell translation, p. 145, lines 526-28. 32. Act V, scene 10 (Boylan translation). 33. Campbell translation, p. 268, lines 265-66. 34. *Tragic Drama in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare*, p. 161. 35. Campbell translation, p. 18, lines 519-23.

36. Lines 1446-52 (p. 465, Arthur S. Way translation). Polynices does not say these lines directly to his mother and sister. They are related to them by the messenger as his last words.

37. *Measure for Measure*, Act II, scene 2, lines 117-22. 38. From his book *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*, third ed. p. 364. 39. From *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, No. 14. Selected Prose Works, p. 267. 40. *World as Will*

and *Idea*, p. 328. 41. *Art and Experience*, p. 55. 42. At the end of the tragedy (Gilbert Murray translation, p. 78). 43. In Eugene O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra*. 44. Lines 252-53 (p. 521, Arthur S. Way translation). 45. Poetics, Ch. 6 (Bywater translation). 46. From *A Free Man's Worship*.

47. Act III, scene 4.

48. This and the last passage quoted were translated by Mr. Lewisohn in *A Modern Book of Criticism*. All other translations are mine, from Vol. XI of Hebbel's *Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin, 1903).

SCHOPENHAUER

1. All references are to the Haldane translation. Page numbers are inserted in parentheses.

2. See the excellent introduction to Professor DeWitt Parker's *Selections from Schopenhauer*.

3. Schopenhauer agrees only in part with Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself as elaborated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Our will *does* remain outside of things, and hence their inner nature cannot be revealed to us. But Schopenhauer adds that we ourselves are the *thing-in-itself* and not merely the *knowing subject*. We can thus know the *thing-in-itself*—though not adequately or exhaustively—because of identity and community of nature. We can know the thing-in-itself from within. To want to know the thing-in-itself objectively is to wish something that is contradictory, since every object of cognition is idea and hence a "mere phenomenon of the brain." *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. II, p. 405. In the first volume Schopenhauer writes: "For the thing-in-itself must, even according to Kant, be free from all the forms connected with knowing as such; and it is merely an error on his part . . . that he did not count among these forms, before all others, that of being object for a subject" (p. 226).

4. Book V, Prop. 31, Scholium. In the English edition of *The World as Will and Idea* there is a typographical error: *Mens* is printed as *Meus*. However, even *Mens aeterna est* is not precisely Spinoza's phrase. Since Schopenhauer was quoting only part of a sentence, he was compelled, for grammatical reasons, to change Spinoza's *mentem aeternam esse* to *mens aeterna est*.

5. Keats: *Sleep and Poetry*, lines 123-24. 6. From a comment by Keats on Shakespeare. 7. From Shelley's *To a Skylark*.

8. The notion of disinterestedness is fundamental both in Kant's and Schopenhauer's aesthetic. In point of fact, Schopenhauer praises Kant for it. Is it the same notion in both thinkers? In his *Schopenhauer's Aesthetik und ihr Verhältnis zu den ästhetischen Lehren Kant's und Schelling's*, Eduard von Mayer maintains that their agreement is merely superficial, verbal, and bears no reference to the inner sense of their thoughts. Kant analyzes the aesthetic judgment, the logical relationships thereof; Schopenhauer is concerned with the psychologic facet of the aesthetic judgment, with the state of consciousness during aesthetic contemplation. Kant approaches the problems of aesthetic from the viewpoint of the universality of the judgment of Taste, Schopenhauer is interested in the feeling of

blessedness which aesthetic pleasure provides. For Kant, disinterestedness in aesthetic contemplation, that is, the elimination of the Will, follows from the universality of the aesthetic judgment; for Schopenhauer, it is a manifestation of genius, of a pure beholding of Ideas. For Kant—although the spontaneous play of the faculties does not include the will—the representation evokes a feeling of pleasure; for Schopenhauer, pleasure is negative, almost a synonym for the quieting of the will. With both Kant and Schopenhauer the doctrine of disinterestedness leads to the notion of the freedom of the powers of cognition. But it does not mean the same thing to both thinkers. Schopenhauer sees in the intellect, determined by will, a slave, and the achieved freedom of the intellect is to him an emancipation. For Kant, freedom here is hardly more than a word; he simply calls imagination free because it is not determined in its content by external objects. For Kant, aesthetic contemplation is an expression of the concord of the faculties of cognition; for Schopenhauer it rests upon a full cleavage of personality. Finally, whereas for Kant beauty is a symbol of morality; for Schopenhauer beauty is the security for the possibility of happiness. Mayer concludes: "Damit ist der persönliche Gegensatz Beider gegeben; denn in der Ethik offenbart sich das eigentliche Wesen eines Denkers. Kants Verwirklichung des Sittengesetzes in der Sinnenwelt und Schopenhauers Verneinung des Willens haben wenig gemeinsam. Jenes ist ein nüchternes, rigoristisches Prinzip, diese ein phantastisch-nihilistischer Traum; jenes ist formalistisch, blutlos, unpersönlich, diese aus den allerpersönlichsten Leiden hervorgegangen" (p. 63). Schopenhauer is therefore a disciple of Kant in his method but not in his results. What brings them into intimate relationship is the fact that both approach the problem of aesthetic contemplation from the aspect of its subjective conditions.

9. Ruskin and Schopenhauer seem to converge on two points. Both speak of the beautiful object as expressing the species or the Idea of the species, and both accept some beautiful objects as expressing a nobler species or a higher Idea (that is, a higher grade of the objectivity of the will). Ruskin exalted Beauty as "the signature of God upon His works" (*Modern Painters*, Vol. II, p. 191, Everyman edition), and preached that the love of nature should be catholic and reverent. He stressed that the whole of reality constitutes the area of the artist's vision and urged that the artist eschew the presumption of selecting certain aspects of nature and thereby falsifying "the signature of God" by a process of arbitrary idealization. And yet Ruskin felt that the signature of God could, and ought, to be discerned in the most perfect and ideal representative of the species, and, in turn, that the consummate wisdom of the divine teleology could be divined in all its significance, in the highest species and in the paragon of the species. In *Modern Painters* he wrote: "Although everything in nature is more or less beautiful, every species of object has its own kind and degree of beauty; some being in their own nature more beautiful than others, and few, if any, individuals possessing the utmost degree of beauty of which the species is capable" (Vol. I, p. 26, Everyman's edition). His conception of *specific* beauty led him to emphasize the generic features of earth, water, air, sky, sea, rock, mountain, vegetation. Disregarding the difference in metaphysical terminology the resemblance between Schopenhauer and Ruskin is ostensible.

To Ruskin (and to Schopenhauer) characteristic specimens of a class are beautiful, but to Spinoza anything is a characteristic specimen of some class, for *omnis existentia est perfectio*. Now it was Keats who, above any one else—and without being cognizant of the sources and consequences of his magnificent thoughts or insights—endowed beauty with that content it could only fully have in Spinoza's proclamation. To Spinoza *perfection* was synonymous with *reality*, with *being*. Keats identifies Truth with Beauty—

“‘Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty,’—that is all

Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know—”

in the manner of Spinoza. He equated Beauty with Truth, and Truth with Reality. Beauty is, to Keats, the quality of selfhood which all objects possess, which nature in its totality possesses. It is veritably “the signature of God” upon things, and is not the mystical and mythical species in things. To perceive this quality, this selfhood of things, is to perceive their significance, their meaning—is to *love* them. To *love* things is to apprehend their selfhood. Beauty is *objectified love*, is love felt as the quality of a thing. In a letter Keats wrote: “I can never feel certain of any truth but from a clear perception of its Beauty.” Beauty, is to Keats, as perfection is to Spinoza, the essence of Reality; and Reality, in its fullness and completeness—as an object of that love which is the highest form of *vision*—is beautiful. The supreme vision which encompasses the whole of nature as the source of our being, of our sorrows and our joys, Spinoza calls *amor intellectualis Dei*, and Keats calls the *chief intensity* (*Endymion* I, 800). Spinoza, as well as Keats, is speaking of love not merely as an emotion, but as the very highest and all-inclusive emotion which becomes a faculty of vision and a form of reason.

10. There is, of course, a valid distinction between an ideal and an idealized *mimesis* of life. The ideal portrayal of reality is the aesthetic-consistent consummation of the possibilities of experience. Unlike history (in the Aristotelian sense as an empirical chronicle of dates and events), it is a clarification of the essential, the coherent, the universal in action, emotion and character. Unlike science and philosophy, it is an apprehension of the universal, a vision of wisdom, in the concretely experiential, in the qualitatively unique. The idealized portrayal of life is an emptying, a denuding of experience of its immediacy, authenticity and unimpeachable meaning. The criterion of idealization is transcendental and rooted in some anterior moral or social philosophy.

11. In the *Ion* and the *Phaedrus* there is an intimation of poetry as a vision achieved in the creative rapture of inspiration, there is a suggestion that art is a direct and intuitive apprehension of reality born from a love of beauty and truth. (But since it is only inspiration and not “knowledge,” Plato places the poet in the *Phaedrus* one degree, on a scale of nine, above the artisan, and two above the tyrant.) Aristotle divided poets into two groups (*Poetics*, Ch. 17), the specially gifted and the slightly mad (anticipating Nietzsche's distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian tendencies in art and artists). Schopenhauer quotes Cicero's *Negat enim sine furore Democritus, quemquam poetam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato* (*De Div.* Book I). And the great Longinus wrote: “. . . Nothing makes the style so great as genuine emotion in the right place. It inspires

the words as it were with the breath of madness and fills it with divine afflatus" (Ch. 8). Schopenhauer's notion of the liberation of the artist from the laws of science is foreshadowed in these comments of Bacon. He says that the imagination "not being tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which Nature hath severed, and sever that which Nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things" (*Adv. of Learning*, Book II). In fact, almost all the critics during the Renaissance looked upon the imagination as pathological, and, relying upon Plato's *Phaedrus* and the remark in Aristotle's *Poetics*, considered it a source of aberration manifested alike in lover, lunatic, and poet. To the Horatian *prodesse* and *docere*, the Renaissance added the Ciceronian *movere*. The poet *moves* by exciting frenzy and ecstasy. In the most beautiful dialogue produced in the Renaissance on aesthetic, Fracastoro had written: "Hence, O friends, that Platonic madness which Socrates thought heavensent. God is not the cause, but music itself, full of a sort of great, exalting wonder which makes the pulse beat with rhythm as if stirred by some violent frenzy, and takes away self-possession and rouses one to ecstasy" (*Dialogue on Poetry*, English translation, p. 65). This surely, is neither the *inspiration* of the *Ion* nor the tranquil, peace-bringing and peace-bestowing rapture of Diotima.

In our own times Bergson writes, "There is a logic of the imagination which is not the logic of reason, one which at times is even opposed to the latter" (*Laughter*, p. 41, English translation). Freud says: "The artist has also an introverted disposition and has not far to go to become a neurotic." But he adds immediately: "A true artist knows how to elaborate his day-dreams so that they lose that personal note which grates upon strange ears and become enjoyable to others; he knows too how to modify them sufficiently so that their origin in prohibited sources is not easily detected" (*Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 314). Santayana, however, tells us simply and effectively that "the imagination of a great poet is as orderly as that of an astronomer" (*Poetry and Religion*, p. 270). And Professor Dewey informs us wisely in *The Quest for Certainty* that "tact, intuition, taste, are intelligent reflection brought to bear upon cumulative experience" (p. 262), and in *Art as Experience* that "because the artist is controlled in the process of his work by his grasp of the connection between what he has already done and what he is to do next, the idea that the artist does not think as intently and penetratingly as a scientific inquirer is absurd."

12. Hamlet, Act I, scene 5, line 189. 13. Pages 190-91. 14. *Round Table*, p. 232 (London, 1903). 15. In *Function of Criticism* and in the essay on Wordsworth. 16. From Arnold's *Study of Poetry* (already quoted).

17. In his exhaustive two-volume work on Schopenhauer, Kuno Fischer, too, interprets the concept of genius, as formulated by Schopenhauer, to imply an evasion of life. The will drives and falsifies the intellect in behalf of its passions: ". . . er verhält sich zu dem Licht der Erkenntnis, wie das Brennmaterial und der Rauch zum Feuer" (p. 298). Genius means full objectivity, the ability to maintain one's self in a state of pure contemplation and to perceive in the Ideas the essential and enduring in appearance. Now what is the function of art? Of aesthetic contemplation?

The aesthetic contemplation of genius is a pure, unobscured contemplation. The source of art is the cognition of Ideas; the purpose of art is the communication of Ideas. ". . . ihr einziger Ursprung ist die Erkenntnis der Ideen, ihr einziger Zweck ist deren Mittheilung." The contemplation of the world is facilitated and purified when we behold the world not under the compulsion of practical interests but when we contemplate the world *im Bilde*. It is then that our attitude is purely disinterested, released from the dominance of the will. To see the world *im Bilde* is to see the world as the product of genius, is to see the world objectively, deeply and clearly. Not life itself is beautiful, but the image of life. Or as Goethe puts it: "Was im Leben uns verdriesst, man im Bilde gern genießt" (p. 299). The beauty of the image-world vanishes as soon as it ceases to appear—*scheinen*—as soon as it ceases to be an object of contemplation and becomes an object of will and desire, as happens with objects in the true world.

The objective, will-less contemplation of the world is the function, prerogative and attribute of genius. That the intellect should emancipate itself from its servitude to the will is far more wonderful than that Will—the ruler of the world—should impel some individuals to deeds demanding extraordinary firmness and energy. According to their very natures genius and will are incompatible. As the hero is not always heroic, so the genius is not always genius. He, too, is susceptible to passion and desire until the blessed moment comes when he cleaves from the servitude to the will and is filled with the contemplation of Ideas. That is the moment of Inspiration. The genius is a man precisely like other men, but he is an inspired man. . . . "ihr Intellect verhält sich zu dem der gewöhnlichen Leute, wie das Sonnenlicht zur Laterne, während sie unter dem Drucke der Welt und in dem trüben Dunst ihrer Atmosphäre zu leben gezwungen sind: daher werden diese grossen Geister von dem Doppelgefühl einer unbezwinglichen Schwermuth und einer überirdischen Heiterkeit, die uns von ihrer hohen Stirn, aus ihrem klaren schauenden Blicke entgegenleuchtet, beherrscht werden. Was Giordano Bruno von der eigenen Gemüthsstimmung gesagt hat, gilt von dem Genie überhaupt: 'in tristitia hilaris, in hilaritate tristis'" (p. 301).

Genius requires concentration and clarity but it is a concentration upon the Ideas. Hence common people are more practical but the genius is wiser. "Die gewöhnlichen Menschen sind weit brauchbarer als die Genies: sie verhalten sich zu diesen, wie die Bausteine zu den Diamanten." Genius is intellect; the common people—will. Childhood is like genius, that is, childhood before the emergence of sex. The child looks with wonder and astonishment at the strange world before him. All things are new to him. His eyes are hungry and cannot be satisfied. He finds infinite pleasure in his picture book, precious delight in the tales he listens to. Pictures, stories, images—these are his joy before he becomes the slave of will, before the appearance of sex. In childhood the world appears as fresh with morning dew, as clothed with the magic of dawn. Every normal child is in a sense a genius and every genius is, and remains, in a sense, a child.

18. Plotinus, VI, 7.22: "Beauty is that which irradiates symmetry rather than symmetry itself and is that which truly calls out love."

19. Bacon in the essay on *Beauty*: "I think a painter may make a better face than ever was; but he must do it by a kind of felicity (as a musician that maketh an excellent air in music) and not by rule."

20. From the lecture "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (p. 25).

21. Epistle XI, 7. Dante says a poem may have four ascending meanings: literal, allegorical, moral, anagogic. It is thus "polysemous."

22. *Son of Apollo*, pp. 177-78.

23. The sublime enters into tragedy when we are lifted above ourselves and our strife with Nature. Sublimity is intensified and accentuated Beauty. In sublimity the intellect is *violently* cleaved from the will and the peace of resignation is achieved.

24. Page 271, Modern Library edition (Fadiman translation). 25. Page 271. 26. Page 167. 27. I think by Grosse or by Hirn. 28. *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*. 29. *Fall of Hyperion*, 1, 199-202. 30. Letter 29, Nov. 22, 1817. 31. *Reason in Art*, p. 39. 32. From Shelley's *Adonais*.

33. In his *Schopenhauer's Aesthetik und ihr Verhältnis zu dem Aesthetischen Lehren Kant's und Schelling's*, Eduard von Mayer sees in Schopenhauer's aesthetic a key to Schopenhauer himself and in his personality a key to his aesthetic. Schopenhauer's aesthetic—he is inclined to think—helps to resolve the apparent contradictions in his philosophy. It grew out of the soil of personal experience. Genius, or as he called it in the notes made in his Dresden years *das bessere Bewusstsein*, was, with him, an intimate experience. As his poems show, he was obsessed with a passionate, never-satiated will, but he discovered in himself imagination and intellect. He saw them in conflict—in a conflict which ceased when his intellect steeped itself in the beauty of nature and art. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* is a confession. Schopenhauer saw himself agonized by his will, liberated and calmed by his intellect. Genius meant the ability to disentangle oneself from the net of will, to emancipate oneself from the thrall-dom of desire, and to become pure contemplating intellect. Genius represents flight from the world, flight into a *bessere Bewusstsein*, flight to the realm of pure knowledge. True, this pure knowledge becomes a beholding of the Will in adequate objectivity, that is to say, it becomes a contemplation of the Ideas,—but that is of secondary importance. From the viewpoint of epistemology and the justification of art it is important; from the viewpoint of the blessedness of aesthetic contemplation and of the ethical-ascetical ideals, it is of lesser significance. And aesthetic blessedness is, after all, *nur Symptom der Befreiung des Intellekts vom Willen*.

In consequence, Mayer maintains, it is clear that Schopenhauer's aesthetic emphasizes the subjective aspect of the beautiful. The cognition and contemplation of Ideas do not entail a positive enrichment of knowledge, but only a more intensive, a more lucid, an intuitive beholding of the character of the world. "Am Herzen aber liegt ihm nur das reine Erkennen, die Genialität, die Zurückdrängung des Willens, die Emanzipation von der Individualität" (p. 48). Essentially Schopenhauer was concerned with genius, that is, with the suppression of Will, with the emancipation of individuality. The contemplation of Ideas hence is not important because it is instrumental in providing the human consciousness with a new content. It is significant in so far as it betokens the liberation of the Intellect from the service of the Will. The positive aspect of aesthetic is transformed into a negative accusation of the Will. Cognition of the Idea and pure

subject of cognition, that is genius—the two elements of Schopenhauer's aesthetic—are embodiments of his pessimism. Both belong to the *bessere Bewusstsein*. Immanent in the concept of genius there is, for Schopenhauer, a profound ascetic-pessimistic significance. Despite his glorification of art, or, perhaps by virtue of this glorification, Schopenhauer's aesthetic flows from, and is in consonance with, the *Grundton* of his metaphysical pessimism. Schopenhauer's aesthetic is not a glad intermezzo but an indispensable link in his whole system, a prelude to his final ascetic pronouncements. His joy in the beautiful is a concealed condemnation of that world which is the revelation of Will. The beautiful is beautiful because it betokens the dissolution of the ties that fetter the Will to the land of Maya.

34. The whole universe is a vain or deceptive shadow (Epistle LXXXVIII, 46). 35. Quoted in T. V. Smith's *The Democratic Way of Life*. 36. The expression is Professor Sidney Hook's in *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, p. 101. 37. *The Contemporary and His Soul*, p. 191.

38. That is, Schopenhauer speaks of the ludicrous but not of humor. On p. 77 of Vol. I, he explains laughter as resulting from the incongruity between sensuous and abstract knowledge, between an object and the concept thereof. In Vol. II, he has a chapter on the ludicrous. It is only in Vol. III that he briefly and incidentally mentions comedy. He says that tragedy represents a turning to resignation, "to the denial of the will to live" and comedy represents the "incitement to the continued assertion of the will" (p. 218). Nowhere, in *The World as Will and Idea* does he deal adequately with the concept of humor.

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THE following bibliography consists of two parts: a) works by Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer that contain their aesthetic theories or shed some light upon them, and books *on* Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; b) works directly concerned with aesthetic and its various problems, and some books that help to clarify the relationship between art and beauty, and other aspects of culture and forms of experience. This bibliography is brief and selected, and does not pretend or aim to be exhaustive. Many titles, as well as the names of a number of books indicated or mentioned in the notes, have, of necessity, been omitted.

The date given with each book refers, in general, to the edition consulted by the author.

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